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l)THE DYNAMICS OF FORMAL ORGANIZATION
ESSAYS ON BUREAUCRACY AND FORMAL RULES
Theories of bureaucracy in organization studies constitute a perspective in which formal
or written rules are seen as fundamental to the understanding of organization. It is argued,
for example, that formal rules facilitate organizational decision-making, establish the basis
for coordination and control, and help to increase an organization’s legitimacy within the
broader institutional environment. Like other elements of organizations, rules also change
over time with potential consequences for decision-making, coordination, and legitimacy.
This dissertation takes up questions about the causes of continuity and change of formal
organizational rules, as well as of bureaucratic organizational forms more broadly. The
first conceptual essay (Chapter 2) starts with the observation that bureau cracy is a remark -
ably persistent organizational form and suggests that the reproduction or transformation
of this form and its prevalence in various organizational fields depends on the agency and
interaction of different expert groups. In Chapter 3, we present a conceptual account of
the dynamic process of codification and enforcement of formal rules and its influence on
the preservation and retrieval of organizational memory via these rules. In Chapter 4, we
offer a conceptual account of how the process of using existing formal rules to deal with
new organizational problems can ultimately lead to change in such rules. Finally, Chapter 5
reports the results of a longitudinal empirical study of rule changes in UNESCO’s World
Heritage Program. We find that that rule makers’ cultural heterogeneity tends to delay
rule changes, while rule makers’ normative power tends to accelerate them.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: A dynamic perspective on 
bureaucracy 
 
1.1 Research topic 
We commonly associate the concept of organization with the presence of some kind of 
formal structure, which is a “blueprint for activities”, specifying “offices, departments, 
positions”, and various kinds of rules (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 341; Zhou, 1993). 
Explaining why such formal organizational structures exist in the first place, how they 
develop and change, and what consequences they can have for people, organizations, and 
the larger society, has long been one of the central concerns of organization theory (e.g., 
March & Simon, 1958; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Perrow, 1991; Pugh et al., 1968). In this 
regard, Max Weber’s classic analysis of bureaucracy is especially influential (Heugens, 
2005). Weber’s recognition of the importance of the formal side of organization is 
reflected in his definition of bureaucracy, which emphasized “official jurisdictional areas”, 
“official duties”, principles that “stipulate a clearly established system of super- and sub-
ordination”, and the presence of “general rules” (Weber, 1978: 956-957, emphasis added). 
Clearly, Weber is describing an organizational structure that is formal in the sense of being 
explicitly stated, prescriptive, and analytically separate from the actual work activity 
(McPhee, 1985: 150). 
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In his work, Weber not only analyzed the socio-historical conditions that 
contributed to the emergence of formal-bureaucratic organizations, but also argued that 
bureaucratic structures enabled the achievement of important administrative goals, such as 
precision, speed, continuity, control, and cost reduction, which made bureaucracies 
“superior” to all other forms of organized action (Weber, 1978: 973). More ominously, he 
characterized bureaucracy as “a power instrument of the first order for the one who 
controls [it]”, adding that “[w]here administration has been completely bureaucratized, the 
resulting system of domination is practically indestructible” (Weber, 1978: 987). Many 
subsequent discussions of bureaucracy by organization and management theorists similarly 
viewed bureaucracy as a potentially effective mechanism of organizational control (e.g., 
Child, 1972a; Ouchi, 1980; Walton, 2005). For instance, it was suggested that formal 
bureaucratic rules could provide a substitute for control through direct supervision 
(Rothschild-Whitt, 1979: 513; see also Blau, 1970; Gouldner, 1954), due to people’s belief 
that such rules were part of a legitimate rational-legal order that demanded compliance 
(Tyler & Blader, 2005; Weber, 1978).  
Weber’s claims about technical superiority of bureaucracy have inspired research 
linking formal structure to coordination and efficiency (e.g., Blau & Scott, 2003; Hage, 
1965), explorations of bureaucracy’s ‘dysfunctions’ and ‘pathologies’ (e.g., Crozier, 1964; 
Gouldner, 1954; Merton, 1940), and predictions of its imminent demise and replacement 
by new ‘post-bureaucratic’ organizational forms (e.g., Child & McGrath, 2001; Heckscher 
& Donnellon, 1994; Kanter, 1989: 351). Simultaneously, Weber’s model of bureaucratic 
structure has been refined, challenged and defended empirically (e.g., Pugh et al., 1968; 
Child, 1972a; Grinyer & Yasai-Ardekani, 1980; Walton, 2005), and bureaucracy’s 
relationship to other variables, such as environmental uncertainty, organizational size, 
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strategy, performance and innovation has been scrutinized (e.g., Burns & Stalker, 1961; 
Grinyer & Yasai-Ardekani, 1981; Thompson, 1965). 
A more dynamic perspective on bureaucracy has also been developed, focusing 
on how bureaucratic structures evolve over time as an organization grows and matures. 
Blau (1970), for example, proposed a formal theory of the effect of expanding 
organizational size on various types of differentiation inside bureureaucracies, and these 
insights were further elaborated and synthesized in subsequent research (e.g., Astley, 
1985). Walsh and Dewar (1987) considered bureaucratic formalization from the 
perspective of organizational lifecycle theory, arguing that increases in formalization are 
likely to be driven by efficiency considerations in the early stages of the lifecycle and by 
political considertaions in the later stages. 
This dissertation revisits this dynamic perspective on bureaucracy, taking up its 
focus on the continuity and change of both individual bureaucracies, as well as 
bureaucratic organizational forms more broadly. However, each of the four main essays 
that comprise this dissertation will address the dynamics of bureaucracy in very different 
ways. Chapter 2 starts with the common-place observation that bureaucracy is a 
remarkably enduring or persistent organizational form (e.g., Adler, 2010; Walton, 2005), 
and examines the role of expert actors’ in the continued adoption and maintenance of 
bureaucratic characteristics by organizations in industrialized societies. It suggests that the 
reproduction or transformation of the bureaucratic organizational form and its levels of 
prevalence in different fields depends on the agency and interaction of different expert 
groups. In Chapter 3, we explore the link between organizational memory, which enables 
information to be preserved by organizations for long periods of time (Walsh & Ungson, 
1991), and formalization, which is arguably the central dimension of bureaucracy (e.g., 
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Adler & Borys, 1996). We re-conceptualize formalization as a dynamic process and show 
how this process influences the preservation and retrieval of organizational memory. 
The last two major chapters contribute to the emerging literature on bureaucratic 
rule change and its antecedents (e.g., Beck & Kieser, 2003; March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000). 
In Chapter 4, we examine how the process of using formal rules to deal with new 
organizational problems can contribute not only to the stability (Schulz, 1998a), but also to 
change of those rules. Complementing the view of rules as codifications of lessons from 
prior organizational learning (Levitt and March, 1988), our analysis of this process 
highlights the ability of such rules to serve as the basis for subsequent learning in their own 
right, with potentially destabilizing effects on the rule system. Finally, Chapter 5 reports 
the results of a longitudinal empirical study of rule changes in UNESCO’s World Heritage 
Program. The study lends support to the view that political processes and organizational 
growth are relatively independent drivers of bureaucratic change (e.g., Blau, 1970; Child, 
1972b). 
1.2 Relevance 
Why are bureaucracy and its dynamics still a relevant topic after almost a century of 
organizational research? Certainly, the organizational characteristics associated with 
bureaucracy, such as specialization, hierarchy, and especially formalization, remain 
ubiquitous in contemporary industrialized societies. For example, research by Baron, 
Burton, and Hannan (1999) shows that some of these characteristics were even present in a 
subset of Silicon Valley high-technology firms. Qualitative research has documented traces 
of bureaucracy in diverse organizational settings, such as a software development firm 
(Adler, 2005), a large consulting firm (Kärreman & Alvesson, 2004), and a research-
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intensive pharmaceutical corporation (Kärreman, Sveningsson, & Alvesson, 2002).  In 
their study of a German bank, Beck and Kieser (2003) identified 246 distinct personnel 
rules and found that these were changed some 655 times in the course of just eighteen 
years, which indicates that adjustment of bureaucratic structure is by no means a trivial 
task for some business organizations. Special issues in Organization (2004) and 
Organization Studies (2005) on bureaucracy and Max Weber, respectively, as well as the 
edited volume on bureaucracy by Du Gay (2005), indicate continued interest in the concept 
bureaucracy by students of management and organization. 
Much of the discussion in this dissertation will be concerned with the dynamics of 
formal, written rules. The relevance of this research topic for management and policy can 
be better appreciated by considering how both the presence of such rules, as well as their 
dynamics are consequential for the achievement of organizational goals. The literature on 
the role of formal rules within organizations and in inter-organizational relationships has 
been reviewed elsewhere (e.g., March, Schulz, and Zhou, 2000; Vlaar, Van Den Bosch, & 
Volberda, 2007), so the main points will be summarized only briefly here based on these 
reviews. As has already been mentioned, formal rules, when combined with other elements 
of bureaucracy, constitute a potent means of controlling behavior in organizations, so that 
this behavior is channeled towards certain goals (e.g., Cardinal, 2001; Walton, 2005). In 
the face of conflicting interests, rules represent mutually agreed-on or imposed constraints 
that set the boundaries within which actors can pursue their interests without 
compromising the achievement of organizational goals (e.g., March, et al., 2000: 12-13; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
Further, rules can be an efficient means of achieving coordinated action among 
specialized actors in complex organizations (Galbraith 1977; March & Simon, 1958), 
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which is again required for realizing organizational goals. Rules preserve information 
(Levitt & March, 1988; Chapter 3 of this dissertation) and facilitate organizational learning 
and decision making under conditions of bounded rationality (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Heugens, 2005; March & Simon, 1958). Last, but not least, the presence of rules has 
become widely taken for granted as a characteristic of rational organization in modern 
societies, while adoption of specific rules can enable the organization to signal compliance 
with the demands of internal and external constituencies (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In both 
cases, rules increase the social legitimacy of the organization and its activities. 
Of course, these points about the relevance of formal rules for organizations 
require some qualification. First, notwithstanding their causal contribution towards the 
achievement of some organizational goals in the abovementioned ways, formal rules can 
also undermine the achievement of other goals due to their additional (‘dysfunctional’) 
effects (Merton, 1940; Vlaar et al., 2007). Most notably, it has often been suggested that 
rules, especially when combined with other characteristics of bureaucracy, tend to inhibit 
innovation and flexible response (e.g., Burns & Stalker, 1961; Dougherty & Corse, 1995; 
Merton, 1940; Thompson, 1965). However, some authors have also disputed this strong 
claim (Adler & Borys, 1996; Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; Briscoe, 2007). Indeed, 
there appears to be no significant negative effect of formalization on innovation across 
studies (Damanpour, 1991), and some more recent studies actually find a positive effect on 
certain kinds of innovation (e.g., Cardinal, 2001; Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 
2006). Nevertheless, the broader point about potential dysfunctional effects of rules 
remains a valid one (Vlaar et al., 2007). 
Second, it is worth emphasizing that adoption of formal rules is not a necessary 
condition for achieving coordination, control, legitimacy, learning, etc. The literature on 
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organizational control, for example, has identified multiple mechanisms of control, some 
of which can substitute for formal rules (e.g., Lange, 2008). An influential research stream 
suggests that the relationship between the presence of formal rules and the organization’s 
ability to achieve its goals with minimum costs is contingent on other characteristics of the 
organization, such as size and strategy, as well as on the organization’s environment (e.g., 
Donaldson, 2001). Given this contingency argument, it is conceivable that the macro-
societal and technological developments in industrialized societies might lead to 
conditions, where achievement of organizational goals becomes less dependent on formal 
rules in the majority of cases (cf. Child & McGrath, 2001). This can happen, for example, 
because coordination, control and decision making can be better supported by “functional 
alternatives” (Kallinikos & Hasselbladh, 2009: 264), such as sophisticated information and 
communication technologies (Dewett & Jones, 2001: 328-329). However, it should be 
pointed out that displacement of some rules by information technologies need not entail a 
net reduction in the total number of rules, since the very adoption of such technologies can 
stimulate the creation of new rules to regulate their use and future replacement (Huber, 
1990: 62). Indeed, some empirical studies report a positive association between 
computerization and formalization (Dean, Yoon, & Susman, 1992; Zeffane, 1989). 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the points concerning the relevance of 
formal rules still have some force. When combined with certain plausible ideas about rule 
obsolescence, these points also entail the conclusion about the relevance of rule dynamics. 
Rules encode specific content; they stipulate the types of actions that are permitted, 
obligatory or prohibited in certain types of situations. This content contributes to the 
establishment and maintenance of certain patterns of activity (Reynaud, 2005), which can 
be more or less appropriate for achieving the organization’s goals in a given environment 
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(cf. Desai, 2010). However, environmental changes can render existing patterns of 
organizational activity inappropriate and the associated rules obsolete (Jackson & Adams, 
1979; Desai, 2010; Schulz, 1998b, 2003). Because adherence to obsolete rules can actually 
hinder the achievement of organizational goals, such obsolescence constitutes a serious 
practical challenge for managers and administrators. The adverse effects of rule 
obsolescence on organizations can be minimized through rule change involving repair or   
   – in some cases – elimination of obsolete rules (Schulz, 2003). It follows that the topic 
of rule change, and rule dynamics more broadly, has considerable practical relevance. 
The issue of rule obsolescence is addressed most directly in chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. This chapter highlights the role of reflexivity in enabling organizational 
members to come to a shared understanding that a particular rule has become obsolete. It 
shows how such reflexivity can develop via the process of ‘problem absorption’ or 
application of existing rules to new problems (see also Schulz, 1998a). In some respects, 
rule obsolescence is an instance of a broader phenomenon of obsolescence of 
organizational memory, which has inspired discussions of the importance of organizational 
unlearning (Hedberg, 1981; Tsang & Zahra, 2008) or forgetting (De Holan & Phillips, 
2004) in the literature. The link between rules and memory is explored in chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. Finally, it should be emphasized that obsolescence of rules is certainly not the 
only reason why rules are changed. Stability or change in rules will often depend on the 
interests of organizational rule makers and their ability to exercise sufficient power in 
pursuit of these interests. In short, rule dynamics are shaped by organizational politics 
(March et al., 2000). The fifth and final chapter provides an empirical assessment of the 
role of organizational politics in rule change, as well as a discussion of what the findings 
imply for the organizational problem of coping with rule obsolescence. 
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1.3 Aims and scope 
The broad aim of this dissertation is to advance our understanding of the dynamics of 
bureaucracy, and of formal organizational rule systems in particular. The focus on written 
rules is warranted because the latter can be regarded as the core characteristic of 
bureaucracy (Mansfield, 1973; Weber, 1978). However, it also means that other important 
lines of enquiry into bureaucratic dynamics will not be pursued here. For example, none of 
the chapters will touch upon the process of vertical and horizontal differentiation (Blau, 
1970), the dynamics of bureaucratic centralization (Prechel, 1994), or the interrelationships 
between these characteristics of bureaucratic structure (Astley, 1985; Walton, 2005). From 
a holistic perspective, which assumes that “parts of a social entity […] cannot be 
understood in isolation” (Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993: 1178), these omissions are 
problematic. However, there is a body of work that takes a similar approach in using the 
concepts of bureaucracy and formal rules more or less interchangeably (e.g., Adler & 
Borys, 1996; Briscoe, 2007; Schulz, 1998a; Zhou, 1993). 
The scope of this dissertation will also be for the most part restricted to the 
antecedents of the dynamics of bureaucracy/rules, as opposed to its outcomes. Admittedly, 
this topic is already fairly well-researched. For instance, we know that organizational 
growth, increasing complexity and aging are associated with increased bureaucratization 
(Astley, 1985; Beck, 2006; Walsh & Dewar, 1987). We know that institutional forces fuel 
the adoption of new bureaucratic rules and/or bureaucratic reforms by organizations 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Edelman, 1990; Heugens & Lander, 2009; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). We also know that the extent of bureaucratization at a 
given point in time affects the rate of bureaucratization at a later point in time (Schulz, 
1998a), and that the number of changes up to a given point in time affects the probability 
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of further change, though the direction of the latter effect is debated (Beck, Brüderl, & 
Woywode, 2008). We know that rule dynamics are driven by increased uncertainty 
(Leblebici & Salancik, 1982), organizational problems, possibly stemming from rule 
obsolescence, and allocation of organizational attention to problems and sets of rules 
(March et al., 2000; Schulz, 1998a; Sullivan, 2010). 
However, despite this progress, significant gaps in our understanding of 
bureaucratic/rule dynamics and its antecedents still remain, which we identify and attempt 
to fill in this dissertation. One such gap has to do with the treatment of the role of actors in 
existing research. No one would deny that rule adoption or change would be impossible 
without human effort. Yet, many studies of these dynamics still present a somewhat 
passive view of actors, in the sense that actors are implicitly assumed to adjust bureaucratic 
structure merely in response to various organizational and environmental conditions like 
changing organizational size, environmental uncertainty, rule obsolescence, falling 
performance, institutional demands, and so on. Non-adjustment of bureaucratic structure is 
attributed to various constraints on actors, including scarcity of attention (Ocasio, 1997; 
Sullivan, 2010), structural inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), path dependence (Zhou, 
1993; see also Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009), and institutionalization (Schulz, 2003), 
which again gives the impression passivity on the part of actors in mediating the effects of 
these constraints. 
Several chapters of this dissertation take issue with this implicit portrayal of 
actors. Our preferred theoretical strategy, which is inspired by the structure and agency 
debate in organizational institutionalism (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Heugens & Lander, 2009), 
is to shift the focus of explanation away from the environmental and organizational 
conditions and constraints that are assumed to be straightforwardly mediated by actors’ 
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responses, and towards the mediation process itself. We focus on the more ‘active’ 
explanatory role of actors by highlighting the causal relevance of their interests and 
strategic activities (Chapters 2), reflexivity (Chapter 4) and ability to exercise power in 
pursuit of conflicting interests (Chapter 5)1
Another contribution of this dissertation is to further develop certain existing 
concepts, as well as introduce some new ones, and to argue for the usefulness of these 
concepts in thinking about bureaucracy and rules. Chapter 2 develops the concept of 
persistence of organizational forms – bureaucratic forms, in particular – by distinguishing 
between three persistence paths. Chapter 3 develops the concept of the memory function of 
formalization, suggesting ways to explain variation in the strength of this function. Chapter 
4 draws on Schulz’s (1998a) idea that rules can absorb problems and provides an extensive 
analysis of the ‘problem absorption’ process and its consequences. 
. Chapter 3 integrates ideas from a variety of 
literatures to reveal “what organizational members actually do” (Orlikowski & Yates, 
2002: 686) in the process of formalizing lessons of organizational experience into rules and 
implementing these rules. We argue that the component activities of this process make a 
difference to the ability of rules to preserve information. The empirical findings reported in 
chapter 5 indicate that variation in the overall power position of actors represented on the 
rulemaking body affects the rate of rule change. More broadly, the results highlight the 
political dimension of bureaucracy and formalization, which deserves research attention. 
                                                            
1 Of course, this dissertation addresses only a very small subset of the characteristics of individuals involved in 
the creation and application of rules that could play a role in shaping bureaucracy. Other potentially relevant 
characteristics like uncertainty avoidance, level of experience, or status are left out of the analyses. Our choice of 
factors to focus on was guided by the specific theoretical perspectives that we sought to build on. Future research 
on rules should strive to address the characteristics of actors more systematically than we do here. 
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A third notable feature of this dissertation is our attempt to engage with a wide 
variety of theoretical perspectives and literatures, instead of restricting the dissertation’s 
scope to a narrowly-defined research problem or theoretical tradition. Part of the reason for 
this has to do with the nature and social significance of formal rules themselves that, as 
mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, has led researchers to study rules in 
relation to diverse social phenomena like coordination, control, cognition, institutions and 
so on (cf. Vlaar et al., 2007). Each of these phenomena has in turn stimulated a distinct line 
of enquiry. This differentiation of research dealing with formal rules in one way or another 
means that researchers, for whom such rules are the focal phenomenon of interest, must 
draw on multiple research programs. While no full-fledged integration of multiple theories 
is attempted here, the dissertation does make some fruitful connections between theories.  
Chapter 2, for example, reconnects organizational institutionalism to the topic of 
bureaucracy, which figured prominently in the articles that initially set out the main ideas 
underpinning the institutional perspective (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977), but has all but disappeared as in the course of its subsequent development and 
applications (but see Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). Chapters 3 and 4 also develop further the 
connection between organizational rules and organizational learning and memory, which 
was first proposed in the work of James March and his colleagues (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Levitt & March, 1988; March et al., 2000). Chapter 4 also capitalizes on striking parallels 
between Schulz’s (1998a) ideas about problem absorption, Corley and Gioia’s (2003) 
concept of semantic learning, and some insights of the new processual perspective on 
organizations and organizational change (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002; see also Hernes & 
Maitlis, 2010). Finally, chapter 5 juxtaposes two perspectives on organizational change: 
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the technical-contingency perspective (Donaldson, 2001) and the political or upper-
echelon perspective (Child, 1972b; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). 
This variety of perspectives notwithstanding, it should be noted that all of them 
are located within the disciplinary boundaries of management research and organizational 
sociology. Important literature on bureaucracy and rules stemming from order academic 
disciplines, such as political science, law, economics, and philosophy was not used in 
developing the arguments in this dissertation. Thus, the chief assumption that characterizes 
the whole dissertation is the view of formal rules as an organizational and social 
phenomenon. The politico-legal origins, the economic rationale, and the normative 
significance of many organizational rules, although no doubt important topics, are left 
unexamined in this dissertation. 
Finally, the scope of this dissertation is intentionally limited to formal or written 
rules. This is again in line with previous research on bureaucratic dynamics (March et al., 
2000) and with Weber’s (1978: 219) emphasis on “rules [that] are formulated and recorded 
in writing”. Still, it must be acknowledged that informal (i.e. unwritten) rules may well be 
at least as important for the achievement of organizational goals as formal ones, and may 
sometimes even substitute the latter. Such rules arguably constitute an important aspect of 
organizational culture (Schall, 1983), as well as the broader socio-institutional 
environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Recognized (but unwritten) precedents that have 
been set by past organizational decisions (cf. Boje, 1991; Cyert and March, 1963) are also 
an example of informal rules. The same formal rules can lead to quite different patterns of 
behavior, depending on which informal rules are present (Reynaud, 2005). Conversely, the 
content of informal rules and actors’ willingness to comply with them may depend on the 
formal rules that are in force. 
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1.4 Structure of the dissertation 
The four major chapters take rather different approaches to the topic of bureaucratic 
dynamics and can be read independently. The commonalities between the chapters are 
limited to the overlap in the literature that is cited and, as already mentioned, to the fact 
that all of the chapters (with the possible exception of chapter 3) are concerned with the 
antecedents of bureaucratic dynamics. Emphasis on the role of actors is another common 
theme of this dissertation. The first three major chapters are conceptual, while chapter 5 
presents a longitudinal empirical study of rule dynamics at an intergovernmental 
organization (UNESCO’s World Heritage Program). Some salient features of the different 
chapters have already been highlighted. Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile to say a few 
more words about the chapters, specifically regarding the differences in the levels of 
analysis and in the focal antecedents of bureaucratic dynamics. Table 1.1 provides an 
overview of the chapters, pulling together some of the points that have already been made 
in other sections of this introduction. 
Chapter 2 differs from all the other chapters in that it focuses on the fate of the 
bureaucratic organizational form that can be instantiated by multiple organizations at the 
macro-societal level, rather than focusing on bureaucratic dynamics at the level of a single 
organization. Following the institutional view that societies comprise multiple 
organizational fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), it suggests that the fate of bureaucracy 
can differ across these fields. The central claim of the chapter, however, is that 
bureaucracy persists (i.e. remains prevalent) as an organizational form in many of these 
fields, and hence in society at large. However, simultaneously with persistence, 
bureaucratic form can also undergo some degree of transformation, giving rise to distinct 
‘persistence paths’. The failure of many fields to de-bureaucratize (i.e. bureaucratic 
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persistence) together with some changes to the form itself that enable it to persist (i.e. 
persistence paths) are the two focal dynamics that this chapter is concerned with. It traces 
the antecedents of these dynamics to the institutional embeddedness and political 
interactions of various professional/expert groups in late industrial societies. 
In the other three chapters, the level of analysis is a single organization. Chapters 
3 and 4 are concerned with what happens inside an organization that exhibits some 
characteristics of bureaucracy, such as formal rules and hierarchy. The focal dynamic in 
Chapter 3 is the entire process of formalization, which includes both the establishment and 
modification of an organizational rule system through codification, as well as the 
enforcement process aimed at connecting rules to action. Unlike the other chapters, which 
address the antecedents of this dynamic process, this chapter focuses on its consequences 
for organizational memory. 
Chapter 4 continues with the theme of rule use that is already highlighted in 
chapter 3. Following Tsoukas and Chia (2002), we argue in chapter 4 that the use of formal 
rules generates an important dynamic, namely modifications of the categories of those 
rules. We identify problem absorption (Schulz, 1998a) as the chief source of such 
modifications. In contrast to earlier literature, which argues that problem absorption 
contributes to the stability of formal rules, we argue that because of its effect on the 
categories, it can also lead to changes in the actual text of formal rules under certain 
conditions. Thus the chapter also addresses another dynamic, namely formal rule change 
(revision or suspension). Connections with the concept of organizational learning are also 
made in this chapter. 
Finally, Chapter 5 again looks at formal rule change as the focal dynamic, 
examining how is affected by various antecedents (cf. Beck & Kieser, 2003). The 
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antecedents addressed in this chapter include different aspects of organizational growth, as 
well as characteristics of the rule-making body. The empirical context for this chapter is 
UNESCO’s Heritage Program. We collected archival data on the evolution of a specific 
rule book, namely the Operational Guidelines for the implementation of the World 
Heritage Convention, between 1977 and 2004. We distinguish between two theoretical 
perspectives on organizational change, namely the technical and the political perspective, 
and derive some hypotheses about the antecedents of rule change on the basis of these 
perspectives. These hypotheses are then tested by applying the statistical techniques of 
event history analysis to the UNESCO data. 
In sum, this dissertation analyses several kinds of bureaucratic dynamics and 
develops some explanations of these dynamics. Two of these explanations are tested 
empirically. The dissertation contributes to understanding how and why bureaucracies 
change over time. 
 
Table 1.1: Dissertation overview 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Focal 
dynamic 
Persistence of 
bureaucracy, change 
to bureaucratic form 
The process of 
formalization 
Rule change 
(revision and 
suspension) 
Rule change 
(revision and 
suspension) 
Level of 
analysis  
Macro-societal, 
organizational field 
Intra-organizational Intra-organizational Organizational/intra
-organizational 
Main 
antecedents 
Activities of expert 
groups, interactions 
Experience, 
problems 
Problem absorption Organizational 
growth, rule 
makers’ power 
Treatment of 
actors 
Focus on interests, 
embedded agency 
Focus on activities Focus on 
reflexivity, learning 
Focus on power, 
politics 
Theoretical 
perspectives 
Institutional theory Organizational 
learning theory 
Process perspective, 
organizational 
learning theory 
Structural 
contingency theory, 
political perspective 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
BUREAUCRATIC PERSISTENCE PATHS: The role 
of embedded agency 
 
In the context of today’s post-industrial economy, bureaucracy is widely condemned as 
obsolete, while radically different post-bureaucratic forms have long been expected to 
replace it. Yet many organizations today continue to be governed by bureaucratic 
principles. Building on the recent neo-institutional work on embedded agency, while also 
moving beyond the more deterministic versions of legitimacy-based explanations of 
institutional persistence, we outline an actor-centered perspective for explaining the 
different ways in which bureaucracy persists. 
2.1 Introduction 
Bureaucracy is a widely maligned organizational form, accused of inculcating its members 
with trained incapacities (Merton, 1940), of stifling their entrepreneurial spirit (Sørensen, 
2007), and of ‘whittling away’ many functions traditionally performed by other institutions 
(Perrow, 1991: 375). Recent social, economic, and technological developments associated 
with the advent of the post-industrial era of networked societies (Castells, 1996) are 
therefore often interpreted as entailing bureaucracy’s inevitable demise and replacement by 
qualitatively different forms of organization (e.g., Child & McGrath, 2001; DiMaggio, 
2001; Heydebrand, 1989; Kallinikos, 2006). Yet, “the extent to which bureaucracy has in 
fact become less prevalent remains a very open question” (Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005: 
516; see also Adler, 2010; Du Gay, 2005; Hales, 2002; Olsen, 2008). Meta-analytic 
evidence shows that the association between the various features of bureaucracy has 
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remained strong and consistent over time (Walton, 2005: 586), and some observers discern 
the covert perpetuation of bureaucratic organizational principles in ostensibly post-
bureaucratic organizational contexts (Courpasson & Clegg, 2006). 
Even though extant work in organizational sociology and management theory 
contains important insights on how organizational forms in general, and bureaucratic forms 
in particular, are able to persist in the face of potential alternatives (e.g. Carroll & 
Harrison, 1994; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Stinchcombe, 1965), bureaucratic persistence 
remains a weakly understood phenomenon. In fact, the most influential explanations of 
bureaucratization and form persistence that can be extracted from the literature appeal 
primarily to impersonal macro-level social forces and processes, such as rationalization 
(Meyer, 1987; Weber, 1978), institutionalization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), isomorphism 
through coercive, mimetic and normative pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), path-
dependent evolution (Carroll & Harrison, 1994), and imbalances in the historically 
constituted competitive structure (Stinchcombe, 1965). These ‘social forces’ explanations 
either leave out altogether or treat as epiphenomenal the role of actors who establish, 
manage, work in, benefit from, advise, monitor, or regulate today’s organizations. More 
precisely, they neglect the institutional work activities that may be necessary to maintain, 
change, or do away with bureaucracy (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
The mechanistic accounts of the institutional reproduction of bureaucracy point to 
a more general gap in institutional theorizing. Paradoxically, even though persistence is 
undoubtedly a fundamental issue in institutional theory (e.g. Zucker, 1977), institutional 
scholars have recently tended to “accord little attention to the issue of institutional 
persistence” and the role of power and agency in it (Scott, 2001: 110, but see Lawrence, 
Winn, & Jennings, 2001), preferring instead to focus more on the problem of institutional 
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change (e.g. Seo & Creed, 2002). The purpose of this chapter is therefore to revisit the 
issue of bureaucratization and bureaucratic persistence in light of more recent 
developments in (neo) institutional theorizing (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 2001; Seo & 
Creed, 2002), which take the notion of embedded agency seriously. Moving beyond 
deterministic explanations and grand narratives about historical trends in society (e.g. 
modernity vs. post-modernity), we outline a more middle range (Merton, 1968) and actor-
centered approach, where bureaucratic persistence at organizational field level is seen as a 
contingent outcome of skillful political interaction among structurally positioned actors 
within the field (Fligstein, 2001).  
The chapter’s core thesis is that several distinct classes of professional agents 
have their interests based in and shaped by bureaucracies, which can induce them to 
contribute to the perpetuation of this organizational form. But although in many cases the 
‘upholders’ of bureaucratic organizational principles are powerful and privileged actors, 
they only succeed at preserving the bureaucratic form as it once was in a limited subset of 
cases. More frequently, these actors are forced by the larger macrosocial environment in 
which they are embedded to give continuity to the bureaucratic form by infusing it with 
non-bureaucratic elements, or by transposing it to previously non-bureaucratic contexts 
(Sewell, 1992). Bureaucratic persistence is thus conceptualized as a transformative process 
involving multiple persistence paths, rather than a static and unitary phenomenon. 
The actor-centered take on bureaucratic persistence yields two contributions. To 
extant research on bureaucracy and bureaucratization (e.g., Adler & Borys, 1996; Heugens, 
2005; Meyer, 1987; Weber, 1978), it offers the insight that bureaucratic persistence is a 
multifaceted rather than a unitary process that is contingent on local interactions between 
different expert groups. If “bureaucratic forms remain central and important ways of 
20 
 
organizing” (Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005: 516), then both management researchers and 
practitioners need to be aware of the agentic mechanisms underlying this phenomenon. 
Second, we contribute to neo-institutional theory, which has strongly emphasized the role 
of social legitimacy in explaining institutional persistence (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1977), by using the case of bureaucracy to illustrate the fruitfulness of combining 
legitimacy-based and interest-based explanations of persistence (cf. Stryker, 2000). Given 
the strong focus of recent work in (neo) institutional theory on the problem of institutional 
change (e.g. Seo & Creed, 2002) and its tendency to give less attention to institutional 
persistence (Scott, 2001: 110) the case of bureaucracy may help to reawaken institutional 
scholars’ interest in the latter topic. 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, extant theoretical approaches to 
persistence of organizational forms and bureaucracy are reviewed, and definitional issues 
are addressed. This sets the stage for the analysis of bureaucratic persistence proper in the 
next section, which focuses on the role of expert groups. In the third part of the analysis we 
describe three distinct trajectories or paths of bureaucratic persistence and suggest a way to 
explain them based on the actor-centered perspective. A discussion and conclusion closes 
the chapter. 
2.2 Theoretical background 
 
2.2.1 Explanations of Bureaucratic Persistence 
Among the fundamental questions of organization theory, such as “why are there so many 
kinds of organizations?” (Hannan & Freeman, 1977: 936) or “what makes organizations so 
similar?” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 147), should be included the question “what makes 
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some kinds of organizations so enduring?” In raising this question, Stinchcombe (1965: 
168) pointed out that new organizational forms do not necessarily displace older ones, 
even when the former are have a superior capacity to generate wealth, power and 
legitimacy. He also suggested that forms could persist because of  “traditionalizing forces, 
the vesting of interests, and the working out of ideologies”, or due to imbalances in the 
“competitive structure” (1965: 169). The role of ‘traditionalizing forces’ was later taken up 
by institutional theorists and population ecologists (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991), who argued that forms that have already been adopted by large numbers of 
organizations tended to become cognitively taken-for-granted ways of organizing or 
normatively “infuse[d] with value” (Selznick, 1957: 15), which gave those forms a 
legitimacy advantage and contributed to their persistence. 
Max Weber (1978: 987) famously characterized bureaucracy as being “among the 
social structures which are hardest to destroy” and offered several arguments for this 
claim. In particular, he pointed to bureaucracy’s “technical superiority” in accomplishing 
administrative tasks (Weber, 1978: 973; see also Heugens, 2005), as well as to its role as a 
robust “system of domination” (Weber, 1978: 987). Weber further suggested that 
bureaucracy’s entanglement with other important institutions of modernity, such as 
democracy and capitalist production, meant that forced attempts to dispense with private 
and public bureaucracies would result in “chaos” (1978: 988). Finally, he emphasized the 
influence of bureaucracy on human actors, who would tend acquire the “habit of 
painstaking obedience” to bureaucratic authority and a “settled orientation […] for 
observing the accustomed rules and regulations” (1978: 988; see also Merton, 1940). 
The explanations for bureaucratic persistence offered by subsequent theorists 
largely echoed these arguments of Weber. Contingency theorists argued that for reasons of 
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technical rationality or efficiency, as an organization grows beyond a certain size, its 
structure would tend to become more bureaucratic (Astley, 1985). This suggests that the 
issue of bureaucratic persistence at least partly reduces to the issue of persistence of large 
organizations (but see Rajan & Wulf (2006) on the delayering of managerial hierarchies in 
large firms). Institutional theorists argued that bureaucracy persists as an institutionalized 
template for organizing that is reproduced through coercive, mimetic and normative forces 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In line with the institutional view, 
some scholars have even suggested that the cultural understanding of ‘rational’ 
organization as presupposing formal rule-based structures has become so strong that it is 
very difficult to conceive of other possibilities (Meyer, 1987). 
Insightful as they are, these explanations leave important gaps in our 
understanding of bureaucratic persistence. First, they fail to distinguish and account for 
multiple paths of bureaucratic persistence, such as the emergence of bureaucratic hybrids 
(Courpasson & Clegg, 2006). Because of their macro-level nature, most of these 
explanations are not very useful for explaining differences in how bureaucratic persistence 
might play out across different organizational fields. Second, institutional explanations 
tend to assume rather than account for the continued ability of bureaucratic structures to 
confer legitimacy, which is an important theoretical problem given that bureaucracy is 
widely condemned as an inefficient, outdated and even morally problematic way of 
organizing (cf. Du Gay, 2000). Third, they do not explicitly address the role of actors in 
bureaucratic persistence. Organizational actors are assumed to be a largely homogenous set 
of ‘cultural dopes’ at the mercy of impersonal institutional forces (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 
1997: 415). 
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While theories of institutional change tend to emphasize the role of skillful 
activity, agency and praxis (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 2001; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002), there still remains some disagreement 
over the extent to which the social processes underlying institutional stability and 
persistence are “relatively self-activating” (Jepperson, 1991: 145) versus actively requiring 
maintenance efforts on the part of actors (Lawrence & Suddaby 2006; Lawrence et al., 
2001; Scott, 2001; Zucker, 1988). Although we cannot address the issues raised in this 
debate here, we opt for an actor-centered approach to persistence in this chapter, while at 
the same time accommodating the ‘self-activation’ intuition by allowing for the possibility 
of persistence being partly an unintended outcome of intentional action (Giddens, 1984; 
Merton, 1936). In this, we depart to some extent from previous, more deterministic 
accounts of persistence. This does not mean that macro-environmental conditions are 
unimportant, but rather that a full explanation must embrace the dialectical interplay 
between structure and agency (Archer, 1995; Benson, 1977; Seo & Creed, 2002). 
 
2.2.2 Defining Bureaucracy and Post-bureaucracy 
Two broad conceptualizations of bureaucracy can be distinguished, which also suggest 
different ways of analyzing bureaucratic persistence. The first conceptualization favors a 
clear-cut classification of organizations as bureaucracies versus non-bureaucracies based 
on some binary criterion, such as whether human involvement in the organization is 
premised on a separation of the organizational role from the person occupying that role 
(see Kallinikos, 2004). In logical terms, this conceptualization is a ‘crisp set’ treatment of 
organizational forms (Hannan, Pólos, & Carroll, 2007). A corollary of this approach is that 
the number of bureaucracies still operating becomes a straightforward proxy for 
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bureaucratic persistence. The second conceptualization, which has been commonly used in 
empirical studies within the structural contingency theory paradigm (e.g. Hall, 1963; 
Walton, 2005), treats bureaucracy/bureaucratization as a matter of degree. In logical terms, 
this conceptualization corresponds to a ‘fuzzy set’ approach to organizational forms 
(Hannan et al., 2007). From this perspective, a decline in the number of more or less ‘pure’ 
Weberian bureaucracies, which constitute the ‘core’ of the fuzzy set, does not tell us a 
complete story about bureaucratic persistence, since there may still exist substantial 
numbers of moderately bureaucratic organizations. Bureaucratic persistence must therefore 
be a regarded as a function of both the number of organizations in a given field and their 
overall degree of bureaucratization. 
While the crisp set approach to defining bureaucracy is parsimonious and rightly 
emphasizes separation of the role from the person as the form’s essential feature 
(Kallinikos, 2004), it does not seem to allow for the blurring of distinctions among forms 
(Hannan et al., 2007: 30) or the possibility of an organization being a bureaucracy “in 
some respects but not in others” (ibid.: 33). Furthermore, as Kallinikos (2004: 31) himself 
acknowledges, his proposed binary criterion has the consequence of classifying “the 
overwhelming majority of formal organizations as bureaucratic”, including organizations 
with virtually no formalized rules and hierarchy, which many will find to be too radical a 
break with established usage of the term ‘bureaucracy’.  
To avoid these shortcomings, the ‘fuzzy set’ conceptualization is presupposed 
throughout the remainder of this chapter. Following previous literature, the bureaucratic 
form is characterized by a number of interrelated dimensions, namely formalization, 
standardization, vertical and horizontal differentiation, task specialization and 
decentralization (cf. Walton, 2005). Higher values for all these dimensions indicate higher 
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levels of bureaucratization. In practice, high levels of formalization and administrative 
intensity (a measure of hierarchy) are sufficient for an organization to be labeled as 
bureaucratic, indicating that these may be the form’s core features.  
The period of industrialization saw the founding and growth of large numbers of 
organizations with high values on the abovementioned structural features, making 
bureaucracy the dominant organizational form in a variety of organizational fields (Perrow, 
1991; Weber, 1978). More recently, academic debate focused on the emergence of 
potential alternatives to bureaucracy that were expected to play an increasingly important 
role in the post-industrial economy (e.g., Child & McGrath, 2001; DiMaggio, 2001; 
Heydebrand, 1989). These ‘new organizational forms’ (e.g., Daft & Lewin, 1993; Palmer, 
Benveniste, & Dunford, 2007) are often also termed ‘post-bureaucratic’ (e.g., Barley & 
Kunda, 2001; Heckscher & Donnellon, 1994), since they are usually assumed to exhibit 
almost none of the abovementioned bureaucratic features. 
Although “there is little agreement on the core attributes of post-bureaucratic 
organizing” (Barley & Kunda, 2001: 77), the attributes generally associated with it include 
team-based (rather than hierarchical) decision making, “general” (rather than 
“specialized”) roles, “fuzzy” (rather than “clear”) role definitions, and reliance on 
“horizontal” and “relationship-based” (rather than “hierarchical” and “rule-based”) modes 
of coordination, control and resource allocation (cf. Child & McGrath, 2001: 1136-1137). 
Organizational forms incorporating these attributes are expected to be free of the various 
bureaucratic ‘dysfunctions’ (Merton, 1940) and more suited to contemporary information-
intensive hypercompetitive environments, where flexibility, learning, innovation, and 
collaboration have become crucial (Child & McGrath, 2001). Yet, as mentioned in the 
introduction, bureaucracy appears to be a very persistent organizational form, confirming 
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Weber’s (1978: 988) early scepticism about the “idea of eliminating [private 
bureaucracies]”, which he considered “utopian”. 
 
2.2.3 Persistence at the Organizational Field Level 
Theories of bureaucratization or the rise of post-bureaucracy generally focus on macro-
historical trends in whole societies (e.g. Castells, 1996; Kallinikos, 2006; Meyer, 1987; 
Olsen, 2008; Weber, 1978), while in-depth analyses of bureaucratization of specific 
organizational fields are still comparatively rare (but see Haveman, Rao, & Paruchuri, 
2007). In this chapter, however, bureaucratic persistence is theorized at the field level of 
analysis. Naturally, the extent of bureaucracy’s persistence in society’s different 
organizational fields will partly determine the extent of its persistence in society as a 
whole, and so the analysis will have a direct bearing on the latter issue. However, 
persistence at society level is also affected by the macro dynamics of field emergence and 
decline (extinction), which are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Our analysis will be concerned both with changes to the kinds of organizational 
forms that are present in the field as well as the changes to the features of those forms 
themselves, since even highly institutionalized forms can change over time (Hsu & 
Hannan, 2005). Where the dominant organizational population(s) within a field still 
exhibit(s) most of the major bureaucratic features, we have a clear case of bureaucratic 
persistence. However, bureaucracy might also persist in niches at the periphery of the field 
alongside dominant non-bureaucratic populations (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983). Furthermore, bureaucratic organizational populations (and consequently the 
bureaucratic organizational form itself) can persist within a given field through processes 
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that tend to reduce their contrast to non-bureaucratic ones, enabling them to merge, as it 
were, into the new post-bureaucratic organizational landscape. 
2.3 Ebedded actors and bureaucratic persistence 
Recent work in neo-institutional theory sought to move away from viewing social activity 
as fully determined by institutional structures and forces and to allow the concept of 
agency, which refers to “an actor’s ability to have some effect on the social world, altering 
the rules or the distribution of resources” (Scott, 2001: 176), to play a greater explanatory 
role (e.g., Barley & Tolbert, 1997; DiMaggio, 1988; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). In doing 
so, it has been forced to grapple with the so-called ‘paradox of embedded agency’: the 
problem of reconciling the possibility of institutional change through agency with the 
central neo-institutionalist tenet that actors’ very identities, beliefs, interests and powers 
are institutionally defined and shaped (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007: 961; Holm, 1995; 
Seo & Creed, 2002). 
A variety of proposals for resolving the paradox have been put forward (for a 
review see Garud et al., 2007). For the purposes of this chapter, however, it is the concept 
of institutionally embedded agency itself that is important. According to Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006: 29), an actor’s embeddedness with respect to an institution implies that the 
actor is not “motivated to change” that institution, and not “aware of or open to 
alternatives” to that institution. Thus, institutional embeddedness clearly acts as a structural 
constraint on actors’ willingness and capacity to exercise certain kinds of agency. 
Nevertheless, institutional embeddedness as such should not be equated with structural 
constraint. Whether social structure will act as a constraining or as an enabling force on 
agency depends on the nature of the specific “agential projects” under consideration 
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(Archer, 2010: 278). Seo and Creed (2002: 241) suggest that actors’ tendency to act in 
ways that reproduce and maintain institutional structures is related to whether or not they 
benefit from these structures. The role of such “structurally reproductive” agency (Hays, 
1994: 63) should therefore be explicitly acknowledged and analyzed in our accounts of 
institutional persistence. The discussion below builds on extant efforts in this direction, 
such as Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) notion of ‘institutional maintenance work’, by 
examining the role of expert groups in the persistence and transformation of the 
bureaucratic organization form. 
 
2.3.1 Expert Groups and Bureaucracy Maintenance 
Weber (1978) argued that the historical trend towards rationalization, which has 
contributed to the emergence and ascendancy of bureaucratic organization, has also 
resulted in “the production of a new type of person: the specialist or technical expert”, who 
seeks to “master reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts” (Clegg, 
2005: 533). Trained bureaucratic officials themselves constitute just one expert group 
among others in late modernity (Reed, 1996). While prior research has recognized the role 
of the professionals and experts as institutional change agents who make possible the 
development and diffusion of new practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hwang & Powell, 
2009; Scott, 2007), the discussion in this section will explore why certain expert groups 
can also contribute to the persistence of bureaucracy. 
The focus on expert groups is not meant to suggest that other classes of social 
actors, such as consumers of organizational products, have no influence on the features of 
organizational forms and their creation, persistence or decline. However, in highly 
rationalized late modern societies the influence of these other constituencies on 
29 
 
organizations is usually mediated by expert groups (Hannan et al., 2007; Hwang & Powell, 
2009). Especially when it comes to the structural features of organizational forms, these 
are usually determined by and for the most part based on highly complex and specialized 
bodies of managerial, technological, legal, and other expertise, and only afterwards based 
on the preferences and beliefs of non-expert constituencies. Furthermore, the preferences 
and beliefs of the latter are themselves culturally and institutionally shaped by expert 
discourses about appropriate ways of structuring organizations. 
Following Reed (1996), three broad classes of expert actors in late modern 
societies can be identified: the liberal/independent professions (doctors, lawyers, architects 
and accountants), the organizational professions (including officials employed by the 
state), and the entrepreneurial professions or ‘knowledge workers’ (consultants, IT and 
financial analysts, R&D engineers). The thesis to be elaborated in the next sub-section is 
that bureaucracy persists primarily because of the institutional maintenance work activities 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) of members of the first two expert groups. Activities like 
rulemaking (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000) and establishment of new administrative 
positions on the basis of professional expertise from fields such as human resource 
management, accounting, and law, directly contribute to the bureaucratization of 
organizational structures. 
Furthermore, experts may also engage in activities that contribute to 
bureaucratization in a less direct fashion, such as auditing (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Power, 1999), which often encourages bureaucratic record-keeping and greater concern 
with administrative standardization. An even subtler way in which actors may contribute 
towards maintaining bureaucracy is through enforcement of managerial training, selection, 
and promotion practices that are biased in favor of bureaucratic credentials and expertise 
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(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), thereby staffing bureaucracies with actors who will be less 
likely to challenge it. Last, but not least, actors may engage in defensive institutional work 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009) that deters and subverts de-bureaucratization projects rather than 
contributes to bureaucratization directly (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
Legitimacy and interests. The motivation and ability of actors to construct and 
maintain bureaucratic structures despite the possibility for contestation of the legitimacy of 
those structures on the basis of alternative institutional logics in society (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991) requires an explanation that treats legitimacy itself as a product of social 
mechanisms involving defense and pursuit of interests by structurally privileged actors 
(Stryker, 2000). In the case of professional groups, the chief interest is likely to be 
maintenance of the demand for the distinct bodies of expertise that define the professions 
(Reed, 1996). In practice, pursuit of this interest can lead to intended or unintended 
bureaucratization of organizations. For instance, legal and accounting professionals may 
favor having more rather than less rules in a certain organization because the need to draft 
and monitor these rules helps to maintain the demand for their expertise. Similarly, 
managers may favor more specialized and narrow job definitions for the staff, because this 
serves to legitimate management’s coordination and supervision role. Members of both 
expert groups will therefore be more likely to question the legitimacy of organizational 
structures that lack the aforementioned bureaucratic elements than those that do not. And 
insofar as other actors are willing to defer to their judgments, this may in turn help to 
reproduce the bureaucracy’s legitimacy. 
More broadly, the suggestion is that established professional expertise of certain 
groups still tends to go hand-in-hand with bureaucratization, remaining to a large extent 
tailored to bureaucracies, and that this makes those expert groups institutionally embedded 
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in relation to bureaucracy. Historically, the processes of professionalization and 
bureaucratization occurred more or less simultaneously and were intertwined (Waters, 
1989; Weber, 1978). As professional expertise tends to develop in a relatively path-
dependent fashion, established bodies of expertise of the traditional professions have 
remained closely aligned with the bureaucratic organizational form. Modern legal 
expertise, for example, which has its origins in the bureaucratic court system (Weber, 
1978), tends to be increasingly incorporated into the fabric of organizational structure in 
the form of legalistic rules and policies in an attempt to structure organizational decision 
making following the model provided by legal settings (cf. Sitkin & Bies, 1993: 345; see 
also Edelman & Suchman, 1997), thereby contributing the social reproduction of key 
features of the bureaucratic form, such as formalization and standardization. 
Similarly, the accounting profession has contributed to the bureaucratization of 
organizational decision making through management accounting techniques that put 
emphasis on hierarchical planning and control, standardized measurement of efficiency of 
organizational processes, and formalization of resource allocation criteria. Even medical 
professionals may sometimes play their part in bureaucratization by advocating complex 
sets of organizational health and safety rules. Once established, bureaucratic rule systems 
that embody professional expertise are likely to require monitoring and periodic 
adjustment (March et al., 2000), thus generating further demand for expert services. It is 
therefore not surprising that the clients served by liberal professionals are frequently 
bureaucratic organizations. Because of this enduring complementarity, today’s 
organizations (including post-bureaucratic ones) are likely to find it difficult to make full 
use of these services without bureaucratizing. At the same time, professional groups have a 
vested interest in protecting their expertise from contestation through occupational closure 
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and institutional control (Reed, 1996). Thus, the fate of the bureaucratic form will be at 
least in part determined by outcome of the struggles over jurisdiction between the 
traditional ‘liberal’ professions and newly emergent expert groups (Reed, 1996). 
A parallel argument can be also made with regard to the institutional 
embeddedness of the organizational professions, such as managers and human resource 
experts, who must rely on a knowledge base that is essentially ‘craft-like’ (Reed, 1996: 
584; Whitley, 1989) and is usually acquired by actors through prolonged local hands-on 
experience (Penrose, 1959). Their sunk investments in local (often organization-specific) 
knowledge makes them resistant to any macro-societal changes that risk rendering this 
knowledge obsolete. Design and implementation of bureaucratic control systems is highly 
dependent on the local knowledge and skill of organizational professionals, who also 
benefit from the opportunity to deploy these systems to further their own interests (Reed, 
1996: 585). Historically, major managerial innovations in the area of organizational 
control, such as Scientific Management and Fordism, have not only been quite congruent 
with the bureaucratic form, but have also acted as a contributory factor in bureaucratization 
(Littler, 1978). Whether more recent organizational control systems and techniques (e.g. 
‘management by objectives’, ‘total quality management’) break with this pattern by being 
more in line with post-bureaucratic organizational forms remains an open question (cf. 
Jermier, 1998: 246). In any event, dismantling bureaucracy risks undermining the status 
and power advantages that organizational professionals’ can derive from occupancy of 
prestigious offices within bureaucratic hierarchies.  
Proposition 1. Liberal and organizational professionals are more likely to engage 
in bureaucracy maintenance activities when they are located in professional and 
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organizational fields that have either historically been highly bureaucratized 
themselves or had close links to bureaucratic organizations. 
 
2.3.2 Opposition to Bureaucracy 
Liberal and organizational professions. The arguments in the previous sub-section have 
focused on why actors from certain professional groups might be motivated to act in ways 
that contribute to bureaucratic persistence. However, it is also important to consider 
whether some actors from these same groups may also have reasons to resist bureaucracy 
in certain contexts. For instance, the notion of professional-bureaucracy conflict (e.g., 
Sorensen & Sorensen, 1974) suggests that liberal professionals will favor reduced 
bureaucracy inside professional organizations or departments that they work in (Wallace, 
1995), especially when such bureaucratization is perceived as threatening to their 
autonomy (Hall, 1968) or as bringing about greater standardization and commoditization 
of expert services (Reed, 1996). Although this point does not invalidate our argument 
regarding the contribution of liberal professionals to the proliferation of bureaucracy in 
various organizational fields, it does provide an important qualification by suggesting that 
liberal professionals seek to escape the bureaucratic pressures that they themselves help to 
unleash. This is especially evident in the case of in-house professionals, who attempt to 
insulate their departments from the formal-hierarchical controls that characterize the rest of 
the bureaucratic organization (Wallace, 1995). It is worth noting, however, that resistence 
to bureaucratic pressures inside professional organizations appears to be weakening as elite 
professionals are increasingly taking on managerial roles (Friedson, 1984). We will return 
to this point in our discussion of bureaucratic persistence through infiltration. 
Similarly, our claims concerning organizational professionals’ contribution to 
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bureaucratic persistence require some qualification. Indeed, it may be more accurate to 
describe this group as being internally divided on the question of organizational design. 
For instance, the professional discipline of ‘Human Resource Management’ has sometimes 
exhibited an anti-bureaucratic ideological orientation (Barley & Kunda, 1992), despite 
being the wellspring of many rationalized and bureaucratic practices in organizations 
(Baron, Dobbin, & Jennings, 1986). Managers may be ambivalent towards bureaucratic 
structures (Adler, 2010) due to personal experience with bureaucratic dysfunctions 
(Merton, 1940), or because such structures are inconsistent with their interest in 
“maximizing their own autonomy” through workplace norms that mimic those of the 
liberal professions (Leicht & Fennell, 1997: 228). Inspired by anti-bureaucratic rhetoric 
and the economic rewards that it promises (Du Gay, 2000), senior managers sometimes 
initiate organizational changes ostensibly aimed at reducing the levels of bureaucratization 
(cf. Salaman, 2005), including strong measures like delayering (Rajan & Wulf, 2006) and 
rule suspensions (March et al., 2000). However, these changes often encounter resistance 
from lower-tier managerial personnel, whose expertise and day-to-day work still centers on 
traditional administrative tasks associated with bureaucracy (Hales, 2002), and who are 
likely to have vested interests in established formal systems (Walsh & Dewar, 1987). 
In sum, we can say that the institutional embeddedness of liberal and 
organizational professionals in relation to bureaucracy is not total, but is potentially 
weakened by instances of ambivalence and internal divisions within these expert groups. 
On balance, however, the interests that motivate (intentional or unintentional) bureaucracy 
maintenance appear to be stronger and more widely shared within these expert groups. In 
the absence of intervention from other expert groups who lack this institutional 
embeddedness in relation to bureaucracy, the opposition to bureaucracy from liberal and 
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organizational professionals is likely to have a negligible impact on bureaucratic 
persistence. Hence, if one wishes to analyze the institutional work that can lead to a major 
transformation of the bureaucratic form in a given field or even its extinction, one will 
need to look elsewhere.  
The entrepreneurial professions. In his review Reed (1996) identifies a third 
expert group, which he calls ‘the new entrepreneurial professions’, and which comprises 
various ‘knowledge worker’ occupations like financial and business consultants, R&D 
engineers, and IT analysts. To this list may also be added securities analysis and portfolio 
managers, whose ‘professionalization project’ has started becoming increasingly 
successful from the 1960s onwards (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). Like the other expert 
groups, the entrepreneurial professions strive for widespread adoption of systems and 
practices that are grounded in their special expertise and depend on this expertise for their 
functioning. These systems and practices are often seen as entailing a radical break with 
the organizational systems and practices of the past, which are proclaimed to have been 
rendered obsolete by these ‘innovations’ (e.g. Child & McGrath, 2001). In building the 
normative and cognitive foundations for these practices (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), the 
entrepreneurial professions endeavor to articulate an alternative ‘vision’ or grand narrative 
of the ‘post-industrial’ socio-economic reality, and especially its implications for the 
organizations of the future, in which their expertise will have a major role to play.  
Knowledge workers thus appear to be the chief actors advancing the institutional 
project of post-bureaucracy, not only because their own work tends to be organized into 
smaller project-based organizations, which are regarded by some as the paradigm example 
of post-bureaucracy (e.g., Clegg, 2007, but see Hodgson, 2004), but also because their 
expertise lacks historical ties to bureaucracy, and often centers around prescriptions of 
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alternative organizational designs. For instance, change programs like corporate 
downsizing advocated by business consultants (cf. Sorge & van Witteloostuijn, 2004) seem 
to rest on cognitive and normative foundations that directly challenge the bureaucratic 
form (e.g. Hammer, 1990). Downsizing and more market-like rather than bureaucratic 
controls are also legitimated based on the ‘shareholder value’ conception of control, 
promoted by institutional investors and stock analysts (Fligstein & Shin, 2007; Useem, 
1996). Experts focusing on design and implementation of information technology in 
organizations also contribute to the undermining of the bureaucratic form, since such 
technology is assumed to substitute for hierarchical control (Dewett & Jones, 2001: 330). 
Again, our claim is about the overall tendency of knowledge workers to promote 
post-bureaucracy, which leaves room for exceptions. Although the technologies 
implemented by IT specialists are often aimed at reducing the need for bureaucracy, they 
sometimes actually have the opposite effect of augmenting bureaucratic structures (e.g. 
Eriksson-Zetterquist, Lindberg, & Styhre, 2009). Likewise, some organizational 
innovations advocated by consultants, such as business process reengineering, “that are 
designed to move away from bureaucracy and hierarchy, may generate precisely these 
conditions” (McCabe, 2002: 506; see also Gill & Whittle, 1993). Nor are the organizations 
where consultants and other knowledge workers themselves work necessarily devoid of 
bureaucratic elements (Kärreman, Sveningsson, & Alvesson, 2002; Kärreman & Alvesson, 
2004). These qualifications notwithstanding, we can still accept it as a premise that the 
strongest opposition to bureaucracy and advocacy of new organizational forms in today’s 
society is likely to come from business consultants, IT specialists, and other knowledge 
workers, who may in turn draw on the rhetoric and theorizations of post-bureaucracy 
propounded by certain management gurus and business scholars. 
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Proposition 2. Increased presence of entrepreneurial professionals in a field 
reduces the likelihood of bureaucratic persistence in that field. 
2.4 Bureaucratic persistence paths 
Having examined the different expert groups and their structural position in relation to the 
bureaucratic form, it is now possible to examine in greater detail how interaction between 
them affects whether and how bureaucracy will persist in a given field. As indicated 
earlier, bureaucratic persistence should not be seen as a monolithic phenomenon, but rather 
is likely to comprise multiple persistence trajectories or paths that are distinguished on the 
basis to what happens to the bureaucratic form. Three such paths are described below, 
which may be termed bureaucratic entrenchment, hybridization, and infiltration. Different 
institutional fields can exhibit different bureaucratic persistence paths, and multiple paths 
may sometimes be found within the same field. Attending to embedded agency of expert 
groups in the analysis of bureaucratic persistence helps to account for this variety in 
persistence trajectories. 
 
2.4.1 Bureaucratic Entrenchment 
Bureaucratic entrenchment starts with the historical presence of bureaucratic organizations 
in a field as the initial condition, and involves the reproduction of bureaucracy’s levels of 
prevalence within the field over time, with little substantive change to the bureaucratic 
form itself. Fields meeting the initial conditions for this path will be those where the 
bureaucratic form had already been adopted by the vast majority of organizations during 
the period of industrialization (Perrow, 1991). The key question is what enables this form 
to persist in those fields. The arguments developed in this chapter suggest that 
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entrenchment depends on the ability of certain expert groups linked to bureaucratic 
organizations (e.g. managers, industrial engineers, personnel experts) to establish and 
maintain a social order that allows them to effectively resist the institutional project of 
post-bureaucracy and avoid or withstand direct competition from alternative organizational 
forms (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976). As Fligstein (2001: 117) points out, incumbent actors are 
often able to structure an existing field in way that gives them “a better chance of 
reproducing their advantage”. 
Withstanding competition from post-bureaucracy is not very improbable in 
historically bureaucratized fields, at least if one is to believe simulation studies in 
population ecology showing that organizational populations that emerged at an earlier 
point in time and grew rapidly can be quite resilient in withstanding competition from 
populations of “structurally superior” organizations that emerge later on (Carroll & 
Harrison, 1994: 745). However, even when there is no threat of competitive exclusion of 
bureaucratic incumbents, entrenchment is not guaranteed, since there may be the 
possibility of gradual blending of the features of the two forms (Haveman & Rao, 2006). 
This may in turn pave the way to the de-institutionalization (Oliver, 1992) of pure 
bureaucracy, rather than its persistence along the entrenchment path. The blending of 
forms represents another path of bureaucratic persistence, which we call hybridization (see 
Haveman & Rao, 2006 for a definition of this term). The question of what explains the 
transition from entrenchment to hybridization (or lack thereof) is addressed in the next 
subsection. 
Following the argument of the previous section, bureaucratic entrenchment can be 
assumed to depend first and foremost on the link between bureaucracy and dominant forms 
of expertise in the field. This link develops over time through the establishment of 
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enduring ties of the focal population of bureaucratic organizations with specific sources of 
expert labour or expert services, such as management education institutions, populations of 
professional service firms, and government agencies. This historical process of field 
structuration (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) leads to the presence in the field of liberal and 
organizational professionals, whose expertise is tailored to bureaucracies (see Proposition 
1 above). They will have an interest in ensuring that newly-founded organizations also 
make use of their expert services. In acting on this interest, these experts will 
(unintentionally) contribute to the bureaucratization of these organizations. 
Furthermore, these experts will also have an interest in policing the field 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) and other forms of defensive institutional work (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009) in order to prevent encroachment by other expert groups, such as the 
entrepreneurial professions. Since the latter are the main advocates of de-bureaucratization 
and post-bureaucracy (see Proposition 2 above), which requires their expertise to be 
implemented and legitimated, bureaucratic entrenchment can be expected to continue so 
long as the incumbent experts are successful in minimizing the impact of these new forms 
of expertise on organizational structure. 
Proposition 3. Bureaucratic entrenchment is more likely to occur in fields where 
organizations have strong and enduring ties to liberal and organizational 
professionals, and where these expert groups are able to minimize the presence 
and influence of entrepreneurial professionals. 
 
2.4.2 Bureaucratic Hybridization 
The second persistence path, bureaucratic hybridization, involves piecemeal changes to 
the bureaucratic form in a given field. This persistence path is likely to occur through 
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attempts by bureaucracies to incorporate elements of other forms into their organizational 
structures, while still retaining the defining elements of the bureaucratic structure. For 
example, some bureaucracies responded to technical pressures for flexibility by 
implementing “extensive informal controls” and elements of team-based decision-making 
(Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999: 54). The resulting form has been characterized by 
scholars as an ‘enabling bureaucracy’ (Adler & Borys, 1996). Similarly, expressions like 
‘soft bureaucracy’ (Courpasson, 2000) or ‘bureaucracy-lite’ (Hales, 2002) have been used 
to characterize the outcomes of bureaucracy’s transformation through “complex processes 
of hybridism” (Courpasson & Clegg, 2006: 319). 
Like entrenchment, hybridization is most likely to occur in fields historically 
dominated by bureaucratic organizations However, while the entrenchment scenario 
depends on either the absence of non-bureaucratic forms from the focal field, or at least a 
sharp segregation between bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic organizational forms 
(Haveman & Rao, 2006), hybridization, on the contrary, results from the process of 
blending between different forms (ibid.). Such blending becomes especially likely if 
experts associated with the post-bureaucratic form are able to theorize and frame the 
features of their form as being relevant to the field’s organizational and institutional 
problems in a way that convinces a sufficient number of actors from the more 
bureaucratically-embedded expert groups. Whether and how this happens depends on the 
social skills (Fligstein, 2001) of the non-embedded experts in framing that project in a way 
that takes account of embedded actors’ interests, as well as on the constraining or enabling 
structural conditions in the field (Archer, 1995). Advocates of post-bureaucracy may have 
to work either with or against these structural conditions. 
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Embedded organizational professionals are likely to defend their professional 
jurisdiction over organizational design against encroachment by other experts, and will 
therefore seek to maintain control over implementation of post-bureaucratic structural 
elements. Thus, organizational professionals may be willing to cooperate with advocates of 
post-bureaucracy, provided that this cooperation occurs on their terms. Such cooperation is 
likely to give rise to hybrid organizational structures, as organizational professionals and 
other expert groups cooperatively implement ‘post-bureaucratic’ features and practices, 
such as teams, project-based structures, delayered structures, internal markets, and 
information technology, without completely dismantling the older bureaucratic structures. 
However, if the organizational field is characterized by extensive institutional 
contradictions and mounting crises, then the organizational professionals with vested 
interests in the existing order are likely to find themselves in a weaker bargaining position 
vis-à-vis challenger groups. They will no longer be able to control the terms on which 
post-bureaucratic practices are implemented. We can therefore expect to see not merely 
hybridization, but genuine de-bureaucratization within those fields. 
Proposition 4. Bureaucratic hybridization is more likely to occur in fields where 
organizations have strong and enduring ties to liberal and organizational 
professionals, and where organizational professionals retain control over 
implementation of organizational change programs advocated by entrepreneurial 
professionals. 
 
2.4.3 Bureaucratic Infiltration 
While the first two paths focus bureaucracy’s resistance to pressures that might favor 
alternative forms, the third persistence path, bureaucratic infiltration, is concerned with 
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bureaucracy’s impact on those forms themselves. Although infiltration need not result in 
wholesale bureaucratization of those forms, it highlights the continued ability of the 
bureaucratic social order to leave its imprint on the forms that seek to challenge it 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). Also, unlike the previous two persistence paths, infiltration is much 
more likely to involve the breaking up of the bureaucratic configuration in favor of a 
partial dissemination of several of its constitutive elements. P2-form organizations (i.e., 
professional partnerships), for example, used to be staunchly non-bureaucratic 
organizations (Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1990), but are presently adopting more and 
more bureaucratic features, particularly in the fields of law and accounting (Malhotra, 
Morris &, Hinings, 2006). Similarly, case studies of knowledge-intensive firms illustrate 
the tendency of organizational professionals to fall back on bureaucratic practices and 
discourse in ostensibly post-bureaucratic contexts (Kärreman et al., 2002). 
An important condition for infiltration in a field is the presence of institutional 
contradictions, crises, or uncertainties about the appropriate organizational form, which 
weaken the position of supporters and defenders of the established order and make some of 
the elite experts more open to experimenting with alternative institutional and 
organizational arrangements. For example, pressures for greater market competitiveness 
imposed by globalization and the deregulation of some liberal professional fields may 
come into tension with the established collegiate organizational forms (Malhotra, Morris, 
& Hinings, 2006). In the case of the accounting profession, a crisis precipitated by a 
number of high-profile corporate scandals provided an opportunity for ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ (mostly former government officials) to implement emergency legislation 
entailing restrictive bureaucratic rules and guidelines for the accounting profession 
(Romano, 2005). In addition to these external pressures, increasingly formalized 
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stratification within the liberal professions implies a greater distance between the more 
managerial role of the professional elite and the day-to-day professional work of the ‘rank-
and-file’ professionals (Freidson, 1984; Reed, 1996). In order to legitimate their role, elite 
liberal professionals may be willing to cooperate with organizational professionals and 
consultants, located at the intersection between professionalized and non-professionalized 
fields, in selectively implementing bureaucratic features like rules, specialization and 
standardization. This process is likely to contribute to bureaucratic persistence through 
infiltration. 
Proposition 5. Bureaucratic infiltration is more likely to occur in fields where 
previously dominant (non-bureaucratic) organizational forms are becoming de-
institutionalized, and where increasing numbers of experts draw on the expertise 
of organizational and entrepreneurial professionals in order to legitimate 
organizational change. 
2.5 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter we sought to address the question of why bureaucracy persists as an 
organizational form. This question is important for a number of reasons. First, as 
mentioned in the introduction, management scholars and organizational sociologists have 
often suggested that bureaucracy would come to be increasingly replaced by alternative 
organizational forms and advanced explanations for why this change was either already 
underway or could be expected to take place in the near future. Yet, the resilience of 
bureaucracy and the barriers to its predicted demise have received far less attention, 
despite Weber’s (1978) early skepticism and Stinchcombe’s (1965) important study of 
persistence of structural characteristics in organizational populations. We hope that this 
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chapter helps to correct this imbalance by framing the question of bureaucratic persistence 
more explicitly in the context of organizational institutionalism than has been done in the 
past (Meyer & Rowan, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Second, we believe that organizational institutionalism can benefit from a 
stronger engagement with this question. Specifically, the topic of bureaucratic persistence 
not only fits well with the institutional scholars’ concern with persistence or durability (e.g. 
Clemens & Cook, 1999; Zucker, 1977) and with the formal and public face of 
organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), but it also poses a theoretical challenge when it 
comes to explaining the simultaneous continuity and change in the bureaucratic 
organizational form via hybridization (Courpasson & Clegg, 2006), and the emergence of 
some aspects of bureaucracy in ostensibly non-bureaucratic contexts (e.g. Kärreman et al., 
2002). Third, a better understanding of the causes of bureaucratic persistence can inform 
policy that is concerned with institutional change and the diversity of organizational forms. 
In particular, it can enable policy makers and managers to better anticipate some of the 
barriers to radical changes in the structure of organizations that comprise a given 
organizational population. 
In contrast to the familiar explanations that appeal either to the efficiency 
advantages of bureaucratic structures under certain technological, environmental and 
organizational conditions (e.g. Astley, 1985; Donaldson, 2001; Williamson, 1985) or to the 
collective perception of bureaucracy as a legitimate organizational form within the 
institutional environments of organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983), we argued for an explanatory framework in which actors’ interests, agency and 
political interactions are allowed to play a more central role (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 
2001; Kim, Shin, Oh, & Jeong, 2007; Seo & Creed, 2002; Stryker, 2000). This theoretical 
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move helps to advance theories of bureaucracy and institutional persistence more broadly 
in several ways. 
First, the actor-centered approach helps to put the classical institutional 
emphasis on legitimacy into broader perspective (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1983). While it is true that legitimacy, - especially in its ‘cognitive’ sense as taken-
for-grantedness (Suchman, 1995), - can sometimes “prevent political mobilization around 
conflicts of interest and value” (Stryker, 2000: 187; see also Lukes, 1974) and therefore 
reduce the likelihood of interest-based contestation and institutional change, this scenario 
need not apply in all cases of institutional persistence. Some institutions may persist 
despite a certain level of contestation due to the institutional maintenance work of 
incumbent actors (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), which can involve active attempts to 
preserve, defend and repair the institution’s legitimacy (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; 
Suchman, 1995). To understand why actors are motivated to engage in such institutional 
work, it is necessary to examine their interests and structural position (Archer, 1995). 
Second, the actor-centered approach advocated here illustrates how the same 
conceptual resources that have been developed for explaining institutional change 
(Fligstein, 2001; Seo & Creed, 2002) can also be used for explaining institutional 
durability and persistence (Clemens & Cook, 1999). The explanatory strategy is to trace 
higher-level institutional processes (notably, reproduction or transformation) back to the 
actions and interactions of specific groups of actors (Archer, 1995), and to identify the 
interests that motivate these actors to act in ways that (intentionally or unintentionally) 
contribute towards these higher-level processes. As illustrated by our argument, such 
interests may not necessarily pertain directly to the focal institution itself, but to other 
aspects of the social order that are indirectly linked to that institution and which account 
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for the actors’ embeddedness. In the case of bureaucracy, we argued that actors are 
concerned with maintaining the demand for their expertise, while it is the use of certain 
kinds of expertise by organizations that leads to the reproduction of bureaucracy. Thus, in 
defending their jurisdictions against encroachment by other groups, actors also maintain 
the organizational structures that embody their expertise. When confronted with 
institutional projects that potentially threaten their position in technical and status 
hierarchies, actors exercise their agency so as to block these projects or at least contain the 
disruptive effects of these projects on their position (Clemens & Cook, 1999). 
Third, the actor-centered approach provides a more differentiated account of 
bureaucratic persistence that can serve as the basis for comparative empirical research on 
the fate of bureaucracy in different organizational fields. Rather than asking how 
technological and institutional changes at the level of whole societies affects the 
bureaucratic form (e.g. Kallinikos, 2006; Olson, 2008), researchers can begin to explain 
differences in the extent of bureaucratic persistence in different fields, as well as their 
implications for the emergence of new organizational forms in those fields (Romanelli, 
1991). To account for these differences, researchers would need to examine the historical 
conditions of a given field, such as the historical presence of different forms and their 
levels of legitimacy. Following the arguments of this chapter, they would also need to 
identify key expert groups in that field, their relation to bureaucracy and/or to other 
organizational forms, as well as their interests and resources (Fligstein, 2001). Finally, 
researchers would need to study how interactions between those actors contribute to the 
reproduction or transformation (Archer, 1995) of the bureaucratic form and its overall level 
of prevalence in a given field. 
Thus, in order to add more flesh to the bones of this chapter’s stylized 
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description of expert groups’ role in bureaucratic persistence along different persistence 
paths, detailed historical studies of specific organizational fields would be needed. We 
encourage researchers studying organizational forms that are present in a given field to 
determine and report on the extent to which those forms exhibit bureaucratic features and 
to search for explanations for why bureaucratic forms become more or less prevalent over 
time. Of course, some of our arguments regarding the relation between different types of 
professional actors and bureaucratic persistence can also be tested using quantitative 
research designs. A recent study by Hwang and Powell (2009), who examined the relation 
between professional influence and organizational rationalization in the non-profit sector, 
provides a good model for such research. However, their measures of rationalization, 
which included the use of strategic planning, independent financial audits, and quantitative 
program evaluation, do not capture key dimensions of bureaucracy like administrative 
intensity and structural differentiation. Furthermore, studying bureaucratic persistence 
would require collection of longitudinal data. 
 
2.5.1 Limitations and directions for future research 
Naturally, we recognize that our argument is not without weaknesses, and that further work 
is required to extend, revise and bolster the argument. Ultimately, the extent of 
bureaucratic persistence is an empirical question. While we have not presented empirical 
evidence to support our premise that bureaucracy does persist in at least some fields, we 
cited some authors who have conducted empirical research in bureaucratic contexts and 
who seem to endorse this premise (e.g. Adler, 2010; Hales, 2002). Large-scale studies, like 
the National Organizations Study (Kalleberg et al., 1996) can help to quantify the extent of 
bureaucratization and to identify organizational fields, where bureaucracy continues to be 
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the dominant form. Even if bureaucratic persistence turns out to be a fairly rare and local 
phenomenon, trying to account for it can still be a worthwhile theoretical exercise, because 
it can provide insights into persistence of forms and institutions in general. Thus, 
bureaucratic persistence should not be seen as a topic for business historians, even though 
business history can certainly inform our thinking on this topic. Indeed, our focus on 
agency is consistent with some historical studies indicating that “individuals have a 
significant impact on bureaucratization” (Diehl-Taylor, 1997: 157). 
While we have identified three generic paths of bureaucratic persistence based on 
common sense reasoning and on the literature, the stability of these paths remains an 
important issue for future research and debate. We acknowledge that these paths may turn 
out to be more transient phenomena than might appear from our discussion. In any event, it 
seems unlikely that these paths could continue indefinitely. The path of entrenchment can 
continue so long as either direct competition for resources between bureaucratic and post-
bureaucratic organizations remains restricted, or the efficiency advantages of the post-
bureaucratic form remain insufficient to completely eliminate its bureaucratic rival. 
Furthermore, the segregating mechanisms between the two forms must also be quite strong 
(Haveman & Rao, 2006), so that the majority of managerial and liberal professionals have 
no incentive to consent to the implementation of post-bureaucracy, otherwise entrenchment 
is likely to give way to hybridization. In practice, it seems unlikely that all three of these 
conditions will be satisfied in most bureaucratized fields today. Thus, the path of 
entrenchment may be more applicable to bureaucratic persistence in the first half of the 
20th century, and less appropriate for describing the fate of bureaucracy at the turn of the 
century or in the future. 
It seems that bureaucracy is more likely to persist via hybridization. However, 
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hybridization indicates that bureaucratic organizations are under considerable pressure to 
adopt some of the features of post-bureaucracy. By definition, this is likely to be difficult 
to do without de-bureaucratizing to some extent. Thus, there is a risk that hybrid forms will 
be short-lived, and would eventually give way to genuine post-bureaucratic organizations. 
The risk is increased by the fact that organizations changes required for hybridization can 
increase the hazard of organizational mortality in bureaucratic populations (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984). Hybridization depends of the ability of embedded organizational and 
liberal professionals to maintain some degree of control over organizational structures and 
their interest in preserving bureaucratic features that are congruent with their knowledge 
base. However, it is possible that a new cohort of organizational professionals may emerge 
in the field that is less embedded in relation to bureaucracy and has a stronger affinity with 
the entrepreneurial professionals. In this case, there is a greater risk that the incumbent 
experts would lose control over organizational structure, and hybridization would give way 
to genuine de-bureaucratization. 
Finally, with regard to infiltration, it remains to be seen whether the phenomena 
observed in the fields of law and accounting and in a few knowledge-intensive firms will 
generalize to other contexts. These doubts notwithstanding, we hope that the actor-centred 
institutional account of bureaucracy’s persistence developed in this chapter can inform 
future empirical studies and debate about this phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RULES AS REMINDERS: Examining the formal 
side of organizational memory 
 
Formal rules and rule-like documents like procedures and manuals play an important role 
in enabling organizations to preserve past information so as to improve future decision 
making. Nevertheless, the memory function of formalization and the factors that condition 
or determine the strength of this function remain weakly understood. In this chapter we 
take a closer look at the process side of formalization in order to identify some of these 
factors. Building on the definition of formalization as a process of codification and 
enforcement, we describe a set of interrelated activities involved in this process. We offer 
some research propositions in order to illustrate our broader argument that the ability of 
formal systems to serve as repositories of organizational memory depends on the different 
activities of the formalization process. The ideas developed in this chapter can inform 
future research on formal rules and organizational memory. 
3.1 Introduction 
Rules, standard procedures, manuals and other manifestations of organizational 
formalization are both a familiar feature of organizational life and a long-standing topic in 
management research. Formalization has been linked in the literature to a variety of 
important aspects of management and organization, including coordination, control, 
legitimation and cognition (cf. Vlaar, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007). Yet, 
formalization’s relation to organizational memory, one of the central concepts in the 
organizational cognition and learning literatures (e.g. Argyris & Schön, 1978; Walsh, 
1995; Walsh & Ungson, 1991), has not until now received sustained theoretical attention. 
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While the importance of embedding or ‘institutionalizing’ the lessons of organizational 
learning in formal structures so as to preserve them for the future has often been 
highlighted (e.g. Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; Levitt & March, 1988), specific activities 
through which this is accomplished and their impact on information retention and retrieval 
have not been examined. Formalization’s role as a repository of organizational memory, 
defined as “stored information from an organization’s history that can be brought to bear 
on present decisions” (Walsh & Ungson, 1991: 61), deserves greater research attention, not 
least because it is often seen by policy makers, professionals, and managers as being a 
necessary and perhaps critical means of preventing future organizational errors, 
misconduct, and disasters (Vaughan, 1999).  
In this chapter we, therefore, focus on formalization’s memory function, by which 
we mean the organization’s ability to preserve information in formal media like rulebooks 
and manuals and to retrieve this information at a later point in time. Specifically, our 
research question is: What are the factors that condition formalization’s memory function? 
Because dynamic processes, such as information acquisition, conservation, and retrieval 
play such an important role in organizational memory theory (e.g., Olivera, 2000; Stein & 
Zwass, 1995; Walsh & Ungson, 1991), a view of formalization as a static outcome is 
unlikely to shed much light on the factors that condition its memory function. Thus, 
answering our question requires examining the process side of formalization (Vlaar et al., 
2006). Unfortunately, as noted by Kwon (2008: 1065), “research to date […] has paid 
insufficient attention to aspects of the standardization process”, and the same observation, 
we suggest, also holds for formalization (but see Adler & Borys, 1996; Kieser & Koch, 
2008; March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000). Moving beyond the static view in this chapter, we 
sketch a framework for analyzing the process side of formalization and its impact on 
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formalization’s memory function. In developing this framework, we draw on and integrate 
many extant insights scattered across multiple literatures on topics like learning, routines, 
rules, control, and high-reliability organizations. We also illustrate the theoretical 
fruitfulness of the process framework by offering several research propositions that relate 
the formalization process to formalization’s memory function.  
Our analysis of the relation between the process of formalization and memory 
contributes to both memory theory and bureaucracy theory. First, it advances memory 
theory by offering an in-depth theoretical treatment of formal repositories of organizational 
memory. While the existence of such repositories is already recognized in the memory 
literature (e.g. Levitt & March, 1988; Wilson, Goodman, & Cronin, 2007), variation in the 
ability of formal systems to function as memory has remained largely unexamined. The 
concept of memory function that we develop in this chapter, as well as the conditioning 
factors that we identify, can serve as the basis for future research into this important topic. 
Second, our analysis contributes towards addressing a key question in bureaucracy theory 
(Adler & Borys, 1996), namely the question of how rules actually operate in organizations 
(Reynaud, 2005: 849). In particular, we are the first scholars to provide a detailed overview 
of the process side of formalization from an organizational memory perspective. Given that 
preservation of memory has been cited as one of the defining characteristics of ‘enabling’ 
formalization (e.g. Adler & Borys, 1996: 69), our discussion of the factors that condition 
formalization’s memory function also has relevance for research on this topic (e.g. Adler, 
1999; Briscoe, 2007; DeHart-Davis, 2009).  
Throughout the chapter, we shall make use of the example of safety rules in order 
to illustrate our arguments (e.g. Bruns, 2009), since the problem of retaining lessons from 
past experience is likely to be relevant for such rules (e.g. Lampel, 2006). However, most 
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of our arguments also generalize to other important rule domains in organizations (Schulz, 
1998a), including corporate governance (Ocasio, 1999), prevention of corruption (Lehman 
& Ramanujam, 2009), orchestrating organizational communication (Heugens, van Riel, & 
van den Bosch, 2004), confidentiality and trade secret protection (Hannah, 2005), and 
technical workflow (Adler & Borys, 1996). The chapter is organized as follows. In the next 
section, we introduce the main concepts and ideas of organizational memory theory, 
including our focal idea that formalization can play an important role in the preservation of 
organizational memory. We also explain why neglect of the process side of formalization 
leads to a gap in our understanding of formalization’s memory function. This is then 
followed by another major section, where we outline our process framework that includes 
codification and enforcement as the two generic sub-processes. In a third major section, we 
illustrate the fruitfulness of the framework by offering and discussing some research 
propositions. The remaining issues, including limitations of the analysis and suggestions 
for future research, are taken up in the discussion section, and a brief conclusion closes the 
chapter. 
3.2 Theoretical background 
 
3.2.1 Introducing Organizational Memory Theory 
Organizational memory or the organizational means of preserving information is an 
intuitively appealing concept that plays a significant role in theories of organizational 
learning, improvisation, and decision making (e.g., Argyris & Schön, 1978; Cyert & 
March, 1992; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988; Moorman & Miner, 1997, 1998; Weick, 
1979). One of the seminal contributions to the organizational memory literature was made 
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by Walsh and Ungson (1991), who not only synthesized the literature available to date, but 
also introduced many important new ideas and directions for future research (cf. Anderson 
& Sun, 2010). Notably, the authors sought to respond to concerns about the fallacy of 
anthropomorphism in organizational memory theory by proposing that organizations can 
“exhibit memory that is similar in function to the memory of individuals” (Walsh & 
Ungson 1991: 60, original emphasis). Defining the memory construct in terms of its 
function or causal “outputs or effects” entails no a priori assumptions about potential 
similarities or differences in the constitution of human and organizational memory (cf. 
Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999: 255), but merely suggests that organizations generally have 
some structures and processes capable of producing memory-like outcomes, such as 
information acquisition, storage, and retrieval (Walsh & Ungson 1991), which can be 
studied by researchers. 
Walsh and Ungson (1991) also offered a typology of organizational ‘retention 
facilities’ or repositories of past information, which range from individuals to 
organizational structure and culture. Other authors proposed alternative typologies (e.g. 
Olivera, 2000), or have chosen to focus on a specific memory repository, such as 
organizational routines (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 1982), organizational 
stories (Boje, 1991), traditions of organizational culture (Cook & Yanow, 1993; Feldman 
& Feldman, 2006), transactive memory systems (Anand, Manz, & Glick, 1998; Brandon & 
Hollingshead, 2004; Wegner, 1987), and IT-enabled organizational memory (Huber, 1991; 
Stein & Zwass, 1995). One can also find some acknowledgement the importance of 
formalization in the memory literature. For instance, Nelson & Winter (1982: 99) wrote 
that their analysis of routines as organizational memory did “not deny that firms keep 
formal memories and that these formal memories play an important role”; Walsh and 
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Ungson (1991: 65, citations omitted) noted that “memory is preserved in a variety of 
procedures, rules, and formalized systems”; while March, Schulz and Zhou (2000: 21) 
stated that written rules “provide a depersonalized organizational memory, a storehouse of 
organizational knowledge”. However, despite these frequent passing references, the link 
between formalization and organizational memory has so far not been fully elaborated. In 
particular, research on formalization and memory can benefit from (i) introducing the 
concept of the memory function of formalization, such that variation in the strength of this 
function could be examined; and (ii) paying greater attention to the process side of 
formalization, which is likely to play an major role in conditioning its memory function. 
 
3.2.2 Formalization’s Memory Function 
Formalization can be defined as “the process of codifying and enforcing output and/or 
behaviour, and its outcomes in the form of contracts, rules and procedures” (Vlaar et al., 
2007: 439, italics removed). While it is possible to see formal systems merely as another 
(separate) repository of memory available to organizations in addition to stories (Boje, 
1991), databases (Huber, 1991), and routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), this approach 
would fail to do justice to formalization’s ability to permeate these repositories and make a 
qualitative difference to their operation. In particular, formalization tends to imbue social 
objects with a quasi-legal status, contributing to their ‘durability’ and ‘reproducibility’ 
(Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000: 710; see also Stinchcombe, 2001: 32). Indeed, the very 
language used in formal documents constructs the statements contained therein as explicit 
and authoritative (McPhee, 1985). We can expect there to be a recursive relationship 
between formal systems and other forms of organizational memory, in that information 
from individuals’ memories, routines, stories, and databases, for example, can be taken 
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into account in the development of formal systems (e.g. Lazaric & Denis, 2005), while at 
the same time the content of formal systems can obviously affect individuals’ 
recollections, the topics and process of storytelling, and the status of information stored in 
databases. Furthermore, recent conceptualizations of organizational routines explicitly 
include artifacts, such as formal rules and technologies, as key components in the internal 
structure of such routines (Pentland & Feldman, 2005). Thus, the formal side of 
organizational memory deserves greater research attention. 
The starting point in this endeavor should be an explicit recognition of the 
memory function of formalization or its ability to preserve information and enable its 
subsequent retrieval (compare: Vlaar and associates (2006) on formalization’s 
‘sensemaking function’). Note that when speaking of the memory function of 
formalization, we do not mean that formalization is necessarily adaptive for organizations 
(cf. Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). We simply mean that preservation of information from 
the past can be one of the outcomes or consequences of having written rules. While some 
rules may be intentionally designed by managers to retain certain information, this 
consequence of rulemaking often remains largely unacknowledged. Actors may simply 
take it for granted that whatever is written into a rule will be preserved, while everything 
that is left out may well be eventually forgotten. Formalization’s memory function is likely 
to have practical importance in many organizational contexts. For instance, organizational 
safety rules and regulations are often developed and revised in light of organizational 
experience with safety-related incidents (e.g. Sullivan, 2010; Provera, Montefusco, Canato, 
2010). Rule makers in such situations are likely to face the practical problem of designing 
and implementing formal systems that reflect the relevant information about past incidents, 
so as to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future (Lampel, 2006).  
58 
 
At the very least, rules can be said to preserve instructions for action. For 
example, a safety rule might instruct actors to “[w]ear appropriate clothing in the 
laboratory when working with hazardous substances” (Bruns, 2009: 1409). This instruction 
is arguably more likely to be preserved by the organization if it is formally encoded in a 
written rule, than if it were to remain merely a verbal command. However, while it is true 
that all rules have a memory function in this sense, it is also true that individual rules and 
entire rule systems can vary in terms the of nature and amount of information that they 
preserve and, more broadly, in the strength of their memory function. Hence, it becomes 
crucial to specify the possible dimensions of this variation, which would also help to 
further clarify the meaning of the memory function construct. 
Three dimensions of the memory function. Most of the contributions to the 
organizational memory literature identify at least three distinct phases or processes of 
memory. Although these are labeled differently by different authors, there is considerable 
overlap in how the phases are described. For instance, most authors agree that 
organizational memory should include the process through which information enters a 
given repository, variously termed ‘recording’ (Levitt & March, 1988), ‘encoding’ 
(Wegner, 1987), ‘acquisition’ (Stein & Zwass, 1995; Walsh & Ungson, 1991), or 
‘collection’ (Olivera, 2000). Obviously, the information that has entered memory should 
be able to remain there for some time without decaying. This phase is generally termed 
‘retention’ or ‘storage’ (Stein & Zwass, 1995; Walsh & Ungson, 1991; Wegner, 1987), 
although some authors also highlight a more active role of the organization in this process. 
Levitt & March (1988: 328), for example, used the term ‘conservation’ rather than storage 
in order to refer to “transfer of tradition” to new organizational members. Similarly, the 
typologies of Stein and Zwass (1995: 105) and Olivera (2000: 819) included the process of 
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memory ‘maintenance’, which is chiefly concerned with updating the stored information. 
Finally, all of the authors cited mention ‘retrieval’ as a crucial memory process. Retrieval 
depends on the ability of organizational members to access the relevant memory 
repositories (Olivera, 2000: 819) and involves the “reconstruction of the selected 
information to satisfy the user’s request” (Stein & Zwass, 1995: 106). 
Although further processes could be added to this typology, including information 
filtering (Olivera, 2000), labeling or indexing (Olivera, 2000; Wegner, 1987), sharing 
(Wilson et al., 2007), search (Stein & Zwass, 1995), and forgetting (DeHolan & Phillips, 
2004), most of them can be accommodated under the three basic processes of memory 
(Walsh & Ungson, 1991). Therefore, following Levitt and March’s (1988) classification 
and terminology2
                                                            
2 The reason for this choice is that of all the contributions to the organizational memory literature, Levitt and March (1988) seem to be especially attentive to the formal side of such 
memory. 
, we identify recording, conservation and retrieval as the three phases of 
memory. We also define corresponding dimensions of formalization’s memory function. 
Specifically, we can stipulate a priori that the memory function of a formal rule system 
should be weaker when the information recoded in this system does not reflect 
organizational history. Similarly, conservation may be defined as referring to the extent of 
members’ familiarity with the organizational rule system (Hannah, 2005). Finally, for the 
‘retrieval’ phase, we can assume that the memory function becomes weaker when the 
information stored in the rule system is not used in organizational decision making (Walsh 
& Ungson, 1991), which can happen when rules are routinely ignored and/or violated 
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). We shall have more to say about these dimensions in the 
penultimate section of this chapter. 
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The challenge of linking formalization to organizational memory also encourages 
us to synthesize and further develop our ideas about the process of formalization (Vlaar et 
al., 2007), as opposed to focusing only on the process’s outcomes, such as the number of 
written rules and procedures. Given the definition of the memory function outlined above, 
which focuses on the nature of recorded information and the extent of conservation and 
retrieval of this information as key the dimensions, it becomes important to examine how 
recoding, conservation and retrieval actually take place in the case of formal systems. 
Although the literature on organizational rules and formalization has provided some 
scattered insights into the process of formalization (Adler & Borys, 1996; Kieser & Koch, 
2008; March et al., 2000), it still lacks an overall framework that would provide an 
overview of the different types of activities involved. In the following section, we integrate 
the insights of this literature to sketch such a framework, with a special focus on those 
parts of the process that seem to us especially relevant for understanding formalization’s 
memory function. 
3.3 Unpacking the process of formalization 
The process of formalization encompasses a rich and varied set of organizational activities, 
which are performed by a diverse set of organizational actors. To characterize these actors, 
we distinguish between two roles that people in organizations may assume: the rule-maker 
role and the rule-follower role. Rule makers are the ultimate legislative agents that have 
authority to develop and enforce formal organizational systems (March et al., 2000). Rule 
followers, in turn, are organizational members whose actions are governed by these 
systems. Although we treat the rule maker and rule follower roles as conceptually 
separable, they need not be divided over two separate groups of actors. We also allow for 
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the possibility that the actions of rule makers themselves are governed by rules (Kieser, 
Beck, & Tainio, 2001), which blurs the empirical lines separating both relational roles. 
Finally, for the sake of exposition, we also assume that the rule maker role encompasses 
the ‘rule enforcer’ role. Because this will obviously not always hold in practice, nothing in 
our argument will hinge on this assumption. The organizational implications of separation 
or overlap between these two roles are beyond the scope of this chapter, but may be an 
interesting topic for future research. 
Following Vlaar and associates (2006: 1619; 2007: 439), the process of 
formalization can be seen as encompassing both codification and enforcement of output 
and/or behavior. Codification, in its broadest sense, refers to the “creation of messages” 
(Håkanson, 2007: 61; see also Cowan & Foray, 1997: 596). For the purposes of this 
chapter, we can define it as the development of an officially-recognized “written 
organizational document that usually specifies who should do what, when, and under 
which conditions” (Schulz, 1998a: 847). Examples of such documents include policies, 
regulations, guidelines, rules, standard procedures, contracts and manuals (cf. Vlaar et al., 
2006; Zhou, 1993; Zollo & Winter, 2002). The generic term ‘rules’, which we use 
throughout of this chapter, should be understood as covering all documents of this kind. 
With regard to enforcement, our guiding assumption is that the process of formalization 
presupposes at least some efforts to ensure that the relevant parties recognize the 
documents produced through codification as being ‘in force’ (Vlaar, et al., 2007: 439), and 
are motivated to take those documents into account, as and when appropriate.  Thus, we 
share Walsh and Dewar’s (1987: 219) intuition that “[l]ittle-used or long-forgotten 
regulations can hardly be considered ‘formal’ since few, if any, actors know that they exist 
or remember them”. 
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The distinction between codification and enforcement as two major sub-processes 
of formalization also fits well with Adler & Borys’s (1996) treatment of the topic, who 
used equipment technology as an analogy. In particular, codification may be understood as 
referring to the process of designing the formal system and its specific components (i.e. 
rules), while enforcement is essentially a matter of implementation (Adler & Borys, 1996: 
69). The activities that we treat as falling under the rubric of codification include, but are 
not limited to: crafting new rules, revising existing rules, eliminating obsolete rules, 
defining explicit sanctions and incentives, and reviewing different elements of the formal 
system in light of new organizational experiences (March et al., 2000). Enforcement 
activities, on the other hand, are aimed at the practical realization of the rule makers’ 
espoused goals and intentions, and are more likely hinge on social interaction with rule 
followers, compared to codification. Examples include: monitoring compliance, imposing 
sanctions, and building, maintaining, and adjusting the cognitive and normative 
foundations for rules through the education and persuasion of rule followers (cf. Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006). We now proceed to examine the two formalization sub-processes in 
greater detail. 
 
3.3.1 Codification 
Formal systems and their constituent elements typically develop and change over extended 
periods of time. The literature on rule dynamics identifies rule births, revisions and 
suspensions as the main categories of events through which such development and change 
become manifest (March et al., 2000). Rule birth implies that the rule has been finalized 
and officially adopted by the organization (Schulz, 1998a; Sullivan, 2010). Introducing a 
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new body of rules3
Experience articulation. One aspect of such codification episodes that seems 
especially relevant for memory theory is their link to organizational history and experience 
(Levitt & March, 1988; Schulz, 1998a). Zollo and Winter (2002) suggest that although 
organizations routinely accumulate experience through performance of organizational 
activities, such experience tends to remain largely tacit and unsystematic, unless it is 
deliberately articulated and codified. Codification efforts not only draw on previously 
articulated organizational experience, but can also induce further articulation, in which 
case codification and articulation become simultaneous processes (Håkanson, 2007). As 
 into an organization obviously entails a high number of rule births. 
However, longitudinal research also shows that new organizational rules generally 
continue to be added to existing rulebooks over time (Beck & Kieser, 2003; Schulz, 
1998a). Rule revision involves the official replacement of an existing rule with another 
version of the same rule (March et al., 2000; Schulz, 2003), while rule suspension occurs 
when a rule “is removed from the organization’s records and no successor version of the 
rule is put in place” (March et al., 2000: 84). Like rule births, rule revisions and 
suspensions can occur at various points in the history of a body of rules. If the codification 
process is understood as encompassing all three types of events, as we propose, then it also 
makes sense to think of codification as a series of episodes, where organizational rule 
makers come together to work on proposals for rule creation, revision and suspension, and 
to officially incorporate the finalized proposals into the rule system. As we explain below, 
such episodes usually draw on organizational experience, and involve a elements of 
articulation, sensemaking, problem-solving, and theorizing. 
                                                            
3 We use the terms ‘rule system’, ‘body of rules’ and ‘rulebook’ interchangeably in this paper. 
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Zollo and Winter (2002: 342) put it, “a group of individuals who are in the process of 
writing a manual or a set of written guidelines to improve the execution of a complex task 
[…] will most likely reach a significantly higher degree of understanding of what makes a 
certain process succeed or fail, compared to simply telling ‘war stories’ or discussing it in 
a debriefing session”. Thus, codification episodes enable organizations to draw explicit 
lessons from experience (March et al., 2000; Ocasio, 1999). 
Sensemaking and problem-solving. Codification episodes are also closely related 
to organizational problem-solving (Schulz, 1998a) and sensemaking activities (Vlaar et al., 
2006; Zollo & Winter, 2002: 342). In the words of March and colleagues (2000: 48), 
“[t]oday’s rules are often the solution to yesterday’s problems”. For example, in high-
hazard industries, accidents and incidents often trigger rulemaking “in an attempt to 
prevent future accidents” (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002: 639; Lampel, 2006; Sullivan, 
2010). Accidents and incidents are extreme cases of ‘disruptive ambiguity’ that invariably 
induces retrospective sensemaking efforts (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005: 413) like 
incident investigations and public inquiries (Carroll, 1995; Gephart, 1993). Such 
sensemaking draws on organizational records and collective recollections of the incident, 
its circumstances, and organizational experience with similar incidents in order to 
articulate a plausible story of what happened and why. Often, the incident becomes viewed 
as a ‘symptom’ of an underlying ‘problem’ (Carroll, 1995; Starbuck, 1983), while 
sensemaking develops into a search for a solution (Cyert & March, 1992), an answer to the 
question “now what?” (Weick, et al., 2005: 413). This is where problems can become 
linked to solutions in the form of proposals/recommendations (Sullivan, 2010), increasing 
the likelihood that “procedures and manuals [will be] amended on the basis of the 
investigation” (Provera et al., 2010: 1065). It is worth noting that sensemaking may not 
65 
 
only precede a codification episode, but also play an important role in the codification 
process itself. For example, in working on a proposed new rule, rule makers may come 
back retrospectively to certain experiences and attempt to resolve potential ambiguity of 
those experiences by developing categories and labels (Weick, et al., 2005), which may in 
turn become incorporated in the draft of the rule. 
Theorizing. As noted by Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings (2002: 60), new 
institutional practices must be ‘theorized’ by the relevant actors, where theorization is 
defined as “the development and specification of abstract categories and the elaboration of 
chains of cause and effect”. A similar process is likely to play out in codification episodes, 
which generally involve “an effort to understand the causal links between the decisions to 
be made and the performance outcomes to be expected” (Zollo & Winter, 2002: 342). 
From a sensemaking perspective, theorization can also be seen as “a search for meanings” 
or for an “emerging story” that “becomes more comprehensive, incorporates more of the 
observed data, and is more resilient in the face of criticism” as work on the new rule 
progresses (Weick et al., 2005: 415). As documented by Kieser and Koch (2008), a draft or 
prototype of a new organizational rule may be presented to specialists from different 
functional areas and amended several times in light of their suggestions, which not only 
helps to integrate specialized knowledge into the rule, but also gives the relevant actors an 
opportunity to develop plausible understandings about the future rule’s rationale and 
potential consequences. While those understandings will not be (or need to be) fully shared 
or identical (Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002), equifinality in understandings can facilitate the 
rule’s eventual formal adoption (Donnellon, Gray, & Bougon, 1986). In fact, purposely 
“keeping rules vague” (Kieser & Koch, 2008: 344) through strategic use of ambiguous 
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language can make it possible for the rule makers to ‘speak in a single voice’, which is 
often important for the rule’s legitimation (Eisenberg, 1984: 232). 
Some authors (e.g. Adler & Borys, 1996) highlight the benefits of involving rule 
followers in theorization and formulation of procedures. Such involvement can increase 
the likelihood that the resulting rules will be consistent with rule followers’ own cognitive 
and normative understandings (Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002), which can be further articulated 
and strengthened during theorization (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). It can also enable rule 
followers to develop useful individual and collective memory contents (e.g. stories) about 
the theory or the ‘meta-ideas’ that led to the development of those rules (cf. Wilson, 
Goodman, & Cronin, 2007: 1049). For high levels of rule follower involvement in 
organizational formalization, the whole process may begin to resemble the ‘concertive 
control’ model, where self-managing teams are able to reach “consensus on key values” 
and codify and enforce their own rules themselves on the basis of such consensus (Wright 
& Barker, 2000: 348). Some authors (e.g. Lange, 2008: 725), however, caution against 
mixing elements of concertive control with bureaucratic approaches to formalization, 
arguing that the empowering ethos of concertive control could make employees less 
willing to defer to externally-imposed rules. 
Based on this review, we can describe a stylized sequence of activities in a 
codification episode. The initial trigger for the episode will generally be a discrepancy 
between recent organizational experience and expectations of certain actors that starts to 
receive greater attention in the organization (Ocasio, 1997), becoming a topic of collective 
sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005). The initiation of such sensemaking, as well as the 
transition from sensemaking to codification proper, will often depend on active ‘issue 
selling’ on the part of the actors concerned (Dutton et al., 2001). The crucial moment 
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occurs when rule makers come to accept that a problem exists and that it can be resolved 
(at least in part) through codification or adjustment to rules. Theorizing about the 
problem’s implications for rules (and vice versa) then commences, leading to new 
proposals for rule creation, change and suspension. These proposals may develop and 
remain on the rule makers’ agendas over extended periods of time, possibly becoming 
‘attached’ to new problems (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). Gradually, the proposals will 
reach a greater degree of elaboration through negotiation and theorizing, while possibly 
also undergoing iterative adjustment in light of feedback from various experts or 
stakeholders (Kieser & Koch, 2008). Eventually, some proposals may be brought to 
fruition, with a new rule or rule version being officially issued, or an old rule officially 
declared null and void (in the case of rule suspension). Empirical research indicates that 
“‘urgency’ from problems embedded in institutional pressures can push an organization” to 
finalize a rule proposal (Sullivan, 2010: 15). 
 
3.3.2 Enforcement 
While some authors wrote that the “process aspect of knowledge articulation and 
codification seems to have been neglected in the existing research” (Prencipe & Tell, 2001: 
1377), this observation is perhaps even more applicable when it comes to the process of 
enforcement or implementation of formal/codified systems.4
                                                            
4 This does not, of course, mean that enforcement is an alien concept when it comes to organization and management theory. It already figures prominently in an early contribution by 
Arrow (1964: 398, italics in the original), who wrote that the problem of organizational control “divides itself naturally into two parts: the choice of operating rules instructing the 
members of the organization how to act, and the choice of enforcement rules to persuade or compel them to act in accordance with the operating rules”. 
 In its narrow sense, 
enforcement focuses on “both the detection and the punishment of deviations from the 
operating rules” (Arrow, 1964: 398). In a broader sense, which is more relevant for our 
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purposes, enforcement is about ensuring that the rules remain ‘in force’ (Vlaar et al., 2006) 
in the sense of being adhered to, as appropriate. The concept of enforcement is also closely 
related to that of organizational control, defined as “any process by which managers direct 
attention, motivate, and encourage organizational members to act in desired ways to meet 
the firm’s objectives” (Cardinal, 2001: 22). The only difference with enforcement, from 
our perspective, is that enforcement is specifically concerned with adherence to formal 
rules. The activities that we see as part of the enforcement process are described below. 
Directing attention. The activity of directing attention, mentioned in the above 
definition, deserves greater emphasis in discussions of formalization and enforcement. 
Formal rules must obviously be promulgated, and organizations often take considerable 
pains to ensure that rule followers stay informed about recent rule births, revisions or 
suspensions (Kieser & Koch, 2008; March et al., 2000). Human attention is a scarce 
resource in organizations (Ocasio, 1997), and rule systems that are extensive, complex 
and/or frequently updated run the risk of exceeding rule followers’ attentional limits. As 
we discuss later in the chapter, directing rule followers’ attention to newly issued rules or 
rule versions can facilitate the development organizational memory about the rule system, 
retained in individuals’ memories (Walsh & Ungson, 1991), advice networks (Olivera, 
2000) and organizational stories (Boje, 1991), which can reduce the amount of search 
required in order identify the rules that are relevant to a given situation. Of course, 
excessive reliance on such memory as a substitute for reading the actual rule books also 
has its drawbacks. 
Educating. Another key activity in implementing formal systems, such as safety 
rules, is provision of education or training for rule followers is (e.g. Naveh, Katz-Navon, & 
Stern, 2005; Vaughan, 2005). Training sessions offer an additional opportunity to direct 
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rule followers’ attention to formal rules, to increase their familiarity with those rules 
(Hannah, 2005)5
Monitoring and incentives. The segment of the enforcement process that has 
received by far the greatest attention in the literature is the development and 
implementation of monitoring, sanctioning, and reward mechanisms (e.g. Arrow, 1964; 
Heugens, 2005; Ouchi, 1979; Tyler & Blader, 2005). Because codification is an ongoing 
process, extra effort may be needed to ensure that newly issued rules or rule versions 
become connected to such mechanisms, while rules that have been suspended become 
disconnected. When theorizing and implementing rules, rule makers will need to take in 
account possible difference the enforceability of those rules, which is primarily a function 
of “opportunities for observation of violation” (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009: 649). In 
, to clarify the rationale of the rules (Adler & Borys, 1996), to impart 
additional knowledge and skills necessary for applying or adhering to the rules, and to 
embed the rules more strongly in rule followers’ routine practices (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006). Clearly, such training can be especially important for novices or newcomers to the 
organization. However, as noted by Gherardi and Nicolini (2002: 193), formal 
(‘classroom-like’) training can easily fail to achieve any of these outcomes when it ignores 
the contextual, social and embodied nature of practice, with the result that “workers soon 
forget what they have learned [during safety training]”. Moreover, the informal processes 
through which novices are socialized into the practice that is supposed to be governed by 
the rules can have a much stronger effect on rule adherence (or lack thereof), compared to 
formal training (Ibid.). 
                                                            
5 Interestingly, Hannah (2005: 71) found that employees’ familiarity with trade secret protection procedures can have either a positive or a negative effect on their “felt obligations to 
protect trade secrets”, depending on the type of procedure. He interpreted these non-uniform effects as suggesting that some (but not all) procedures may signal distrust on the part of 
employers, leading to a negative impact on employees’ felt obligations. 
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some cases, it may be possible and desirable to complement weakly enforceable rules with 
“[p]hysical limits on employee action” (Lange, 2008: 716). This can be seen as an example 
of reinforcing the memory function of rules with ‘memory’ embodied in workplace 
technology and ecology (Walsh & Ungson, 1991). However, it is also a control strategy 
that can signal mistrust and provoke workarounds (Hannah, 2005; Lange, 2008). 
Alternatively, it may be possible to encourage deference to weakly enforceable rules by 
striving to increase their congruence with rule followers’ own normative understandings 
and internalized values (Lange, 2008; Tyler & Blader, 2005). This strategy corresponds to 
reinforcing the rule’s memory function by linking it more strongly to actors’ individual 
memories and organizational culture (Walsh & Ungson, 1991). For example, rule makers 
may attempt to mythologize the history of the older rules in order to preserve their 
normative underpinnings (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
For rules that are more enforceable, monitoring compliance may take the form of 
periodic inspection or even continuous surveillance that is enabled by information 
technologies. For example, in her study of air traffic control, Vaughan (2005: 52) describes 
how computer systems automatically measure and record all violations of the ‘rules of 
separation’, which “define the amount of space that must exist between aircraft in the air 
and on the runway”. Responsibility for such a violation/error is initially assigned by 
default to an individual controller, and the incident is investigated. In some cases, the 
controller in question may have to undergo retraining or even face more severe sanctions. 
Of course, such a command-and-control approach to enforcement, even when it is 
technically feasible, can have downsides (Tyler & Blader, 2005). Moreover, rule makers 
must be open to the fact that systematic departures from rules are sometimes caused by 
flaws in rule design or inappropriateness of those rules to current conditions (Jackson & 
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Adams, 1979), indicating the need to search for new rules or rule versions (Adler & Borys, 
1996; Desai, 2010). Due process, which refers to the existence of ‘appeal procedures’ for 
correcting possible shortcomings in rule design and resolving rule-related disputes, has 
been found to enhance a rule system’s effectiveness (Kwon, 2008: 1066). 
Feedback, precedents and discretion. For new rules or rule versions, a trial 
period may be required that would involve “testing formulated rules in the ‘real world’, 
and waiting for problems to occur that necessitate modifications” (Kieser & Koch, 2008). 
During this trial period, rule makers might closely monitor early cases of rule application 
and their effects, and encourage rule followers to provide feedback on the rule (Adler & 
Borys, 1996). For new rules, critical cases of (mis)application are likely to arise early on, 
which help to clarify remaining ambiguities, resolve unforeseen conflicts with other rules, 
and establish precedents for future applications (Levitt & March, 1988; Reynaud, 2005). 
Also, after changes to the organizational rule regime (March et al., 2000), including the 
actors formally responsible for enforcement, early cases of enforcement are likely to shape 
rule followers’ expectations regarding the enforcement process (Gouldner, 1954), 
including the organization’s tolerance of violations, as well as willingness to allow 
exceptions. Sending contradictory messages about enforcement can be problematic in this 
regard. 
Another key factor in the enforcement process is deciding when not to enforce the 
rules, but rather allow exceptions or more flexible interpretations (Brady, 1987; Kwon, 
2008). Thus, “leaders may elect not to enforce the formal structure if they feel 
nonenforcement will facilitate task achievement” (Ford, 1981: 281, citations omitted). 
Organizations can have different procedures for making exceptions to codified rules, some 
of which may themselves be codified (Brady, 1987). In many contexts, departures from 
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operating rules may only be allowed after formal review and authorization from rule 
makers/enforcers. In some cases, however, rule followers are empowered to depart from 
certain procedures based on their own judgment rather than formal authorization (Adler & 
Borys, 1996). For example, Roberts, Stout, and Halpern (1994: 621) note that the US Navy 
has a rule to the effect that one should “never break a rule unless safety will be jeopardized 
by carrying out the rule”. Similarly, Provera, Montefusco and Canatoan (2010: 1067) 
report an interview with VP of a retail bank, who spoke of the organization’s struggle to 
“include the possibility of committing of an error into our standard operating procedures” 
so as to make them “self-correcting”. 
Institutionalizing and deinstitutionalizing. Any analysis of enforcement needs to 
take the process of institutionalization and legitimation of rules into account (Schulz, 2003; 
Selznick, 1957; Tyler & Blader, 2005). Some perspectives on institutionalization actually 
suggest that highly-institutionalized rules will (almost by definition) be “relatively self-
activating” and will therefore not require repeated “authoritative intervention” in order to 
ensure adherence (Jepperson, 1991: 145). Given that institutionalization is closely related 
to legitimacy (e.g. Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and given that the legitimacy of the process 
and outcomes of formalization in the eyes of rule followers affect their voluntary deference 
to rules (Tyler & Blader, 2005), the possibility of managing such legitimacy (Suchman, 
1995) can make a major difference to the need for enforcement and the nature of the 
enforcement process (Lange, 2008; Tyler, 2004; Tyler & Blader, 2005). 
Due process, responsiveness to feedback, and a balance between consistent 
enforcement and reasonable exceptions are all likely to have a positive effect on legitimacy 
(Kwon, 2008; Tyler, 2004). The activities of directing attention and educating can also be 
used as part of efforts to legitimate and institutionalize organizational rules, especially 
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when these activities succeed in forging the connection between specific rules and rule 
followers’ collective identities and their existing taken-for-granted practices (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006)6
To summarize this discussion so far, we can say that the main activities involved in the 
enforcement process are: directing attention, educating rule followers, implementing 
monitoring, sanctioning, and reward mechanisms, maintaining due process, soliciting 
feedback from rule followers, and managing precedents and exceptions. Two broader 
remarks can also be made. First, there is a close link between the enforcement process and 
the levels of legitimation and institutionalization of rules, rule systems and rule regimes. 
The enforcement activities listed above can contribute towards the reproduction or 
. It should be noted, however, that a high degree of rule 
institutionalization is not always desirable and can pose special problems for enforcement 
of rule suspensions (or significant revisions). That is, there is a risk that some actors will 
continue to habitually follow an institutionalized rule, even after rule makers have 
officially suspended it, so that additional effort is required to deinstitutionalize that rule. In 
order to do so, rule makers might attempt to problematize the suspended rule by 
highlighting its adverse consequences for the organization and its possible inconsistencies 
with other taken-for-granted assumptions and practices. In some cases, the deeper beliefs 
that provided the institutional foundation for the suspended rule must themselves be 
undermined (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Although this is quite difficult to accomplish, 
some strategies available to rule makers include supporting those rule followers who 
already espouse a new and contrary set of beliefs, and supporting contrary practices that 
can erode the original belief system. 
                                                            
6 One must be careful not to exaggerate rule makers’ capacity to unilaterally influence the levels of rule institutionalization. Indeed, the scope for actors’ agency in institutional 
processes is the subject of ongoing debate in institutional theory (e.g., Heugens & Lander, 2009). 
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transformation these social properties. Second, the process of codification can have major 
implications for enforcement, and vice versa. While we tried to maintain an analytic 
distinction between them, we acknowledge that codification and enforcement can overlap 
to some extent in practice. For instance, theorizing and soliciting feedback on a rule can 
continue both before and after that rule has been issued, while the problems encountered in 
enforcing rules can serve as input for further codification. Figure 3.1 provides an overview 
of the formalization process. 
 
Figure 3.1: Formalization process framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Implications for formalization’s memory function 
The more detailed overview of the formalization process developed in the previous section 
extends our understanding of formalization’s memory function and of organizational 
memory more broadly, by paying greater heed to the social roles and processes underlying 
the organizational capacity for developing, updating and using formalized memory. To 
illustrate the fruitfulness of the formalization process framework as a conceptual lens, we 
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show how it helps us understand the factors that condition the memory function of formal 
rule systems. Because the formalization process framework covers a large number of 
generic activities, and multiple variables could be defined to capture the relevant features 
of each activity, our discussion of the conditioning factors is not meant to be exhaustive. 
Rather, our aim is merely to provide some general observations and specific examples (in 
the form of theoretical propositions) of the ways in which the process side of formalization 
matters. We organize our discussion around Levitt and March’s (1988) three phases of 
organizational memory, for which we have previously defined three corresponding 
dimensions of formalization’s memory function. 
 
3.4.1 Recording 
The notion of memory necessarily implies a link to past history. The memory perspective 
on formal rules views such rules as repositories of lessons from past organizational 
experience, and specifically of solutions to organizational problems (Levitt & March, 
1988; March et al., 2000; Ocasio, 1999; Schulz, 1998a). Thus, we can say that a rule or set 
of rules has a memory function only to the extent that this assumption holds for these rules, 
which need not always be the case. As noted by Lampel (2006: 343), organizational 
rulemaking does not always focus on past organizational experience, but may sometimes 
be much more influenced by “prudential concerns about hypothetical futures”, leading to 
rules “without solid historical foundations”. The memory function of such rules will be 
prima facie weaker, at least initially. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that 
prudential rulemaking should be avoided, since memory preservation is not the only 
function of formalization (nor is it always the most important one). Moreover, even if the 
rule deals with a wholly hypothetical scenario, rule makers can still draw on organizational 
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and industry experience of actual events that provide relevant analogies for the 
hypothetical scenario. Finally, the memory function of a prudential rule may be 
strengthened if the hypothetical scenario envisaged by rule makers actually transpires 
sometime after the rule’s adoption, and the rule is revised to take the new information into 
account. 
Besides prudential concerns, we should consider how other characteristics of the 
codification process that can be expected to affect the information that becomes recorded 
into a formal rule or set of rules. Recall that in our discussion of codification episodes, 
experience articulation and sensemaking activities were identified as important precursors 
to such episodes. There are many occasions that enable organizations to articulate and 
make sense of recent experience, including “collective discussions, debriefing sessions, 
and performance evaluation processes” (Zollo & Winter, 2002: 341). Although these 
occasions may themselves draw on various memory repositories, the process of 
articulation helps to further supplement, elaborate, integrate, reinterpret, filter or 
reorganize this information, thereby generating new memory contents. Examples of new 
memory generated through articulation include reports, minutes of meetings, stored 
electronic mail, but also new connections and understandings between actors (Feldman & 
Rafaeli, 2002), which imply a modified transactive memory system (Wegner, 1987). This 
modified memory becomes a potential source of information for rule makers. 
Clearly, links to data sources are a crucial factor for the recording capability of 
any memory repository (e.g. Stein & Zwass, 1995: 104). Yet, it would obviously be 
impossible for rule makers to sift through all potentially relevant information from other 
organizational memory repositories (e.g. minutes of meetings, reports, databases, stories) 
during a codification episode (cf. Huber [1991] on information overload). Rule makers 
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must allocate scarce attentional resources between information search and other activities 
(Ocasio, 1997). If the rule makers have some very general information about past 
occasions for sensemaking or articulation (i.e. meetings, dialogues) that could be 
potentially relevant to a certain rule proposal, and are able to identify and contact some of 
the actors who participated in those processes, then this can simplify the search for 
information (Kieser & Koch, 2008). Taking this information into account during 
codification can contribute to the memory function of the resulting rules in at least two 
ways. First, it expands the sample of experiences for making inferences, resulting in rules 
that more fully reflect organizational history (March et al., 2000). Second, it minimizes 
potential inconsistencies between rules and other memory repositories, and thus reduces 
the likelihood that retrieval of formal memory will be inhibited by these inconsistencies. 
Proposition 1. Formalization's memory function will be stronger when the rule 
makers attend to articulation and sensemaking episodes in the organization and 
have the means of locating and contacting the actors, who participated in those 
episodes. 
 
3.4.2 Conservation 
Organizations with extensive rule systems face the practical challenge of ensuring that 
organizational members are aware of the existence of the various rules and are more or less 
familiar with their content. Familiarity (Hannah, 2005) is important for the memory 
function of a formal rule system, because it indicates the presence ‘meta-memory’ or 
organizational memory about the rule system (Wegner, 1987: 187). If the organization 
fails to develop and conserve such meta-memory, then retrieval of appropriate information 
from the rule system in a given situation becomes much less likely. Thus, even though 
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conservation of the formal rule system itself can usually be taken for granted (since the text 
of the rules is encoded in durable media), conservation of rule-related meta-memory is 
likely to be a serious challenge, especially under conditions of high turnover. 
An important portion of such meta-memory is developed by actors (mainly rule 
makers) as a by-product of participating in codification episodes. However, in most 
organizations, rule follower involvement in codification episodes tends to be low, so 
additional effort will be required to ensure that rule followers develop their own meta-
memory, which usually takes time and cannot be assumed to happen automatically. Novice 
rule followers need to have both incentives and opportunities to familiarize themselves 
with the rule system. With regard to opportunities, a lot will hinge on the activity of 
directing attention, which we highlighted in our discussion of enforcement. Attention is 
likely to be directed to rules when rules are a salient topic in day-to-day organizational 
communication. In particular, managerial personnel responsible for setting performance 
targets can place more or less emphasis on the need to comply with certain organizational 
rules (or refer to certain manuals) in task performance. A similar argument is made by 
(Naveh, Katz-Navon, & Stern, 2005: 951), who hypothesized that the presence of 
“suitable” safety procedures will be more likely to lead to reduced errors when managers’ 
practices are “perceived as emphasizing safety”. 
The role of education activities, such as vocational training, as a means of 
directing rule followers’ attention to rules and facilitating the conservation of rule-related 
meta-memory, have already been noted. However, these effects of rule-related training 
may soon fade, unless they are reinforced by more informal socialization practices that 
also emphasize rules (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002). Moreover, education and managerial 
communication may have no effect or even provoke a cynical response from rule followers 
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(Dean, Brandes, & Dharwadkar, 1998) when the organizational rule system lacks 
legitimacy (Tyler, 2004). A similar point is made by Naveh and associates (2005: 951), but 
using the notion of procedure ‘suitability’ rather than legitimacy. We therefore offer the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 2. Attention to formalization in organizational training programs and 
day-to-day managerial communication will have a positive effect on 
formalization’s memory function, provided that the formal rule system has a 
minimum level of legitimacy. 
 
3.4.3 Retrieval 
Since most rule systems are associated with some form monitoring and sanctioning 
mechanisms, it is worth considering the implications of these mechanisms for the memory 
function of those rule systems. Clearly, in many cases organizational rule makers might 
have reasons to anticipate both that non-adherence to certain rules would have disastrous 
consequences for the organization, and that (at least some) rule followers will have a 
preference for non-adherence due to, for example, the time consuming nature of 
requirements imposed by the rules. In these cases, rule makers will most likely opt for 
monitoring and sanctions as a means of ensuring retrieval of formal memory. However, as 
Tyler and Blader (2005: 1144) point out, “[f]or sanctions and deterrence systems to work, 
organizations must be able (and willing) to devote considerable resources to the 
surveillance needed to make detection of rule breaking sufficiently likely that people are 
deterred”. Assuming that this is possible, implementing such systems can indeed motivate 
rule followers to pay closer attention to organizational rules, and to be more proactive in 
striving to minimize errors in rule application by, for example, asking rule makers for 
80 
 
further clarification. Indeed, coercive systems imply a lower tolerance of errors in rule 
application (Adler & Borys, 1996), since any deviation from a rule is likely to be treated as 
a potential rule violation, unless can be proven otherwise (Vaughan, 2005). This reasoning 
suggests that the use of monitoring and sanctions can enhance the memory function of 
rules by stimulating retrieval and resolution of ambiguity. 
Memory retrieval also depends on the level of rule institutionalization. As 
discussed earlier, rule institutionalization implies that rule adherence becomes more or less 
automatic, and therefore less contingent on situational variation in the costs and benefits of 
adherence. This bears some affinity to the notion of ‘automatic’ (as opposed to 
‘controlled’) memory retrieval in the memory literature (Walsh & Ungson, 1991). A rule 
system characterized by high levels of institutionalization should have a stronger memory 
function, simply because rule adherence (and therefore retrieval) has become more 
routinized for such a system. Moreover, institutionalization should also help to ensure that 
retrieval of formal memory is maintained in the long term, and not merely in the period 
when rule makers/enforcers are especially attentive to it. Yet the use of sanctions 
(especially ‘hard’ ones like withholding expected rewards, status degradation, and legal 
liability) is not always conducive to institutionalization and may even work against it by 
diverting rule followers’ attention towards avoiding punishment and away from the more 
substantive value-based reasons for adherence (Lange, 2008: 725; Tyler, 2004). Thus, the 
increased salience of purely instrumental concerns associated with sanctions makes it less 
likely that the rule system will become ‘infused with value’ (Selznick, 1957). 
A further drawback of monitoring and sanctions in relation to the memory 
function becomes apparent if we consider the whole memory process rather than merely 
memory retrieval, and specifically the feedback effect of enforcement on future 
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codification efforts. As empirical research conducted by Tamuz (2001: 299) in the air 
transportation industry shows, “the use of incentives necessary for rule enforcement 
creates disincentives for reporting potential dangers and constrains how data about these 
events are classified and stored”. Thus, fear of sanctions can prevent rule followers from 
reporting errors in rule application or deviations of observed situations from the ‘theory’ 
implicit in the rule (that cannot be detected via monitoring), which can severely limit the 
pool of organizational experience available to rule makers during subsequent codification 
episodes and lead to systematic biases in the information encoded into the rule system 
(Levitt & March, 1988; March et al., 2000). Thus, by severing the link between rules and 
at least some of the potentially relevant organizational history, these enforcement 
mechanisms clearly undermine formalization’s memory function in the long term. 
Proposition 3. The use of monitoring and sanctions in enforcement will have a 
positive effect on formalization’s memory function in the short term, but a 
negative effect in the long term. 
 
The negative long-term effect may be weaker for softer sanctions, such as 
negative supervisor evaluations and retraining. In fact, soft sanctions, coupled with 
extensive monitoring, may well contribute to the durable institutionalization of rules, 
provided that these elements are used as part of a broader disciplinary power process, 
which would ensure that these “external pressures” are eventually “internalized” by rule 
followers, becoming a routine feature of their work (Lawrence, Winn, & Jennings, 2001: 
636-637). This in turn requires an enforcement process capable of shaping not only rule’ 
followers rule-related experience, but also their understanding of this experience and even 
their very identities through mechanisms like training, socialization and teamwork 
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(Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck, & Kleysen, 2005: 187-188). For instance, the concertive control 
approach to formalization, referenced earlier, where rule followers are allowed to 
formulate and codify their own rules based on agreed-on group norms, can come to 
constitute a disciplinary system that incorporates ‘horizontal’ peer surveillance and 
behavior correction as part of the very process of teamwork and socialization (Sewell, 
1998). 
3.5 Discussion and conclusion 
Our aim in this chapter has been to analyze organizational formalization as process (rather 
than a fixed outcome) from an organizational memory perspective in order to advance our 
understanding of the implications of this process for formalization’s memory function. We 
offered a framework that provides an overview of the main activities involved in the 
formalization process and a rough classification of these activities into two broader 
analytical categories, namely codification and enforcement. Although the subdivision of 
the formalization process into codification and enforcement is borrowed from previous 
research (Adler & Borys, 1996; Vlaar, 2007; 2008), our framework constitutes one of the 
most comprehensive accounts of codification and enforcement available to date, while also 
highlighting the need to examine these sub-processes together due to potential 
interrelations and overlap between them. The framework draws on a variety of disparate 
literatures, ranging from organizational learning (e.g. Zollo & Winter, 2002; Schulz, 
1998a) and high reliability organizing (Vaughan, 2005), to institutional theory (Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006) and organizational control (Lange, 2008), paving the way for closer 
integration between these literatures around the topic of formal rules. To illustrate the 
framework’s usefulness for understanding the antecedents of formalization’s memory 
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function, we have selected a number of themes from the framework and developed 
propositions relating those themes to the memory function of formalization. Examples of 
themes that we considered include rule makers’ attention to articulation and sensemaking, 
the activities of directing attention and educating, applying and the effects of sanctions. 
 
3.5.1 Theoretical and Research Implications 
The dual focus on formalization as a process and formalization’s memory function has 
several theoretical implications that are worth highlighting. First, it encourages us to go 
beyond the truism that rules codify and preserve information from an organization’s past, 
and to specify more precisely what we actually mean when we attribute a memory function 
to formalization. In this chapter, we distinguished between three dimensions of this 
function, which must both be taken into account in assessing it, namely the extent to which 
rules are actually based on past organizational experience (recording), the extent of rule 
followers familiarity with these rules (conservation), and the extent to which rule followers 
actually retrieve information encoded in those rules (retrieval). Of course, more work is 
needed to further refine, supplement, and operationalize these dimensions. Developing a 
robust conceptualization of the memory function can be important for advancing research 
on ‘enabling’ formalization (e.g. Adler & Borys, 1996; Adler, 1999; Briscoe, 2007; 
DeHart-Davis, 2009), since a strong memory function has been cited as one of the defining 
characteristics of such formalization (e.g. Adler & Borys, 1996: 69). However, as far as we 
know, none of the published literature that references rules (or formalization) as a form of 
organizational memory contains an explicit discussion of potential variation in the strength 
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of the memory function, either at rule system level, or at the level of individual rules.7
Second, the proposed formalization process framework contributes to 
perspectives on organizational learning that emphasize ‘institutionalization’ as a crucial 
step in the learning cycle that “sets organizational learning apart from individual or ad hoc 
group learning” (Crossan et al., 1999: 529). According to these perspectives, 
institutionalization implies that “learning is embedded in the systems, structures, strategy, 
routines, prescribed practices of the organization, and investments in information systems 
and infrastructure” (ibid.). Some authors have also employed the term ‘organizational 
capital’ to refer to “institutionalized knowledge and codified experience stored in 
databases, routines, patents, manuals, structures, and the like” (Youndt, Subramaniam, & 
Snell, 2004: 338). Although formal rules (including procedures and manuals) constitute 
merely one item among many on these lists of organizational elements in which 
learning/knowledge may be embedded, they are frequently cited as examples (e.g. Crossan 
et al., 1999: 531). 
 The 
dimensions that we identified highlight the need to take such variation into account in 
future work on the topic. Future research might also use these dimensions to assess the 
memory function of other potential memory repositories in organizations besides formal 
rule systems, such as various kinds of electronic databases and even advice networks 
(Olivera, 2000). 
Our process framework complements these approaches and suggests that 
activities like interpreting and integrating organizational experience not only precede 
institutionalization (Crossan et al., 1999), but may actually be stimulated by the very effort 
                                                            
7 A possible exception is the work of March, Schulz and Zhou (2000), who suggested that a rule’s age might be a proxy for the amount of knowledge stored in the rule (see also 
Schulz, 2003). 
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to codify and institutionalize experience via rulemaking. It also points to the fact that not 
all attempts to embed the lessons of organizational learning in durable artefacts like written 
rules will succeed in ‘institutionalizing’ these lessons in the sociological sense of the term 
(e.g. Zucker, 1977)8
 
. Most importantly, our framework and propositions highlight the role 
of enforcement in enabling the retrieval of learning. Issues of enforcement and control are 
still sometimes overlooked in extant discussions of codification (Cowan & Foray, 1997; 
Zollo & Winter, 2002; but see Lazaric & Denis, 2005; Prencipe & Tell, 2001) and 
institutionalization of knowledge or learning (Crossan et al., 1999; Youndt et al., 2004; but 
see Lanzara & Partiotta, 2007; Lawrence et al., 2005). We have suggested, however, that 
enforcement activities play a key role in maintaining or altering the levels of legitimacy 
and institutionalization of rules (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
3.5.2 Limitations of Analysis and Topics for Future Research 
Before we discuss the more substantive limitations of our work, it seems appropriate to 
make a couple of remarks about its similarities to (and differences from) research by Paul 
Vlaar and associates on formalization and sensemaking (Vlaar et al., 2006; 2007). We 
must admit that their work has been a source of inspiration and a model for our approach to 
formalization’s memory function. Vlaar and associates argued that “participants in 
interorganizational relationships use formalization as a means to make sense of their 
partners, the interorganizational relationships in which they are engaged and the contexts 
in which these are embedded so as to diminish problems of understanding” (Vlaar et al., 
                                                            
8 Some of the authors discussing ‘institutionalization’ of knowledge or lessons of organizational learning have already been explicit on this point. For example, Lanzara and Patriotta 
(2007: 637) distinguish between the process through which “ideas, intentions and haphazard modes of action gradually become embedded in durable artifacts and stable structures of 
signification” and the process of actual institutionalization of these structures through which they become taken for granted.  
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2006: 1617). They further identified a number of mechanisms, through which 
formalization facilitates sensemaking. Like these authors, we are basically interested in the 
link between formalization and organizational cognition and learning (Vlaar, et al.: 2007: 
444). However, whereas these authors focus on sensemaking and coping with problems of 
understanding, we focus on organizational memory, and especially on retention and 
retrieval of lessons from organizational experience. While the information retrieved from 
formalization can certainly help actors to cope with problems of understanding, it can also 
help in reducing errors and safety risks (e.g. Bruns, 2009; Naveh et al., 2005) or in 
speeding up and legitimating organizational decision making (e.g. Ocasio, 1999; Walsh & 
Ungson, 1991). 
Admittedly, Vlaar and associates do discuss reduction of biases and judgment 
errors as one of the mechanisms through which formalization facilitates sensemaking 
(2007: 1626), but they do not link these outcomes to the notions of organizational memory, 
experience or information retention. They did mention the memory concept briefly in the 
second paper, where one of their findings was that formalization “functioned, among 
others, as a memory device, reducing the vulnerability of the alliance to personnel turnover 
and fallible memories” (Vlaar et al., 2007: 451). Unfortunately, they did not elaborate 
further on the nature of this memory function or its antecedents. With regard to 
information, they argued that “[f]ormalization also raises the likelihood that relevant 
information is considered and treated properly” (Vlaar et al., 2006: 1626). Our work 
complements this argument, but goes a step further by emphasizing that much of the 
‘relevant information’ will itself be codified and preserved in formal rule systems. 
While the notion of formalization as a process is already referenced by Vlaar and 
associates (2006; 2007), we develop this notion much further than has been done in 
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previous research. Naturally, there are a couple of places where our formalization 
framework overlaps with these authors’ discussion of sensemaking mechanisms. For 
example, the link between formalization and articulation figures prominently in both 
frameworks (see also Zollo & Winter, 2002). Both frameworks also mention the notion of 
attention, but treat it quite differently. While we agree with Vlaar and associates’ (2006: 
1623) argument that formalization can act as a ‘focusing device’, our emphasis is more on 
whether or not attention is directed towards formalization itself. If actors routinely neglect 
to attend to the content of rules, then benefits of formalization discussed by Vlaar and 
associates (2007) are unlikely to materialize. More broadly, the notion of enforcement that 
these authors rightly identify as important receives a much more detailed treatment in our 
work. In the end, this chapter represents an example of cumulative theory building, where 
brief suggestions from earlier work are assimilated, integrated and taken in new directions. 
A comparison with the work of Vlaar and associates also suggests a couple of 
directions for future research. First, the relation between organizational memory and 
sensemaking needs to be further clarified. We suggested that incident-related sensemaking 
can become a precursor to changes in organizational memory (via codification), and that 
the very process of updating organizational memory often induces further sensemaking. 
Future research might focus more on the retrieval side of memory and investigate how 
sensemaking is affected by retrieval of information from formalization and other memory 
repositories. Second, Vlaar and associates (2006; 2007) focused on formalization in an 
interorganizational context, while most of our arguments implicitly assumed a single 
organization. Future research may consider extending our analysis to an interorganizational 
context, which is likely to require some modifications to our framework, such as for 
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example, considering interactions between two or more groups of rule makers and rule 
followers from different organizations. 
Naturally, we hope that our framework and propositions will be taken up in future 
empirical work. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to offer some suggestions with regards to 
operationalizing our the concept of memory function. Because memory function is 
multidimensional and these dimensions need not be strongly correlated, researchers should 
ideally develop operationalizations for each dimension. To assess preservation of history, 
researchers may develop psychometric scales and ask rule makers to rate the extent to 
which they considered and incorporated information related to the organization’s past into 
its rules. However, this operationalization has many limitations, such as recollection bias 
and the practical impossibility of identifying and contacting the rule makers that drafted 
certain very old rules in the rule system. 
An alternative or complementary approach would be using historical methods to 
reconstruct the rule system’s history based on documentary evidence about various 
codification episodes and to rate the extent to which the resulting rules reflect the historical 
information. For conservation, the work of Hannah (2005) suggests ways of measuring 
rule followers’ familiarity with a given set of rules. Finally, for retrieval, researchers might 
adapt Tyler and Blader’s (2005) methodology to measure rule adherence, but also include 
items measuring the extent to which rule followers perceive rules as clear or ambiguous, 
and informative or uninformative. Examining the memory function of formalization and 
the factors that condition it can help organizations develop formal structures that are less 
impervious to organizational learning, so as to make repetition of past organizational 
mistakes and shortcomings less likely in the future. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING THROUGH 
PROBLEM ABSORPTION: A processual view 
 
In organizations, existing codified rules are often used as the basis for solving new 
problems even when this means stretching those rules. Such ‘absorption’ of new problems 
by rules reduces the need to explore and develop new solutions and to encode those 
solutions into new rules. In this chapter we examine the phenomenon of ‘problem 
absorption’ more closely from the process perspective and conceptualize it as a micro-
level form of ‘semantic learning’. Contrary to previous literature, we argue that problem 
absorption does not necessarily reinforce existing rules and prevent the search for 
alternatives. We thus contribute to the literature on organizational learning and rule 
dynamics by showing how under certain conditions the cumulative effects of semantic 
learning via repeated absorption of novel problems by formal rules can give rise to higher-
level learning that has the potential to transform the organization’s rule system.  
4.1 Introduction 
Organizational learning is often conceptualized as a process by which organizations 
develop rules, procedures and routines for solving recurring organizational problems 
(Cyert & March, 1992; Levitt & March, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Schulz, 1998a; 
Weick, 1991). Over time, a repertory of ‘tried-and-tested’ solutions is built up in 
organizational memory (Walsh & Ungson, 1991), and, insofar as these can be used to deal 
with or ‘absorb’ new problems, the perceived need to search for alternative solutions is 
reduced (Levitt & March, 1988). In the literature on the dynamics of organizational rule 
systems in particular (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000), this notion of ‘problem absorption’ 
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has been used to explain why the availability of codified and prescribed solutions to 
problems in the form of written rules tends to reduce the impetus for further learning and 
codification efforts (Schulz, 1998a). 
In this chapter we examine the phenomenon of ‘problem absorption’ more closely 
from the process perspective (e.g., Tsoukas & Chia, 2002), arguing that it need not always 
imply the absence of organizational learning. On the contrary, we suggest that insofar as it 
involves the ongoing construction and reconstruction of the very meaning of those rules in 
practice and calls for reflexivity on the part of the actors concerned (e.g., Antonacopoulou 
& Tsoukas, 2002; Archer, 2003), problem absorption may actually constitute a form of 
organizational learning in its own right. Furthermore, while extant literature on problem 
absorption suggests that “[s]tretching old rules to deal with new problems reinforces the 
old rules” (Schulz, 1998a: 853), we propose that such stretching can actually undermine 
those rules under certain conditions and thereby trigger higher-level organizational 
learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). 
The intended contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, although the idea that 
rules absorb problems has already been introduced and briefly discussed in the literature on 
rules (Schulz, 1998a; March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000), the concept of problem absorption 
remains underdeveloped. Our analysis helps to address this gap by reconceptualizing 
problem absorption as a reflexive process and integrating the concept more strongly with 
other literature that deals with related phenomena (Corley & Gioia, 2003; Tsoukas & Chia, 
2002). Understanding problem absorption by rules is important for organization theory not 
only because such absorption constitutes a mechanism that limits bureaucratic growth 
(Schulz, 1998a), but also because, as we argue in this chapter, problem absorption can be a 
source of both lower and higher-level organizational learning. Thus, our second 
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contribution is to challenge views that associate problem absorption with only lower-level 
learning (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000) or codification traps (Schulz, 1998a), by showing 
how the process of repeated and cumulative problem absorption can induce higher-level 
learning and thus release the organization from the codification trap. Our arguments 
suggest opportunities for advancing research on organizational learning through closer 
attention to learning in bureaucratic contexts. 
Building an previous literature, we conceptualize problem absorption as involving 
reflexive extension of a rule’s labelled categories to cases that are markedly different from 
the prototypical members of those categories (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002), which allows 
practitioners to maintain the pattern of practice and a sense of order in the face of 
ambiguity and situational variation. We further argue that problem absorption is a form of 
‘semantic learning’ or learning on the basis of meanings that emerges in a subtle and 
largely unintentional way from organizational members’ practical coping (Corley & Gioia, 
2003). When rules are extended to new cases repeatedly, semantic learning can become 
cumulative due to retention of precedents and new understandings in organizational 
memory (Walsh & Ungson, 1991). We suggest that it can have certain destabilizing effects 
on the relevant rule or rules and the broader understandings that underpin those rules and 
support their use in practice (Schatzki, 2006). Rule makers’ recognition of these effects 
through reflection can lead to higher-level organizational learning, unlearning (Tsang & 
Zahra, 2008), and codification. 
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4.2 Theoretical background 
 
4.2.1 Problem Absorption and Rule Dynamics 
The notion of problem absorption, as developed in the literature on rule dynamics (Schulz, 
1998a; March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000), has its roots in the ‘Carnegie School’ research 
program, with its emphasis on the relationship between “human problem-solving 
processes” under bounded rationality and “the basic features of organization structure” 
(March & Simon, 1993: 190). According to this perspective, problem definitions, for 
example, do not constitute complete or fully accurate representations of all aspects of a 
problem, but rather simplified models that tend to be constructed already in light of 
potentially available solutions (March & Simon, 1993; Starbuck, 1983). Furthermore, 
many solutions, having once been developed through the process of search, become 
learned responses that can subsequently be routinely applied to similar situations, reducing 
the search process to the task of matching problems to solutions, and vice versa (Cohen, 
March, & Olsen, 1972; March & Simon, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988). Thus, an 
organization gradually accumulates a repertory of decision rules, procedures and routines 
for dealing with recurring problems (Cyert & March, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
The rule dynamics research builds on these ideas, arguing that “[t]oday’s rules are 
often the solution to yesterday’s problems” (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000: 48). The 
recognition or ‘social construction’ of problems is sporadic and depends strongly on the 
allocation of organizational attention to different organizational task domains when 
performance in those domains falls below aspiration levels (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000: 
63; see also Cyert & March, 1992; Zhou, 1993). Once a solution to a problem situation has 
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been encoded in a written rule, it is assumed that the rule can also help organizational 
members to deal with future problems “in a routine way”, making such problems “less 
available for further rule production” (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000: 65). This is what is 
meant by problem absorption. 
Schulz (1998a) identified two problem absorption mechanisms. The first of these, 
which he called preemption, has to do with the reluctance of rule makers to develop new 
rule-based solutions to a problem when a rule-based solution to the same problem already 
exists, because doing so could lead to inconsistencies between rules. The second 
mechanism involves a so-called codification trap stemming from the tendency of rule 
users to “stretch established rules to cope with new problems”, which “reinforces the old 
rules and keeps experience with alternatives inadequate to make them rewarding to use” 
(Schulz, 1998a: 853; see also Levitt & March, 1988). Schulz found indirect empirical 
support for problem absorption in the tendency for the rate of birth of new rules to decline 
as the total number of rules in a given domain grew larger. He also also found that the rule 
birth rate increased when other rules were suspended, suggesting that such suspensions 
allowed problems that had previously been ‘absorbed’ to be ‘released’ and ‘recycled’ into 
new rules (Schulz, 1998a: 855). 
In another study, Beck and Kieser (2003) attempted to extend the problem 
absorption argument to rule revisions, but could not find support for the hypothesis that 
rates of revision would decline with rule volume. March, Schulz, and Zhou (2000: 58) 
have suggested that rules are revised primarily in order to enhance their capacity to absorb 
new problems, describing this ‘refinement’ process “as a case of learning by rules”. Rule 
revision is also seen as a process through which experiences accumulated through rule use 
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become formally incorporated into the rule (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000: 76; see also 
Beck & Kieser, 2003; Schulz, 2003). 
What are the main implications of these arguments and findings for the 
relationship between problem absorption by rules and organizational learning? Insofar as 
problem absorption involves exploitation of experiences already encoded in extant rules, it 
may prevent exploration of alternative solutions (March, 1991; Schulz, 1998a). Note that 
such exploitation need not imply the absence of learning, since rule users can learn “how 
to operate within rules, extending the meaning of rules to new situations, molding them to 
encompass new problems” (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000: 53). However, this kind of 
experiential learning within rules is seen as contributing to the stability of those rules (cf. 
Zhou, 1993), and thus to the codification trap mechanism mentioned above (Schulz, 1998a; 
Levitt & March, 1988). Even when some of these learned experiences are formally 
incorporated into the rules via the revision process, such revisions may well only serve to 
further enhance the rule’s stability through refinement (Beck & Kieser, 2003; March, 
Schulz, & Zhou, 2000). 
Despite considerable theoretical and empirical progress towards understanding 
both the problem absorption phenomenon itself, as well as its importance and 
consequences for organizations, we contend that important gaps in the theoretical 
treatment of the phenomenon still remain, and that filling those gaps from a process 
perspective will yield insights that may challenge some of the above conclusions regarding 
the relationship between problem absorption and organizational learning and change. In 
particular, extant treatments of problem absorption do not sufficiently address the micro-
processes through which absorption occurs, the broader normative and cognitive 
foundations that underpin the organizational rule system, and the role played by reflexivity 
95 
 
of organizational members. In the next section we further elaborate on these issues and 
explain how adopting a process perspective can both sensitize us to them, as well as 
provide a way to theorize about them. 
 
4.2.2 A Processual View of Problem Absorption 
The meta-theoretical approach that we favour treats organizational rules as components of 
unfolding organizational practices (Schatzki, 2005; 2006). Moreover, it views the 
performative dimension (Feldman & Pentland, 2003) of such practices as inescapably 
open-ended and processual, and as having ontological primacy over the 
structure/organization/patterning of practice, which is a secondary accomplishment 
(Schatzki, 2005; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). In line with this assumption, the meanings of 
artifacts like written rules are not ‘given’ once and for all but are negotiated in and through 
practical activity, ever remaining open-ended and in a state of becoming (Tsoukas & Chia, 
2002). As Tsoukas (1996) has forcefully argued, drawing on the work of Wittgenstein 
(1959) and other philosophers and social theorists, the knowledge that informs and directs 
the flow of practice can never be reduced to such rules, since ‘correct’ use of any rule in a 
specific case always presupposes an unarticulated background of understandings, 
expectations and embodied abilities. 
How can this perspective contribute to our understanding of problem absorption? 
First, it provides a way of going beyond the truism that rules are extended or ‘stretched’ to 
cope with new cases (Schulz, 1998a) and of theorizing about this process. The very notion 
of ‘stretching’ presupposes not only a view of rule use as involving attempts to subsume 
particular cases under general categories that correspond to the rule’s domain (Schulz, 
1998a), but also a distinction between prototypical and non-prototypical cases, the former 
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being more representative of a given category than the latter (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). The 
‘absorption’ of a problem by a rule will thus often require “an imaginative projection of a 
category beyond prototypical cases to marginal ones”, which in turn has “the potential of 
extending the radius of application of the concept, thus transforming it” (Tsoukas & Chia, 
2002: 574). This conceptualization opens up new questions about problem absorption, such 
as the issue of the stability of prototypes, and the long-term effects of such conceptual 
micro-transformations. 
Second, by emphasizing that rules are incomplete and so can never determine 
their own use (Reynaud, 2005; Tsoukas, 1996), the process perspective encourages us to 
look beyond the properties of the written rules themselves in analyzing problem absorption 
and its effects. For example, work on organizational routines and practices suggests that 
not only rules, but also general background assumptions and understandings about, for 
example, the nature of the task performed, the social roles of organizational members, 
organizational goals and priorities, and other relatively ‘enduring’ aspects of organizational 
context, make an important contribution to the patterning of activities in organizations 
(e.g., Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002; Schatzki, 2006). This does not imply that all such 
understandings, if brought into focal awareness and reflected upon (Tsoukas, 1996), will 
be met with agreement by all participants in the routine or practice, but merely that there is 
sufficient implicit agreement to sustain mutual expectations and the patterning of activity.9
                                                            
9 A participant can feel a pressure to conform due to her assumption that such implicit agreement exists among others. However, this assumption may well overestimate the actual 
extent of agreement. 
 
Some of these understandings will also correspond to the cognitive and normative 
foundations underpinning certain sets of rules within the rule system; foundations that 
97 
 
develop over time though theorizing and valorizing activities (Heugens & Osadchiy, 2007; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
One of the reasons why these understandings cannot be neglected in the analysis 
of problem absorption is that they are likely to encompass lessons from past rule use 
experience, including stories about different prototypical and non-prototypical cases that 
have already been encountered and any precedents that may have been established (Levitt 
& March, 1988). As emphasized by Schatzki (2006), the concept of organizational 
memory10
Third, the analysis of problem absorption requires clarity in the assumptions 
regarding the scope for and role of human reflexivity in rule use (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). 
While Schulz (1998a: 853) suggests that problem absorption by bureaucrats might be 
“habitual” or the result of training (Merton, 1940), our view is that the constraints of 
bureaucracy can be mediated by reflexivity on the part of actors (Archer, 2003). Indeed, 
the view of rules as forming relatively enduring institutional structures with their own 
emergent causal powers, which constrain and enable the practice of agents (Archer, 1995), 
can be juxtaposed with the view of rules as ‘tools’ that are ‘readily available’ to 
practitioners who use them and that gradually come to be ‘internalized’ or ‘dwelled-in’ by 
 is necessary for explaining how general understandings about practice are 
preserved in organizations (Walsh & Ungson, 1991). While written rules may be regarded 
as the formal memory of the organization (Heugens & Osadchiy, 2007; Levitt & March, 
1988: 327; Schatzki, 2006), it is also important to recognize that “organizations have 
memories in the form of precedents” (Cyert & March, 1992: 38). An analysis of problem 
absorption must take both these interdependent memory repositories into account. 
                                                            
10 The processual orientation sensitizes us to the danger of reifying organizational memory or conceptualizing it in substantialist terms. Perhaps ‘organizational remembering’ would 
be a better term in this context (cf. Feldman & Feldman, 2006). 
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those practitioners (Chia & Holt, 2006). While the language of ‘internalization’ may 
appear to conflate people and rules (cf. Archer, 1995 on Giddens), this criticism need not 
apply. The analytic distinction between rules and rule users can still be maintained, since 
there is always a possibility of “distancing of the individual from the phenomenon 
apprehended”, a reflexive standing back, which characterizes the ‘occurrent’ mode of 
engagement with the world (Chia & Holt, 2006: 641). 
4.3 Problems, rules, reflexivity 
The term ‘organizational problem’ can have a variety of meanings, which poses a 
challenge for abstract theory. Typically, a problem is defined as “an undesirable gap 
between an expected and an observed state” (Tucker, Edomondson, & Spear, 2002: 124; 
see also Cowan, 1990: 366). It is generally recognized problems are social constructs that 
can be said to ‘exist’ only insofar as they are “recognized as existing” (March, Schulz, & 
Zhou, 2000: 63). Problem constructions are “imposed [on the ongoing flow of events], but 
not in total disregard of one’s context and constraints” (Weick, 1995: 89). In light of the 
process perspective, where activity is seen as central to the phenomenon of organization 
(Schatzki, 2006; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002), it makes sense to conceptualize organizational 
problems as inextricably linked to activity. Indeed, as pointed out by William Starbuck 
(1983), organizational problems are often framed as ‘needs for action’. 
However, most of the activity that occurs continuously in organizations does not 
involve the imposition of problems or explicit search processes (Starbuck, 1983). Rather, it 
takes place within what Chia and Holt (2006), following Heidegger, called the ‘dwelling’ 
mode of engagement with the world, where circumstances and objects present themselves 
as ‘available’ for activity. It is only when there is “a shift from the experience of 
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immersion in projects to a sense that the flow of action has become unintelligible in some 
way” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005: 409) that ‘problematization’ of activity is likely 
to take place (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998: 998). Some elements within the unfolding 
situation are apprehended as unexpected, novel or ambiguous, which prevents the 
continuation of activity in the ‘dwelling’ mode. Instead, subsequent action with regards to 
the situation must to take place within the ‘building’ or ‘occurrent’ mode of engagement, 
which allows for more disengaged reflexivity (Chia & Holt, 2006), at least until the 
momentarily disrupted sense of order is restored. 
Given this understanding of organizational problems, we may say that a situation 
that has been problematized is ‘absorbed’ when organizational members find a way of 
responding to that situation in a manner that both they and others within the organization 
might recognize as being in accordance with existing formal rules. Moreover, after the 
response, the situation is no longer regarded as problematic, and therefore does not become 
a pretext for proposals of new formal rules (Schulz, 1998a). We believe that this 
interpretation of ‘problem absorption’ is consistent with the arguments in the literature on 
rule dynamics (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000; Schulz, 1998a).11
A further and perhaps crucial point is that an attempt to respond to a situation in 
accordance with existing rules can generate problems of its own, which might be called 
rule-related problems. Specifically, the situation’s novel or ambiguous features can make 
people wonder, which rule (if any) should be applied. Alternatively, or perhaps 
additionally, it may not be clear how a particular rule should be applied. As will hopefully 
 
                                                            
11 Still, perhaps this interpretation does not completely exhaust what these authors had in mind. One might argue that by enabling the enactment of a rationalized and patterned 
context of activity (Weick, 1995), and facilitating the emergence of organizational routines (Reynaud, 2005), formal rules make it less likely that situations will be problematized in 
the first place. While we acknowledge that it may well be worth exploring ‘problem absorption’ in this second sense, we leave it as a task for future research. 
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become clear as we consider specific examples, these rule-related problems frequently 
have to do with categorization (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). Indeed, difficulties of 
categorization are often the reason why situations are problematized in the first place 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). How organizational members cope with such rule-related 
problems can make the difference between problem absorption and non-absorption. If no 
rule seems applicable or if some rules cannot be applied in the usual way, it becomes more 
likely that the response to the situation will be more ‘ad hoc’ (Winter, 2003), 
improvisatory (Moorman & Miner, 1998) or ‘non-canonical’ (Brown & Duguid, 1991). In 
some cases, this may entail an officially authorized exception to some rule or even an 
(unauthorized) rule violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). These non-absorption 
responses can alert organizational rule making agencies to the ‘problem’ and motivate 
them to create new rules or adjust existing ones so as to enable the organization to handle 
similar problems in a more routine way in the future (Schulz, 1998a). 
 
4.3.1 Two Examples of Problem Absorption 
To clarify the types of situations that we have in mind, we shall make use of two examples 
of problem absorption. The first example, we consider the work of a treasurer of a 
university department12
                                                            
12 I thank Irma Bogenrieder for sharing this example with me. See also Bogenrieder and Magala (2007). 
. The part of the treasurer’s role relevant to our analysis consisted 
in evaluating and approving research-related expenditures that were to be financed from 
the department’s budget. The applicant would fill out a form, providing details on the types 
of expenditure planned (e.g. conference visit, research collaboration, etc.) together with the 
estimates of the expenses, which was then forwarded to the treasurer, who had to sign the 
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application for approval. The treasurer was formally responsible for verifying that the 
expenditures were relevant to the department’s research needs. In doing so, she naturally 
also had to take into account the department’s financial situation. The treasurer’s decisions 
were formally reviewed by the university’s financial department, which made sure that 
these decisions were lawful and that the total expenditures remained within the budgetary 
limits. 
The application form specified different categories of expenditure together with 
some rules and standards for ensuring that the expenditures remained relevant and the 
budget was not exceeded. In describing the case, we are specifically concerned with the 
category labeled ‘conference presentations’. Recall that a case can be more or less 
prototypical relative to a category (Rosch & Lloyd, 1973, cited in Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). 
In this example, a prototypical application falling under the ‘conference presentations’ 
category would involve a department member attending a conference with the aim of 
presenting a paper. The written rules stipulated that the category covered both conference 
fees and costs of travel and accommodation. However, as the treasurer was soon to 
discover, some conferences also required participants to be full members of the association 
linked to the conference, such as the AOM or EGOS. Attendance of such conferences thus 
entailed not only the usual conference registration fees, but also membership fees. This 
was the first problem or non-prototypical case faced by the treasurer, since the rules on the 
application form said nothing about membership fees. Thus, the treasurer had to decide 
whether or not to extend the ‘conference presentations’ category and interpret it as also 
covering membership fees. After careful reflection and consultation, the treasurer chose to 
extend the original category. 
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This example is a case of problem absorption, since the treasurer brought a non-
prototypical request within the domain of existing rules (Schulz, 1998a) and handled it by 
extending one of the categories. The problem was rule-related, since the request revealed 
(what the treasurer recognized as) a problematic ambiguity of the rules. The treasurer’s 
decision resulted in a foregone opportunity for rule revision, such as the establishment of a 
separate category and procedure for membership fees (both related and unrelated to 
conferences). Later on in this chapter, we shall describe how this decision had the 
unintended consequence of attracting further non-prototypical cases for the treasurer cope 
with. 
The second example is drawn from a historical study of the Rotterdam port (Van 
Driel & Bogenrieder, 2009). The focal rule is a bye-law for regulating the use of berths in 
the Rotterdam port, adopted in 1883. The bye-law stipulated that only “liner services” or 
“ships maintaining a scheduled service for many different customers” could be granted the 
right to a permanent berth (Van Driel & Bogenrieder, 2009: 654). The first truly 
problematic case in the history of the bye-law involved the firm Wm. H. Müller & Co., 
which had filed a request for a permanent berth in 1891. While the municipal executive 
was in principle willing to grant the request, other important actors opposed such a 
decision on the grounds Müller had initially failed to name specific ships that would use 
the berth, which was one of the official requirements. The case thus illustrates the role of 
disagreement between actors in the social construction of organizational problems. When 
Müller eventually did provide the details of the ships, further questions were raised about 
whether those ships were in fact true ‘liner services’. In all likelihood, the actors viewed 
“the short sea traffic that dominated the Rotterdam liner shipping scene” as the prototype 
for the ‘liner service’ category (Van Driel & Bogenrieder, 2009: 657). The prototypical 
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‘liners’ were thus daily or weekly services, while the ships mentioned by Müller were 
primarily bi-weekly services (ibid.). However, since the bye-law did not explicitly specify 
the meaning of ‘liner service’, it was also possible to interpret it in Müller’s favour. In the 
end, the city council agreed to grant the request, thereby extending the radius of the 
category beyond the prototype (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). 
 
4.3.2 The Role of Reflexivity 
As these examples illustrate, problem absorption is about “special cases that have to be 
fitted to a given repertoire of actions” (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006: 507). Actors recognize a 
case as ambiguous or non-prototypical when they are attentive to both the similarity & the 
difference (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006: 516) between the prototypical cases that they have 
experienced in the past and the case they are faced with in the present. That is, the 
“systems of relevances” (Schutz, 1964, cited in Emirbayer & Mische, 1998: 979) acquired 
by actors through practical experience directs their attention to specific similarities and the 
differences that might be relevant in their work. For example, the similarity between 
membership fees and other conference-related expenses suggests to the treasurer the 
possibility of applying existing rules, while the fact that such fees have until now not been 
financed from the budget makes her hesitate. When a case is non-prototypical relative to a 
rule’s domain, this can make actors uncertain as to whether the rule applies to the case. 
When a case is non-prototypical relative to a category that serves as a criterion for what 
should be done according to the rule, such as the ‘liner service’ category in the port 
example, this can make actors uncertain as to how the rule applies to the case (i.e. which 
action would be consistent with the rule). 
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The fact that the non-prototypical case cannot be immediately subsumed leads 
actors to problematize the situation and to engage with the case more reflexively or 
mindfully (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006). An important component of this reflexive 
engagement will be what Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 971) called the ‘practical-
evaluative element’ of agency, which “entails the capacity of actors to make practical and 
normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action”. Note that among 
these trajectories may be the action of not subsuming the case under any rule-related 
category. Thus, problem absorption is not inevitable and reflection can enable the exercise 
of agency with regard to whether and how the problem is absorbed. 
Of course, in organizations with many rules, the frequency with which rules will 
be cited as legitimating reasons for action is likely to be quite high (Ocasio, 1999: 393). 
Rules will consequently tend to be seen as being “more or less exhaustive” and “gapless” 
(Weber, 1978: 958, 656, cited in Nass, 1986). Given these background understandings, 
actors may face strong normative pressure towards problem absorption that can constrain 
their agency. Empirical research can shed more light on the agentic choice between 
absorption and non-absorption, which is no doubt an important topic, but one that is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Even when the problem is absorbed, reflexive agency can still matter in the 
process. In reflecting on the possibility of subsuming the case under different rule-related 
categories, what is relevant are not only the relevant similarities and differences between 
the case and the prototypical instances of the categories (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002), but also 
the overall variability of past instances still belonging to each of those categories (cf. 
Holland et al., 1986: 185-188). Both the sense of a category’s overall variability and 
understandings about prototypical instances are developed through the use of the category 
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in practice and can be brought to bear on the present situation through organizational 
remembering (Feldman & Feldman, 2006), in which actors’ personal experiences, written 
organizational records (Walsh & Ungson, 1991), and storytelling (Boje, 1991) can all play 
a role. For example, there was ambiguity in the Müller case as to whether the ships in 
question could be categorized as ‘liners’ or ‘irregular’. In the debates that followed, actors 
considered the prototypical examples of liner ships and noted the variability within the 
category between daily and weekly services. 
The last point we wish to highlight here is that reflection need not be completely 
retrospective, but will in most instances also cover the possible actions to be taken if a 
given rule is applied to the case and the anticipated consequences of these actions. This is 
the core of Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) practical-evaluative element. As Levinthal and 
Rerup (2006: 507) observed, “an important skill in the context of bureaucratic 
organizations is the art of manipulating the label or category with which a given request or 
initiative is encoded to elicit a desired outcome”. Thus, reflexive evaluation of courses of 
action and anticipated outcomes in light of personal projects, understandings about 
organizational goals, and the teleological ordering of the relevant practice (Schatzki, 
2006), clearly matters in problem absorption. 
 
4.3.3 Stabilizing Consequences 
In the short run, problem absorption may be seen as contributing to the stability of both the 
individual rule and the rule system as a whole. First, extending the rule to new problems 
will tend to increase both its pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995); it not 
only serves to reaffirm the rule’s usefulness to the organization, but also contributes to its 
becoming increasingly taken for granted as part of organizational life, so that its 
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abandonment seems almost unthinkable (Zucker, 1977). Second, problem absorption is an 
experiential learning process, whereby rule users become more skilful in interpreting and 
applying the rule, which in turn makes them less likely to challenge it (Zhou, 1993: 1138). 
Third, problem absorption via rule extension to non-prototypical cases leaves far 
less scope for exploration of novel responses that could potentially be encoded into new 
rules (Schulz, 1998a). Fourth, it is important to remember that the organizational rule 
system “is not some abstract chart but one of the crucial instruments by which groups 
perpetuate their power and control in organizations: groups struggle to constitute structures 
in order that they may become constituting” (Ranson, Hinings, & Greenwood, 1980: 8). 
Thus, as long as problems are absorbed and individual rules within the system remain 
unchallenged, the ‘rule regime’ as a whole becomes more entrenched (March, Schulz, & 
Zhou, 2000). 
While acknowledging that problem absorption can have the stabilizing effects just 
described, what we would like to do in the remainder of this chapter is to focus on the 
more dynamic consequences of problem absorption. As we argue below, problem 
absorption can be seen as involving a special kind of organizational learning (March, 
Schulz, & Zhou, 2000). Furthermore, repeated problem absorption by the same rule can 
lead to amplification of the small changes that problem absorption generates (Plowman et 
al., 2007), thereby giving rise to more radical forms of change. 
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4.4 Dynamic consequences and organizational learning 
 
4.4.1 Semantic Learning 
Corley and Gioia (2003: 625) used the term ‘semantic learning’ to refer to the “changes to 
the intersubjective meanings underlying the labels and actions constituting the core of a 
collective’s understanding of themselves”, and emphasized that such learning need not 
involve any changes to the actual labels. Although their discussion focused on the labels 
and meanings that form the basis for organizational identity, we suggest that an analogous 
learning process can take place at the micro level when existing rules are extended to deal 
with non-prototypical cases, enabling the organization to maintain relative stability in its 
(rule-based) response in the face of variety in stimuli (Weick, 1991). While problem 
absorption does not generally lead to changes in the actual text of the written rule, 
including the labels used to specify its domain and the actions it prescribes, it can still 
modify the categories for those labels (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). In the words of Corley and 
Gioia (2003: 622), “the meanings associated with these labels change to accommodate 
current needs”. Because the intention of rule users in problem absorption is usually to deal 
with the new case, rather than to transform the rule’s meaning, semantic learning is likely 
to be an unintended consequence of problem absorption. Thus we can also agree with 
Corley and Gioia’s (2003: 625) assertion that semantic learning can take place “without 
explicit awareness of learning, without the recognition of learning, or even without the 
intention to learn by the members of the collective.13
                                                            
13 This, of course, does not mean that rule extension itself must be a completely tacit or unreflexive process. On the contrary, as should be clear from the previous sections, it rarely is 
in our view. 
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One aspect of semantic learning that Corley and Gioia’s (2003) did not 
sufficiently emphasize is the cumulative nature of modifications of meaning. Similarly, 
discussions of problem absorption by rules do not address the implications of repeated 
absorption (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000; Schulz, 1998a). Only Tsoukas and Chia (2002: 
756), while discussing empirical material from Feldman (2000), briefly mentioned that 
extensions of “current policies” to accommodate non-prototypical cases “provided 
opportunities for further changes”. We believe that the temporal dimension of problem 
absorption and the tendency for later changes in the meaning/use of formal rules to build 
on earlier ones deserves greater attention. We also wish to highlight the role played by 
organizational remembering (Feldman & Feldman, 2006) in making it possible for 
semantic learning to become cumulative and have lasting effects. 
As an illustration of our arguments, we return to our earlier example of the 
treasurer’s work at a university department. Recall that the treasurer had found it necessary 
to interpret the ‘conference presentations’ category as also covering conference-related 
membership fees, thus allowing such fees to be paid out of the department’s budget under 
the existing rules. This decision set a precedent (Levitt & March, 1988) for subsequent 
uses of the application with regards to conferences requiring membership fees. Over time, 
visits to conferences requiring membership fees became more common, in effect making 
such cases part of the prototypical core of the category (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). This in its 
turn paved the way for further category extensions. 
The next non-prototypical request faced by the treasurer involved a membership 
fee that was not related to any conference, but had to be paid in order to enable the 
applicant to join a special association of researchers. In the absence of prior history of 
problem absorption, it would be very difficult to justify classifying such an expense under 
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‘conference presentations’. However, given the fact that the category had already been 
extended to some membership fees, as well as the lack of any alternative category that 
could cover the case, the treasurer faced strong normative and political pressure from 
department members to extend the category once again, which she did. What happened 
was a category shift, where a case (or set of cases) that used to be treated as non-
prototypical came to serve as the new prototype, to which future cases could be compared. 
Such a shift need not involve the complete unlearning (Tsang & Zahra, 2008) of the initial 
prototype, such that it no longer plays any role in the use of the rule in question, but it at 
least opens up the possibility of rule application to cases, which would not have been 
included based purely on comparisons with the initial prototype. 
 
Figure 4.1: Category enlargement and category shift 
 
Initial 
prototype 
New case 
First extension: Second 
extension: 
Shifting category 
Initial 
prototype 
New 
prototype 
New case 
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We distinguish the phenomenon of category shift from (mere) category 
enlargement, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Category enlargement occurs when past category 
extensions modify organizational members’ sense of the overall variability of category, 
while category shift additionally involves an adjustment of the prototype, as in the above 
example. Pure category enlargement occurred when the treasurer was forced to also extend 
the category to conference visits that did not involve any paper presentations for the 
applicant. Essentially, the cases of membership fees enabled both the treasurer and the 
department members to see the category as encompassing more variability (and the 
category boundaries as being more broad and flexible) compared with the initial 
understanding of the category that was based solely on prototypical cases. Therefore, a 
seemingly unrelated extension to membership fees also paved the way for a further 
broadening of the category to cover conference visits for non-presenters. 
As the example illustrates, problem absorption is form of experiential learning 
insofar as it is involves inquiry about how to respond to a mismatch between expected and 
observed situations or outcomes, as well as the retention of “learning agents’ discoveries, 
inventions, and evaluations […] in organizational memory” (Argyris & Schön, 1978: 19) 
in the form of new understandings and precedents for future rule applications. In the above 
example, the new understandings and precedents were relevant both for the treasurer (an 
actor formally charged with applying or enforcing the rule) and for the applicants (the 
actors directly affected by the rule). As participants in a common routine, both parties were 
able to learn about the others’ “tasks and perceptions of the routine” (Feldman & Rafaeli, 
2002: 314). The treasurer learned more about the kinds of expenses that applicants wanted 
reimbursed, while the applicants became more likely to submit further non-prototypical 
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requests under an old category once they learned that the treasurer was sometimes willing 
to extend the category beyond the prototypical instances. 
However, without broader reflection on the whole cumulative experience with the 
rule, semantic learning of the kind that we have described is likely to be limited in its 
impact on the organization and especially its more formal aspects, such as the rule itself. 
At best, it constitutes a form of practical drift (Snook, 2002) that leads to an increasing 
divergence between the abstract understandings about the rule-governed practice, which 
generally remain wedded to prototypical performances, and the actually pattern of practice 
itself, which has been transformed through problem absorption (Feldman & Pentland, 
2003). In the next section we discuss how problem absorption can induce a higher order 
learning process with more far-reaching effects for organizational rules. 
 
4.4.2 Higher-Level Learning 
Organizational learning theories often distinguish between different types or levels of 
learning. Fiol and Lyles (1985), building on Argyris and Schön’s (1978) classification of 
single versus double-loop learning, postulate two levels of learning. Lower-level learning 
stems from repeated action within a given set of rules leading to new behavioural 
outcomes, while higher-level is a non-repetitive enquiry leading to the development of new 
rules and understandings (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Nicolini and Meznar (1995) make a related 
distinction between learning as a continuous and often unconscious process of cognitive 
modification in the course of practice, which is especially close to the notion of semantic 
learning discussed above, and learning as a socially constructed product of organizational 
self-observation and abstraction. Finally, in developing their process perspective on 
organizational change, Tsoukas and Chia (2002: 579-580) appear to differentiate between 
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‘microscopic’ change, which is pervasive and “always ongoing” in organizations, and 
institutionalized change, which depends at least in part on the management’s “declarative 
powers” to turn change into a potential institutional fact (Searle, 1995). 
The relationship between the two levels of learning, however, is not entirely clear. 
Although it is recognized that lower-level learning “can provide the raw material” for 
higher-level learning (Lant & Mezias, 1992: 64; Nicolini & Meznar, 1995), the two 
processes have sometimes been presented as relatively independent (Fiol & Lyles, 1985) or 
even antagonistic (Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991). Some have suggested that a 
transition from lower to higher-level learning can be triggered when experience from 
lower-level learning is “equivocal” (Lant & Mezias, 1992: 64), when organizational 
performance falls below the aspiration level (Cyert & March, 1992; Lant & Mezias, 1992), 
or when the organization faces a crisis (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). In analyzing the consequences 
of problem absorption by rules we can better understand the process through which lower-
level (semantic) learning can lead to higher-level organizational learning and change in 
written rules. The consequences we have in mind have to do with the emergence of new 
understandings and patterns of practice that can undermine the pragmatic, cognitive and 
normative bases of a rule’s legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
Cognitive burden and breadth. First, repeated problem absorption can impose 
considerable cognitive burden on rule users and those whom they may consult and/or ask 
for authorization with regard to whether or not to extend the rule. This happens precisely 
because, as we argued above, problem absorption is often a reflexive (rather than mindless) 
process. Especially when people have to engage in such reflection frequently for the same 
rule (and thus encounter uncertainty in the expected results), the important purpose of the 
rule to provide a sense of order gradually becomes undermined by non-prototypical cases. 
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The rule’s use imposes cognitive burden instead of reducing it (Simon, 1997), thereby 
undermining the rule’s usefulness or pragmatic legitimacy in the eyes of rule users. In the 
example introduced above, the treasurer found after repeated extensions of the category 
that the rule was not helping her to reach a decision on a particular application, but rather 
that she had to consider each case in light of the whole history of past decisions. 
Second, cumulative category enlargements and category shifts tend to make the 
rule quite broad or inclusive. Rule users may consequently find it increasingly difficult to 
draw the line and justify not extending the rule further given that it has already been 
extended so often in the past. Thus, the rule’s usefulness in making distinctions can 
become undermined (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001). Although each non-prototypical 
extension might be plausible in the concrete situation, nevertheless the sum of all 
extensions can generate problems for rule application, which in turn provide opportunities 
for learning and change. For example, after the rule has been extended to non-conference 
membership fees and to conference visits without paper presentations, the treasurer was 
asking herself: “Where does it stop?” She could no longer use the rule to justify turning 
down applications, even when their relevance to the department’s research needs might be 
called into question. The reflexive attitude towards the rule induced by problem absorption 
makes it more likely that the rule’s diminished usefulness (in making distinctions and 
reducing cognitive burden) will be recognized within the organization. 
Reflection on broader understandings. The same reflexive attitude can also 
contribute towards weakening the rule’s cognitive legitimacy or taken-for-grantedness 
within the organization (Suchman, 1995). Because applications of a rule to non-
prototypical cases are difficult to justify on the basis of the rule’s text alone, other 
considerations, including especially the purpose or rationale behind the rule, are likely to 
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be cited in accounting for such applications. Thus, problem absorption can bring the 
historical circumstances surrounding to the rule’s adoption into the focal awareness of 
organizational members (Tsoukas, 1996). More precisely, certain understandings about the 
rule’s history and rationale will be re-constructed and elaborated through the process of 
organizational remembering (Feldman & Feldman, 2006). The very activity of reflecting 
on these matters can reduce the tendency to see the rule a necessary or inevitable part of 
the organization (Suchman, 1995) or to value it for its own sake (Merton, 1940; Selznick, 
1957). It can also make people more aware of potential alternatives to the rule. 
Rationalized cultural understandings about formal organizational rules generally 
focus on the rules’ relationship to organizational goals, technical expertise or professional 
norms (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, organizational preferences and goals are 
frequently ‘ill-defined’ and ambiguous (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; Lindblom, 1959), 
while professional jurisdictions are often contested (Bechky, 2003; Reed, 1996). Thus, 
collective reflection on the rule’s purpose can reopen old debates over what the relevant 
organizational goals and professional norms are, and how best to balance conflicting norms 
and goals. The normative underpinnings (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suchman, 1995) of 
the organizational rule (or even a whole set of organizational rules) may be called into 
question as a result. For example, the bye-law regulating the use of permanent berths in the 
Port of Rotterdam was originally adopted in 1883 in order to prevent “independent 
middlemen [from] make[ing] money out of the right on permanent berths” (Van Driel & 
Bogenrieder, 2009: 654). However, by the end of the debates in the late 1890s, which were 
stimulated and informed by controversial extensions of the category ‘liner service’ within 
the bye-law, the relevant authorities came to the conclusion that the prosperity of the port 
was no longer “best served by an unmediated relation between the port and the end users 
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of its berths”, which in turn made it possible for a major revision of the bye-law to be 
passed in 1900 (ibid.: 663). 
Transition to higher-level learning. As this example shows, reflection on how 
the rule relates to boarder organizational goals can trigger higher-level learning and formal 
rule change when actors with formal authority over organizational rulemaking become 
involved in this reflection. This is consistent with the view that higher-level learning 
“occurs mostly in upper levels” of the organization (Fiol & Lyles, 1985: 810). If the 
organization has routines for monitoring and reviewing rule applications, then these can 
help to bring the non-prototypical rule applications to the attention of rule makers and thus 
ensure their involvement in the reflection induced by repeated problem absorption. Factors 
like organizational voice/silence (Morrison & Milliken, 2003) and the politics of issue 
selling (Dutton et al., 2001) can also affect whether reflection will become a collective 
process in which rule makers participate as well. 
The transition to higher-level learning also implies the occurrence of a ‘cognitive 
breakdown’ (Nicolini & Meznar, 1995: 739) or a “realization that certain experiences 
cannot be interpreted within the current belief system” (Lant & Mezias, 1992: 42; Argyris 
& Schön, 1978). In the context of problem absorption, this means that organizational 
members realize that the pattern of repeated category extensions cannot continue anymore. 
The sense of increased cognitive burden and of inability to make distinctions due to 
excessive broadening of the category can help to trigger such realization, as discussed 
above. The undermining of the rule’s taken-for-grantedness and normative underpinnings 
can in turn make organizational members more willing to consider revising the rule or 
even suspending it altogether. Although the precise outcome of higher-level learning is 
difficult to predict ex ante, it is clear that the outcome will be affected by the 
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organizational experience with category extensions. Given that higher-level learning is a 
response to a cognitive breakdown induced by this experience, it is likely to involve “the 
effort not to incur the same breakdown again” (Nicolini & Meznar, 1995: 739). 
Indeed, one result of higher-level learning can be an attempt to reverse the process 
of category extensions that has taken place in the course of applying the rule. The rule 
might be revised so as to explicitly prohibit the kinds of extensions that have taken place 
by delineating more explicitly the boundaries of the relevant category14
The extent to which the consequences of semantic learning, such as the increased 
variety of users of permanent berths in the port example, are embraced or rejected in rule 
revisions is difficult to predict. Rejection may become less likely when broadening of rule 
. Thus, if the setting 
of precedents through category extensions is a form of (semantic) organizational learning, 
as we maintain, then rule revisions that explicitly reject those precedents are a form of 
organizational unlearning (Tsang & Zahra, 2008). However, this is not what happened in 
the Rotterdam Port example. There, the rule makers actually embraced rather than rejected 
the results of semantic learning, since the revised bye-law explicitly authorized the use of 
permanent berths by irregular ships, whereas prior to the revision such ships were only 
permitted to use permanent berths when the officials were willing to stretch their definition 
of liner service (Van Driel & Bogenrieder, 2009). Thus reflection on the process of 
semantic learning can reveal the not only inadequacy of the olds rules in dealing with the 
problems that have been absorbed, but also the value of some lessons from the process of 
semantic learning for the organization. 
                                                            
14 Of course, no amount of specification can eliminate the need for judgment in applying the rule to new cases, since the specifications themselves can 
only be made in abstract terms with the possibility of non-prototypical applications (Tsoukas, 1996; Wittgenstein, 1953). For example, changing the 
category ‘conference presentations’ into ‘conference presentations excluding membership fees’ will not help in cases, where it is not clear whether the 
relevant expense is a membership fee or not. 
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categories over time generates organizational commitments that are difficult to reverse. 
Furthermore, as noted by March, Sproull, and Tamuz (1991: 5), it can happen that the 
“preferences and values in terms of which organizations distinguish successes from 
failures are themselves transformed in the process of learning”. Thus, the process of 
semantic learning can subtly modify the prevailing understandings of organizational goals 
and preferences, which can in turn pave the way for more racial forms of change, such as 
rule suspension (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000). 
4.5 Summary and discussion 
The aim of this chapter was to further develop the concept of problem absorption and to 
explore the relationship between problem absorption and organizational learning. Building 
on the process view, we suggested that an important part of problem absorption is the 
extension of categories of existing rules to non-prototypical cases, which can transform the 
meaning of those categories in practice without changing the actual text of the rules 
(Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). Thus, our perspective on rules parallels Feldman and Pentland’s 
(2003) argument that the performative aspect of a routine can vary even while its ostensive 
aspect (i.e. the abstract understanding of the routine) and the associated written rules, 
documents, and other artifacts, seem to remain relatively stable. In fact, variation at the 
performative level can actually contribute to stability at the ostensive and artifact levels 
(Essén, 2008), just as problem absorption in practice can sometimes contribute to the 
stability of a rule. Given that written rules are similar to technological artifacts (Adler & 
Borys, 1996), Orlikowski’s (2000: 407) arguments that technology’s capacity to structure 
work is not inherent, but is enacted through “people’s repeated and situated interaction 
with particular technologies”, and that “technologies-in-practice” can undergo subtle 
118 
 
transformations that will not be apparent when technologies are examined apart from 
practice, also generalize to rules. 
However, apart from Tsoukas and Chia’s (2002) contribution, this literature fails 
to address the crucial role of categorization in the interaction between the performative and 
the ostensive or artifact levels. Category extensions are an important type of performative 
variation, which can to some extent modify people’s shared understandings of the relevant 
categories (ostensive change), but without changing the associated labels and the 
normative link between categories of situations and categories of actions, as encoded in 
written rules (ostensive stability). We build on Tsoukas and Chia’s (2002) arguments that 
extensions transform the radius of a category by affecting understandings about category 
variability, but further add that extensions can transform understandings about the core or 
prototype, leading to category shifts. 
We also develop Tsoukas and Chia’s (2002: 580) brief remark about the 
‘agglomerative’ nature of microscopic change and the possibility of such change being 
‘amplified’ (ibid.: 579; see also Plowman et al., 2007) by examining the effects of repeated 
extensions, each building on the previous one. We identified organizational remembering, 
and specifically reliance on precedents in rule use, as the crucial enabling condition for 
cumulative extensions. While our analysis echoes Feldman’s (2000: 620) finding that 
continuous change in routines is possible when previous performances generate “outcomes 
[that] enable new opportunities”, giving participants “the option of expanding” the routine, 
we specifically focus on category enlargements and shifts as the outcomes that provide 
opportunities for further change in the use of formal rules. 
Finally, we explored the possibility of microscopic change (via problem 
absorption) leading to formal organizational change (in the form of rule revisions), which 
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Tsoukas and Chia (2002: 580) mentioned as an “interesting topic […] for further 
theoretical development”. We framed the issue as one of transition form lower to higher-
level learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Like Feldman and Pentland (2003; see also Feldman, 
2000), we argued that collective reflection on problem absorption and its outcomes 
(performative aspect) in relation to broader understandings that underpin the rule 
(ostensive aspect) matters in bringing about more fundamental changes. The crucial 
question that is not addressed in this literature, however, is why the performative variation 
cannot continue indefinitely without inducing any major changes to the ostensive aspect 
and the relevant artifacts. After all, research shows that flexible routines can persist in 
organizations (Howard-Grenville, 2005), and they may persist precisely because of (rather 
than in spite of) performative variation (Essén, 2008). What then might be the limits to the 
persistence of flexibly-applied rules? 
We argued that because rule application to non-prototypical cases requires 
reflection (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002), it imposes cognitive burden 
on those who actually apply the rules or review rule applications. When rules have been 
extended repeatedly, the accumulated precedents add to the burden. This can make 
organizational members dissatisfied with the current version of the rule. Furthermore, 
repeated extensions can blur the boundaries between the categories and undermine the 
rule’s role as standards for drawing distinctions. Finally, reflection on the purpose of the 
rule can enable the organization to recognize that the purpose is no longer valid or that it 
would be best served by developing a different rule. It is these factors that, in our view, 
enable the transition to higher-level learning with regards to rules and can thus ‘release’ 
the organization from the codification trap (Schulz, 1998a). 
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An important issue for future research is how experience with problem absorption 
might affect the contents of the revised rules. While we agree with Feldman (2000: 624) 
that “rule changes may simply be the codification of changes that are already made”, and 
specifically of the changes to rule-categories in problem absorption, we also suggest that 
the process of rule revision in response to problem absorption can entail more exploratory 
forms of learning (March, 1991), where the outcome cannot simply be inferred from prior 
organizational history or experience. Furthermore, the aim of codification might in some 
cases be to reverse some of the category extensions and to preclude their occurrence in the 
future.  
4.5 Conclusion 
The process perspective on organizations suggests that although change always has 
primacy, a sense of order can emerge temporarily when distinctions are made between 
different types of situations and systematically connected to distinctions between different 
types of actions (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001). By serving as reminders of the imperative 
to continue making those distinctions and connections in practice, written rules contribute 
to the maintenance of the sense of order in organizations. In some situations, the 
distinctions and connections will be more difficult to make than in others. Such situations 
act as momentary disruptions of the sense of order and might be called ‘problems’ by those 
who attend to them. Yet, organizational members can often find a way of acting in such 
situations that is consistent with the imperatives of the rules. Building on previous 
research, we called this phenomenon ‘problem absorption’. 
Problem absorption subtly transforms in the way in which distinctions are made 
within an organization, and thus constitutes a form of ‘semantic’ organizational learning. 
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Furthermore, when it occurs repeatedly, its cumulative consequences can lead to far 
greater disruptions to the sense of order and trigger a transition to higher-level 
organizational learning. We identified reflexivity as the crucial enabling condition in this 
process. We argued that through reflection on problem absorption both in situ, as well as 
retrospectively, organizations can develop new understandings about the relevant practice 
that can undermine existing rules and clear the way for the development of new 
distinctions and associations.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
TASKS AND POLITICS: Explaining rule change in 
UNESCO’s World Heritage program, 1977-2004 
 
This chapter examines how organizational politics influence bureaucratic rule change, a 
form of incremental organizational change. By performing an event history analysis of 
changes to the organizational rules in the World Heritage Program of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) between 1977 and 2004, we 
test a set of hypotheses predicting that rule changes in bureaucracies will be driven by 
dominant coalition power processes against competing hypotheses that such changes 
derive from rational adaptation to technical contingencies. In line with the political 
perspective, we find that change in World Heritage rules is related to the normative power 
and cultural heterogeneity of the States represented on the World Heritage Committee in a 
given year, and that these relationships exist even after controlling for technical factors. 
These findings contribute to research on the dynamics of organizational rules by 
suggesting that the composition of the rulemaking body exerts an independent effect on 
rule change that needs to be explicitly taken into account. Our study also has implications 
for the analysis of the dysfunctions of bureaucracy, indicating that bureaucratic inertia 
stems from the heterogeneity of rule makers rather than their overall power position. 
5.1 Introduction: the two faces of bureaucracy 
The study of bureaucracy has long been established as a major branch in administrative 
science (e.g. Adler & Borys, 1996; Blau, 1955; Gouldner, 1954; Ouchi, 1980; Schulz, 
1998a). Many of the contributors to this research stream portray bureaucracy as an 
organizational form that tends towards stability, if not outright inertia and resistance to 
change (Downs, 1967; Merton, 1940; Miller & Chen, 1994; Selznick, 1943; but see Blau, 
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1955; Kallinikos, 2006). These tendencies derive in no small part from the constitutive 
properties of this organizational form, which include the breakdown and partitioning of 
decision problems over several hierarchically nested groups of decision-makers, the 
formalization of administrative processes in rational-legal rule sets, and the extensive use 
of written communication and files for record-keeping (Weber, 1978). Moreover, a long-
standing tradition of configurational research on bureaucratic organizations stresses the 
additional inertia and stability that derive from the vital interdependencies between these 
constitutive properties (Fiss, 2007; Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993; Short, Payne, & 
Ketchen, 2008; Walton, 2005). 
Even though the conception of bureaucracy as a stable and inert organizational 
form dominates the field, this vision may have to be modified and expanded in the future 
with the emergence of  new theories of how bureaucracies change over time (e.g., March, 
Schulz, & Zhou, 2000; Schulz, 2003). These new theories argue that historical measures of 
organizational change as fluctuations in the degree of bureaucratization (e.g. Baron, 
Burton, & Hannan, 1999; Meyer & Brown, 1977; Slack & Hinings, 1994) and as shifts in 
the configuration of bureaucratic elements (Astley, 1985; Walton, 2005) may in fact 
underestimate the prevalence of bureaucratic change because they fail to register the form 
of bureaucratic change that is most endemic to bureaucratic organizations: adjustment of 
the bureaucratic architecture of formal rules that guide and constrain all areas of decision-
making in the bureaucratic domain. It is a major achievement of this concise but impactful 
genre of administrative studies that the attention of scholars studying bureaucracy is now 
increasingly focused on this incremental type of bureaucratic change, which can be 
observed even when the degree of bureaucratization or the bureaucratic configuration 
remains the same, making it possible to map previously undetectable forms of 
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organizational adaptation. Its contributors employ a fine-grained type of 
intraorganizational analysis, which traces developments in the ecology of organizational 
rules by mapping the life history of each and every individual rule. The upshot of these 
analyses is a clearer vision of how bureaucracies change, notably by adjusting their rule 
systems to endogenous and exogenous contingencies. 
In terms of identifying the drivers of bureaucratic rule change, prior work has 
primarily pointed to factors that are endogenous to the rule system itself, such as the 
system’s age, as well as individual rule size, age and number of previous changes (Beck & 
Kieser, 2003; March et al., 2000). Yet in terms of exogenous dynamics, this genre has thus 
far focused primarily on the classic conception of organizational change in relation to task-
environmental contingencies (Donaldson, 1987; Thompson, 2003), with examples 
including rule proliferation and change in response to increasing organizational size and 
complexity (Beck & Kieser, 2003; March et al. 2000; Schulz, 1998a). In this sense, its 
contributors’ conceptualization of bureaucracy remains limited to Weber’s (1978) original 
notion of it, in which it is largely portrayed as a system operating exclusively according to 
Zweckrationalität, or instrumental rationality. These ‘neo-Weberians’ (Heugens, 2005) 
thus follow Weber closely by underwriting his claim that a reliance on written rules makes 
bureaucracy a ‘rational’ type of organization, where ‘rationality’ is evaluated mainly in 
terms of efficiency (Weiss, 1983). 
It has long been recognized in the sociological analysis of the bureaucratic 
organizational form, however, that bureaucracy is essentially Janus-faced (Adler & Borys, 
1996; Gouldner, 1954; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006), capable of looking two ways at once. 
Whereas bureaucracy certainly has a ‘rational’ side focused on handling complex tasks 
efficiently and reliably through a division of labor, the creation of accountability, and the 
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adjustment of decision tasks to decision makers’ cognitive abilities (Simon, 1997), it also 
has a political side (e.g. McNeil, 1978; Weiss, 1983), constituting “a power instrument of 
the first order for the one who controls [it]” (Weber, 1978: 987). Specifically, 
bureaucracy’s strict monocratic hierarchy of authority creates strong informational and 
knowledge asymmetries as well as remunerative, status, and control imbalances in 
organizations, which in turn give rise to strong power differentials between organizational 
participants (Etzioni, 1961; Hardy & Clegg, 2006; Pfeffer, 1981). When such power 
differentials are not appropriately checked by organizational governance and control 
systems (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1980; Van Maanen & Barley, 1984), the private 
interests of those in power rather than task-environmental contingencies can become the 
main drivers of bureaucratic change.  
In this chapter we test the previously untested hypothesis that rule changes in 
bureaucratic organizations are driven by such power processes against the competing 
hypothesis that such changes derive from rational adaptations to task-environmental 
contingencies. Our conceptualization of power-based bureaucratic decision-making is that 
of rivaling factions vying to control the organization for private benefit (Cyert & March, 
1992). Privileged power positions can elevate certain of these factions to the – temporary 
and contested – status of a dominant coalition (Cyert & March, 1992; Child, 1972b; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Finkelstein, 1992), which enjoys control over rule creation, 
change, and suspension processes. Whereas the specific interests and intentions of 
dominant coalitions are hard to observe directly, certain coalitions have a conservative 
agenda with an interest in keeping an organization on course of its original mission, while 
others push a progressive agenda and are keen to steer the organization in a divergent 
course. In operational terms, we expect that conservative dominant coalitions will seek to 
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achieve their goal of mission preservation by slowing down rule change. Conversely, 
progressively oriented coalitions will seek to achieve mission transformation by speeding it 
up. In our analysis, a coalition’s power can derive from at least three sources. First, in 
bureaucratic organizations power usually (though not always; Child, 1972b) has a social 
role (Emerson, 1962; Ibarra, 1993) or social-structural dimension (Brass, 1984; 
Krackhardt, 1990), in that it derives from actors’ organizational position, such as their 
occupancy of an office or membership of a committee. Second, power can be based on 
remunerative (Clegg, 1979; Etzioni, 1961) or resource control (Casciaro & Piskorski, 
2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), in that it derives from actors’ abilities to grant or 
withhold others prized resources. Third, and finally, power can be based on a normative 
(Blau, 1964; Etzioni, 1961) or institutional (Dacin, 1997; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) 
foundation in that it derives from the other-perceived legitimacy of actors’ interests or 
decisions.  
The empirical context we use to test our hypotheses is formed by a major branch 
of a transnational bureaucracy, the World Heritage Program (WHP) of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The WHP is an appropriate 
research context for testing our theoretical interests for four reasons. First, the WHP, as 
well as UNESCO more broadly, is an archetypical bureaucratic organization that possesses 
all properties that are deemed characteristic of this organizational form, ranging from a 
strictly hierarchical structure to highly formalized organizational procedures. Second, the 
formal rule system of the WHP is well-documented in the form of a complete and codified 
rule manual, first published in 1977 and regularly updated at 1-4 year intervals thereafter. 
In total, we were able to obtain and analyze thirteen editions of the manual (counting the 
initial 1977 edition), containing a total of 368 versions of 180 rules. Third, the WHP is 
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governed by the World Heritage Committee, composed of representatives of 21 States 
Parties to the World Heritage Convention. Because the countries represented on the 
Committee change substantially over time, the Committee is an excellent context for 
observing the work of dominant coalitions in action. Fourth, and finally, because the 
Committee is staffed by individuals acting in a commissioned role, the Committee 
represents and encompasses various power bases, ranging from the predominantly 
normative power base of committee members representing nation states harboring a 
disproportionately large share of the world’s cultural or natural heritage (e.g., Italy, 
Greece, and Egypt) to the predominantly remunerative power base of members 
representing nation states with an exceptionally large economy, whom are by far the 
largest contributors to the UNESCO organization (e.g., the U.S., Germany, and Japan). 
Our study offers three contributions related to the theorization of organizational 
change and politics in administrative science. First, it advances the research program 
focusing on the dynamics of organizational rules by demonstrating that rule change is as 
much shaped by the behavior of dominant coalitions, as it is by rule histories and various 
technical factors (March et al., 2000). Second our results speak to bureaucracy theory in 
general, and to the theory of bureaucratic dysfunctions (Crozier, 1964; Merton, 1940) in 
particular. Bureaucracy theorists have long wrestled with the seemingly contradictory 
notions of bureaucracy as a rational organizational form, in which individual interests 
necessarily become subordinate to organizational goals and the norms of technical 
efficiency (Weber, 1978), and bureaucracy as a producer of red tape, organizational 
rigidity and inertia (Merton, 1940). Our study suggests that while some of its dysfunctions 
can indeed be traced to the power-oriented side of this Janus-faced organizational form (cf. 
Walsh & Dewar, 1987), the operation of power should not be assumed to necessarily lead 
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to rigidity or inhibit organizational problem-solving. Third, our results bolster existing 
theories of organizational change by directing attention to the role of power in incremental 
change processes. Change approaches like contingency theory (Astley, 1985; Donaldson, 
2001), learning theory (Levitt & March, 1988), and evolutionary theory (Nelson & Winter, 
1982; Miner, 1991) predominantly focus on organizational adaptations to task-related 
contingencies, neglecting actors’ interests as a (possibly exogenous) source of change in 
their own right. And while the political (Pfeffer, 1981) or upper-echelon (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984) studies of change have come a long way towards filling this gap, they 
introduce a bias of their own by focusing primarily on changes in organizational strategy 
or radical forms of structural change. Our study helps to strengthen the political 
perspective by showing both theoretically and empirically how its arguments also apply to 
more incremental forms of change in organizational structure. 
5.2 Theoretical background 
 
5.2.1 Organizational Change: Two Perspectives 
Among the various theoretical traditions in administrative science that are concerned with 
the problem of organizational change two prominent perspectives are structural 
contingency theory and political theory (Hage, 1999). Whereas these perspectives are 
mostly used to explain sweeping changes in organizational form, such as shifts towards 
more organic structures (Burns & Stalker, 1961) or post-bureaucratic organizational forms 
(Hodgson, 2004), we suggest that they can also be applied to the analysis of incremental 
change. Seen through a structural contingency theory lens, change in organizational 
structure is caused by changes in internal and external contingencies, such as 
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organizational size, task uncertainty, and environmental uncertainty (Donaldson, 2001). 
More precisely, it is argued that change in the level of a given contingency variable can 
result in misfit between that variable’s new level and the existing organizational structure, 
which lowers organizational performance. Eventually, organizational structure would 
change in a way that restores its fit with the relevant contingency, thereby increasing 
performance. The argument relies on the assumption of technical rationality of 
organizational structure (Astley, 1985: 202; Gouldner, 1959; Thompson, 2003). As noted 
by Donaldson (2001: 249), “the theory can explain the incremental change that many 
organizations display,” based on the assumption that even minor changes in contingency 
variables can lead to misfit and therefore trigger incremental structural adjustments. 
The political perspective, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of organization’s 
dominant coalition in structural change (Child, 1972b; 1999), where the dominant coalition 
is defined as a group of “interdependent individuals who collectively have sufficient 
control of organizational resources to commit them in certain directions and to withhold 
them from others” (Thompson, 2003: 128; see also Cyert & March, 1992; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). In its strong form, the political perspective challenges the contingency 
theory assumption of technical rationality (cf. Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981) 
as well as the argument that the dominant coalition will invariably adjust organizational 
structure to fit relevant contingencies (Child, 1972b; Miller, 1991). As far as organizational 
change (or lack thereof) is concerned, empirical studies in this tradition have focused 
primarily on strategic persistence (e.g., Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993; 
Westphal & Bendar, 2005); major strategic changes, such as diversification (Boeker, 1997; 
Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992); and 
new program adoption (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hage & Dewar, 1973). However, 
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empirical research into the effect of dominant coalitions on incremental structural change 
is sparse, even though such change is quite congruent with the political perspective 
(Dutton et al., 2001; Lindblom, 1959). 
Although usually presented separately, these two perspectives are not completely 
antagonistic. Contingency theoreticians acknowledge the dominant coalition’s role in 
structural adjustment, and even allow for the possibility that the coalition’s preferences 
could affect “the rate at which structural adjustment is made” (Donaldson, 1987: 19). 
However, they may not go so far as to allow the coalition’s preferences to have an 
independent effect on structural change, maintaining that the latter is triggered solely by 
“[m]isfit of structure to contingencies” (Donaldson, 1987: 20; 2001). Political approaches, 
on the other hand, readily acknowledge that technical contingencies can constrain 
structures (e.g. Ranson, Hinings, & Greenwood, 1980), but emphasize this is not the whole 
story. 
 
5.2.2 Bureaucratic Rule Change: Previous Research 
Most empirical studies focusing on incremental organizational change in the form of rule 
amendments (Beck & Kieser, 2003; March et al., 2000; Schulz, 1998b, 2003) do not use 
either the contingency or the political perspective as the main theoretical framework15
                                                            
15 The political perspective figured more prominently in research by Witteloostuijn and de Jong (2008). However, this study examined change of 
national laws rather than organizational rules. 
. 
Bureaucratic rule change scholars widely acknowledge the relevance of these perspectives, 
however, and occasionally include some contingency and political control variables in 
their empirical work.  
132 
 
For example, in a study of Stanford University’s written rules, Zhou (1993: 1153) 
hypothesized that “[t]he rates of rule founding and of rule change are positively related to 
the complexity of organizational structure,” a key variable in contingency theory (Blau, 
1957). Complexity was measured as the number of academic programs, and organizational 
size (student and faculty numbers) was also included as a control variable. He found that 
size did not have a significant effect on rule changes, while the effect of structural 
complexity was not robust across different rule populations and time periods (see also 
March et al., 2000; Schulz, 1998b, who used the same dataset and reported similar 
findings). Subsequently, Beck & Kieser (2003) studied change of personnel rules at a 
German Bank, and their control variables similarly included measures of organizational 
size (number of employees) and complexity (number of branches). They found a robust 
negative influence of organizational size on rule change, but no effect of complexity. 
Furthermore, in their joint work on rules and rule change, March, Schulz, & Zhou 
(2000) argued that rules record solutions to both technical and political problems, and 
therefore can be expected to adapt to both technical and political pressures. In their 
empirical analysis, they examined how the likelihood of rule change was affected by 
external political-institutional pressures, measured in terms of government legislation and 
funding of higher education. They found that legislation generally had a positive effect on 
rule change, while the effect of funding was contradictory across different models. Yet this 
study did not examine the effects of the dominant coalition (i.e. internal politics), though it 
did provide some evidence for the claim that rule makers’ attention plays a role in 
determining which rules will be revised when (see also Sullivan, 2010).  
In short, in spite of these promising efforts to study internal rule ecologies, a more 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the role of technical and internal political factors in 
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rule change is needed before we can assess the relative ability of the two perspectives to 
explain incremental change in bureaucracies. In this chapter, we therefore concurrently test 
hypotheses predicting the responsiveness of rule systems to technical factors like growth in 
staff, service output, and membership against hypotheses attributing rule system change to 
political factors like dominant coalition turnover, diversity, and remunerative and 
normative power. 
5.3 Technical and political antecedents of rule change 
 
5.3.1 Technical Drivers of Rule Change 
The effect of organizational growth on bureaucratic structure has been one of the central 
themes of contingency theory (e.g. Astley, 1985; Blau, 1957; Donaldson, 2001; Kimberly, 
1976), and therefore, focusing on growth seems especially appropriate for testing the 
technical perspective on rule change. It is often argued that reliance on formal rules offers 
greater efficiency advantages to larger organizations (e.g. Pugh et al., 1968; Weber, 1978; 
Walsh & Dewar, 1987), and longitudinal research generally confirms the link between 
organizational growth and increase in the overall levels of formalization (Beck, 2006; 
Inkson, Pugh, & Hickson, 1970).16
                                                            
16 It is important to note that this association may also have an institutional explanation rather than an efficiency explanation (cf. Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Walsh & Dewar, 1987). 
 However, the effect of organizational growth on change 
of individual rules (rather than rule proliferation) is less obvious due that fact that growth 
(like organizational size) has many dimensions (Kimberly, 1976), and multiple causal 
mechanisms can play a role. 
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Growth in staff. The first type of organizational growth that we consider is 
growth in the number of staff. As Damanpour (1992: 377) points out, organizational size 
“directly affects the size of the administrative component of the organization through 
which most administrative innovations are introduced”. Naturally, the administrative 
component usually also plays an important role in the organizational rulemaking process 
(e.g., Walsh & Dewar, 1987). Furthermore, research on rulemaking shows that adjustment 
of rules requires organizational attention (Sullivan, 2010), which suggests that rule changes 
might be easier to finalize when there are some slack human resources available. These 
arguments lead us to expect that slack in human resources generated by staff growth will 
act as a ‘facilitator’ of rule change (cf. Cheng & Kesner, 1997), which is in line with the 
results of a study by Beck (2006), who found that increasing number of employees led to 
increasing size of personnel rules, measured by the number of pages devoted to each 
individual rule. The opposite scenario, where staff is somehow used to buffer (Cheng & 
Kesner, 1997; Thompson, 2003) the rule system from the need to adapt to technical 
contingencies, seems to us far less plausible. If existing rules are not consistent with the 
surrounding conditions and need to be changed (Schulz, 1998b), then it is hard to see how 
having more staff might help the organization to cope with this inconsistency. 
H1a: Growth in staff decreases the time until the next rule change. 
 
One possible objection to hypotheses 1a might appeal to the concept of structural 
inertia and the idea that larger organizations will be more inert (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
Indeed, Beck & Kieser (2003: 808) used this idea to explain their finding that the 
likelihood of rule change decreased as the number of the organization’s employees 
increased. However, the original arguments of structural inertia theory (Hannan & 
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Freeman, 1984), as well as most of the empirical studies that tested those arguments (e.g. 
Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991; Haveman, 1993; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991), were 
concerned with strategic change or radical change to core organizational features, and it is 
not clear whether these arguments can be straightforwardly generalized to change in 
organizational rules, which is arguably incremental and non-core. Moreover, Hannan and 
Freeman (1984: 159) actually wrote that the “relationship between size and the rate of 
structural change [was] indeterminate in [their] theory,” precisely because larger 
organizations might be more likely have the resources to achieve structural change. Still, 
the possible confounding effect of pressures towards structural inertia poses a challenge in 
testing the above hypothesis and the associated theory. Luckily, as we discuss later on in 
this chapter, there might be a methodological solution to this problem, which involves 
measuring short-term rather than long-term growth. 
Service output. One aspect of organizational size that has been largely neglected 
in research on organizational change is output (Kimberly, 1976). Inputs and outputs are 
important concepts in the open systems perspective on organizations (Thompson, 2003) 
and reflect “the amount of activity to which the core technology of the organization is 
exposed in a given period of time” (Kimberly, 1976: 588). In the case of a service 
organization like UNESCO, the output is generally intangible and inseparable from the 
inputs, while the ‘technology’ is constituted by various organizational procedures for 
handling transactions with clients (Mills & Moberg, 1982; Thompson, 2003). Thus, it is 
quite conceivable that the rules that govern these transactions will be affected by the 
volume of transactions completed in a given period of time (i.e. service output). 
Specifically, a sharp increase in output can generate problems for the actors that have to 
use the rules, and previous research has argued that new organizational problems are 
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precisely what drives rule change (March et al., 2000; Sullivan, 2010). Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H1b: Growth in (service) output decreases the time until the next rule change17
 
 
Membership. A final aspect of size that we consider is membership. This aspect 
of size is especially important for so-called ‘meta-organizations’ (Ahrne & Brunsson, 
2005; 2008), which are organizations that have other organizations or nation states as 
members. The number of staff employed by an intergovernmental organization is likely to 
be affected by the number of its member states, but research shows that the former tends to 
grow at a faster rate than the latter (Vaubel, Dreher, & Soylu, 2007). Growth in the number 
of members of a meta-organization may become “a possible source of [organizational] 
changes, as new members introduce new ideas or a different balance of power” (Ahrne & 
Brunsson, 2005: 443). Because meta-organizations often have rules that govern their 
interactions with their members, membership growth should tend to trigger rule changes. 
H1c: Growth in membership decreases the time until the next rule change 
 
It should be emphasized that the effects predicted in hypotheses 1a, b and c might be 
counteracted by structural inertia stemming from intensified pressures for reliability and 
accountability that often accompany growth (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). This possibility 
needs to be taken into account when testing the hypotheses and interpreting the results. 
                                                            
17 Surprisingly, an early study of the Chicago Board of Trade found that that the volume of transactions had no significant effect on changes in the 
rules that are meant to govern those transactions (Leblebici & Salancik, 1982), which seems contradict the above hypothesis. However, this finding may 
not generalize to those organizational contexts, where increased volume of transactions is more likely to generate problems. Moreover, the study pooled 
rule births and rule changes in measuring the dependent variable. Thus, we find it worthwhile to test hypothesis 1b (and our arguments for it) with new 
data, despite Leblebici and Salancik’s (1982) discouraging finding. 
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5.3.2 Political Drivers of Rule Change 
While organizational growth represents the paradigmatic example of a technical factor that 
is likely to either induce, facilitate, or impede incremental structural change in an 
organization, the characteristics of the dominant coalition represent a paradigmatic 
example of a political factor in organizational life (e.g., Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Ocasio, 
1994). And although the dominant coalition cannot be assumed to initiate and control all 
structural changes in an organization, it is still likely to have a say in the vast majority of 
such changes. Particularly in the case of rule changes, formal authority to approve a 
revised rule before it can be officially issued will usually rest in the hands of members of 
the dominant coalition. Of course, this need not always be the case, and the extent to which 
the dominant coalition is able to control the activities of organizational rulemaking bodies 
can vary. 
Turnover. One variable that is likely to affect the extent of such control is 
turnover in the rulemaking body. A common argument in the literature associated with the 
upper echelons perspective on organizations (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) is that turnover 
within an elite decision making group, such as a top management team (TMT) or a 
corporate board of directors, can help to overcome inertia stemming from entrenched 
interests and cognitive biases within that group (e.g., Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Nystrom 
& Starbuck, 1984; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). Some 
empirical studies show that TMT turnover is indeed associated with increased strategic and 
structural change in firms attempting turnaround (Barker III, Patterson Jr, & Mueller, 
2001), and that turnover in hospitals’ boards of directors has a positive effect on new 
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service adoption (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991). Yet, other studies failed to find a positive 
effect of TMT turnover on strategic reorientation (Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992) or even 
found a negative effect (Gordon et al., 2000). Moreover, all these studies focused on large-
scale strategic and organizational changes as opposed to incremental changes, which 
remains a neglected topic within the upper echelons perspective. 
The effects of turnover on the work of rulemaking bodies have also been 
examined in the political science literature. One study showed, for example, that 
membership turnover in state legislatures was not related to the percentage of bills passed 
(Squire, 1998). Van Witteloostuijn and De Jong (2008), on the other hand, found that 
government cabinet turnover had a positive effect on contemporaneous changes in higher 
education legislation. They reasoned that when a cabinet was succeeded by another 
administration, the new cabinet would strive to prove to the electorate that it has the will to 
make the necessary changes (ibid.: 507). However, there is reason to expect a positive 
relationship even in cases of more routine turnover in a rulemaking group (as opposed to 
its wholesale replacement), where the expectations of the electorate are a less salient 
concern. Turnover of rule makers can be seen as one aspect of a rule regime change, where 
a ‘rule regime’ refers to “organizational systems, agents, and processes which create and 
revise rules for a delimited problem domain” (Schulz & Beck, 2002: 16). As a rule regime 
matures, rule change become more rare, which is explained by mutual adaptation between 
the rule system and the interests and experiences of rule makers (Beck & Kieser, 2003; 
March et al., 2000; Schulz & Beck, 2002). However, higher turnover of rule makers is 
likely to lead to a temporary disruption of this process, causing rules to be changed sooner. 
H2a: Turnover of members of the rulemaking body decreases the time until the 
next rule change 
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Heterogeneity. Besides turnover, research in the upper echelon perspective has 
also examined the effects of decision maker heterogeneity. Some studies indicate that high 
levels of top management heterogeneity are associated with interpersonal conflict and 
therefore lower cohesiveness (Knight et al., 1999). TMT heterogeneity has also been found 
to weaken social integration (Smith et al., 1994; see also review in Certo, et al., 2006), 
while homogeneity appeared to strengthen it (O’Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989). In 
some studies, decision maker homogeneity also appeared to have a positive effect on 
organizational change (e.g. O’Reilly, Snyder & Boothe, 1993) and on change in national 
laws (van Witteloostuijn & de Jong, 2008). Conversely, diversity within corporate boards 
was associated with less strategic change (Goodstein et al., 1994). Thus, based on these 
findings and arguments, one would expect heterogeneity of the rulemaking body to reduce 
the likelihood of reaching consensus in political negotiations between rule makers. 
Assuming that such consensus is required for initiating and finalizing rule change, the time 
until the next rule change should increase (van Witteloostuijn & de Jong, 2008). 
In this chapter we focus on cultural heterogeneity, which seems particularly 
relevant for decision making in an intergovernmental organization.18
                                                            
18 The relevance of cultural differences for negotiations in the World Heritage Committee was confirmed to us by an informant, who had previously 
served on the Committee. 
 The effect of such 
heterogeneity on organizational change has (to our knowledge) not been examined in prior 
research. Elron (1997) found that TMT cultural heterogeneity had a positive effect on 
organizational performance, a positive effect on issue-based conflict, and no effect on 
cohesion. Given that issue-based conflict is likely to make reaching agreement on rule 
change more difficult, we propose the following hypothesis. 
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H2b: Cultural heterogeneity in the rulemaking body increases the time until the 
next rule change 
 
Remunerative and normative power. Power, or “the ability to get things done the 
way one wants them to be done” (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977: 14; see also Weber, 1978: 
926), is the central concept of the political perspective on organizations (Child, 1972b; 
Pfeffer, 1981). When applied to the topic of organizational change, the political 
perspective emphasizes that 
 
“[o]rganizationally defined groups vary in their ability to influence 
organizational change because they have differential power. Some 
groups and individuals are listened to more keenly than others. Some 
have more potential or less potential for enabling or resisting change” 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996: 1038). 
 
It is therefore surprising that power has not been given much attention in previous research 
on rule change (but see van Witteloostuijn & de Jong, 2008). 
Mobilization of power is not only required for bringing about major strategic and 
structural changes (e.g., Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007), but also plays an important role even 
when it comes to comparatively small-scale organizational changes, such as changes in 
organizational routines (e.g. Howard-Grenville, 2005). The possibility of amending formal 
rules and procedures will often depend on the exercise of power in order to overcome 
“vested interests [that] become embedded in the procedures” (Walsh & Dewar, 1987: 225). 
Such power will not be limited to the purely formal authority that actors gain through their 
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election or appointment to an office in a decision making body (Weber, 1978), although 
“being in the right place” is certainly an important determinant of power (Brass, 1984). 
Rather, it will also encompass the ‘remunerative’ power (Etzioni, 1961) that actors gain 
due to their capacity to provide valued material resources to the organization (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). 
Actors enjoying a relatively stronger power position within organizations may 
well be committed to the status quo rather than change (e.g. Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). 
This is especially true for radical or ‘divergent’ organizational change, which is therefore 
generally assumed to entail changing power distributions (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). 
Incremental or convergent change, on the other hand, often proceeds through the process 
of issue selling (Dutton et al., 2001), where any change must be endorsed by members of 
the dominant coalition through a formal decision making process if it is to materialize at 
all. At the same time, actors enjoying a high level of remunerative power may be able to 
prevent unwanted changes from becoming an issue for decision making in the first place 
(Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). With regard to rulemaking, this implies that most of rule 
changes considered by the rulemaking body will be in line with the interests of actors with 
a high level of remunerative power. However, the participation of these actors will still be 
required in order to overcome potential opposition to these changes within the rulemaking 
body itself. Hence, we expect that rule changes will be more likely to occur when actors 
with greater remunerative power are represented in the rulemaking body. 
H2c: Rule makers’ remunerative power decreases the time until the next rule 
change 
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Besides structural and remunerative power, actors may also mobilize normative 
power in order to secure the necessary changes (Etzioni, 1961). Normative power is based 
on the “allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations”, including 
“esteem and prestige” (Etzioni, 1961: 5). A similar concept of ‘prestige power’ can be 
found in the literature on dominant coalitions (Finkelstein, 1992). In the institutional 
literature prestige is understood as “an organization’s capacity to achieve objectives by 
virtue of enjoying a favorable social evaluation”, and this capacity is seen as related to the 
organization’s legitimacy, status and reputation (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008: 66). We 
expect the effect of rule makers’ normative power on rule change to be similar to that of 
remunerative power. Specifically, rule changes become more likely when actors with high 
normative power are represented on the rule making body. Because, as mentioned above, 
actors’ normative power is associated with their prestige and legitimacy, participation of 
legitimate and powerful actors in rule change negotiations is vital for ensuring that these 
changes are perceived as legitimate by the relevant audiences (Deephouse & Suchman, 
2008). 
H2d: Rule makers’ normative power decreases the time until the next rule change 
5.4 Method 
 
5.4.1 UNESCO’s World Heritage Program 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was 
founded in 1945 as part of a broader set of UN specialized agencies. The organization’s 
purpose, as formulated in its Constitution, is “to contribute to peace and security by 
promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order 
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to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.” UNESCO’s constitutional organs are: (i) the General Conference, 
consisting of representatives of all Member States of UNESCO, (ii) the Executive Board,, 
elected by the General Conference, and (iii) the Secretariat, headed by the Director-
General, who is appointed by the Conference for a period of four years. The General 
Conference sets policy and budget, the Executive Board is responsible for the execution of 
the program adopted by the Conference, while the Secretariat, consisting of civil servants 
from various countries, performs the day-to-day work of the organization. UNESCO is 
organized into five Program Sectors (Education, Natural Sciences, Social and Human 
Sciences, Culture, and Communication and Information), each encompassing a variety of 
specific programs and projects. 
One of the major programs within the Culture Sector focuses on administering the 
World Heritage Convention (WHC). This Convention was adopted by the UNESCO 
General Conference in 1972 with the aim of “establishing an effective system of collective 
protection of the cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value”. The key 
decision-making body established within UNESCO under the Convention is the World 
Heritage Committee, consisting of representatives from 21 of the States Parties to the 
WHC. These are elected by the General Assembly of States Parties to the WHC, which 
meets during the sessions of the General Conference. The Committee meets at least once a 
year and its main tasks are to decide which properties are to be inscribed onto or deleted 
from the World Heritage List (WHL), to monitor the state of conservation of the properties 
inscribed on the WHL, to decide whether certain properties from the WHL should be 
inscribed on, or removed from, the List of World Heritage in Danger, to formulate the 
procedure concerning requests for international assistance, to evaluate the implementation 
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of the WHC, and to formulate and revise the Operational Guidelines (see Zacharias, 2008: 
1844). 
The Committee is assisted in its work by the Secretariat of UNESCO, as well as 
by three Advisory Bodies: the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the 
International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and the International Centre 
for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM). The 
latter are international organizations that were named in the WHC. 
 
5.4.2 The Operational Guidelines 
The Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the WHC set out the specific criteria 
for the inscription of properties on the lists and the granting of assistance, which were left 
undefined in the Convention. The Guidelines thus play an important role in the 
Committee’s work, which tends to treat them “as if they were not merely a nonbinding 
commentary to the Conventional provisions but binding secondary law” (Zacharias, 2008: 
1849). They were first adopted by the Committee in 1977, and revised twelve times in the 
course of the following 30 years (Zacharias, 2008: 1848). The stated purpose of the 
Guidelines is to inform “States Parties to the Convention of the principles which guide the 
work of the Committee in establishing the World Heritage List and the List of World 
Heritage in Danger and in granting international assistance”. Thus, the Guidelines can be 
regarded as a formal coordination mechanism between the service provider (the 
Committee) and its ‘clients’ (the States Parties) (cf. Larsson & Bowen, 1989; Mills & 
Moberg, 1982). 
The process of revising the guidelines varied depending on the scale and nature of 
revisions. For example, in 1978, the Committee simply authorized the Secretariat to amend 
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the Guidelines, so as “to bring them into line with the decisions taken at the second 
session”. The amended version was issued in the same year. In other cases, the process was 
more complex. For example, in 1979, Committee set up special working groups, consisting 
of representatives of several States Parties (who also happened to be members of the 
Committee in that year) and of the relevant Advisory Bodies, in order to define more 
precisely the World Heritage criteria. After hearing the reports of the working groups in 
the same year, the Committee took a number of decisions and instructed the Secretariat to 
prepare a draft of the revised Guidelines based on these decisions. It also instructed the 
Secretariat to prepare a draft of the procedures for the deletion of properties from the 
WHL, which it later adopted with some modifications. In 1980, the Committee examined 
the draft of the revised Guidelines, made some further detailed modifications to the text. 
The new version of the Guidelines was finally issued in the same year. 
The Guidelines comprise a number of major sections, which reflect the tasks of 
the Committee: establishment of the WHL, reactive monitoring and periodic reporting, 
establishment of the List of World Heritage in danger, international assistance, the World 
Heritage Fund, balance between cultural and natural heritage, and a section on ‘other 
matters’, such as the use of the World Heritage Emblem. These are further subdivided into 
smaller subsections. For example, the guidelines on the establishment of the WHL are 
divided into ‘general principles’, indications to States Parties concerning nominations to 
the WHL, criteria for inclusion of cultural properties, criteria for inclusion of natural 
properties, procedure for the deletion of properties from the WHL, guidelines for the 
evaluation and examination of nominations, format and content of nominations, and 
procedure and timetable for the processing of nominations. The 1999 edition of the 
Guidelines was 38 pages long (not counting the eight pages of annexes). 
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In 2005, a new edition of the Guidelines was published, which was some 76 pages 
long (excluding another 60 pages of annexes) and which constituted a major overhaul of 
the original Guidelines. For example, the previously separate criteria for inscription of 
cultural and natural properties were combined, the Introduction was greatly extended by 
incorporating a lot of background information about the WHC and the WHP, an entirely 
new major section of guidelines on ‘encouraging support for the WHC’ was inserted. 
Given the radical nature of these changes, compared to more incremental additions and 
adjustments that characterized the development of the Guidelines up until that point, we 
decided to exclude them from the analysis and to end our observation period in 2004. In 
their study of rule changes, Beck and Kieser (2003: 799) similarly concluded their 
observation period just before the rulebook in question “underwent a significant redesign”. 
 
5.4.3 Data and Model Specification 
We modeled changes in the rules of UNESCO’s World Heritage using event history 
analysis. Our dataset included all rules (Operational Guidelines) created by the World 
Heritage Committee between 1977 and 2004. We obtained thirteen editions of the 
Operational Guidelines from UNESCO’s electronic archives 
(http://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines/). When the Committee revised or suspended a rule, 
we coded either as the same event (rule change). If the rule was revised, we kept it in the 
dataset, but coded it as a new rule version. Our final dataset included 368 versions of 180 
rules. To examine the effects of time-varying covariates, we split every rule observation 
into multiple annual spells (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 2002), equal to the total number of 
years that a rule version was in effect. The final dataset included 3,096 observations. 
However, since a rule was not at risk of revision during the year in which it was created, 
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we did not include the first observation year of each rule version in the analysis, and thus 
based our analysis on a total of 2,916 annual spells. 
We chose a log-logistic, parametric specification to model rule revisions. In event 
history analysis, parametric models specify that the distribution function for the failure 
times takes on a specific shape. Such models are appropriate when there are strong 
theoretical reasons to believe that there is an underlying time dependency to the likelihood 
of an event occurring (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). In the case of rule changes, 
past work on the evolution of rules in bureaucratic organizations suggests that time 
dependence of rule changes is likely to be non-monotonic, or more specifically, that the 
hazard of change tends to increase due to potential obsolescence of a rule over time, but 
this increase will occur with decreasing increments as a rule becomes institutionalized and 
possibly even ossified (e.g. Schulz, 1998b, 2003). In our modeling, we wanted to allow for 
the possibility that the hazard would actually begin to fall after some point due to 
institutionalization, suggesting nonmonotonic inverted U-shaped time dependence. The 
two primary specifications of nonmonotonic time dependence are the log-logistic and log-
normal. Although these often yield very similar estimates (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 
2004), we compared the fit of these competing specifications by assessing their Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) scores, which is an appropriate method for comparing the fit of 
nonnested models (Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez, 2004). Based on minimizing the AIC 
(Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004), our comparison provided evidence that the log-
logistic (AIC = 679.02) specification offered a better fit than the log-normal (AIC = 
755.60). 
While previous research on rule change estimated hazard rates (e.g. March et al., 
2000), we used a failure-time metric in order to implement our analysis in Stata. As 
148 
 
explained by Rao, Greve and Davis (2001: 514), who followed the same procedure, 
“[h]azard rate and failure-time metrics are mathematically equivalent, but the coefficients 
of a failure-time specification are read as effects on the time until failure […], so a positive 
coefficient means longer event-time and thus lower hazard rate.” In our case, ‘time until 
failure’ is measured as the length of time until the next rule change (revision or 
suspension). The survival function of the log-logistic distributioQLV6W >ȜWp]-1 ZKHUHȜ
and p are two parameters of the log-logistic distribution (see Kleinbaum & Klein, 2005). 
This model is implemented using an accelerated failure-time parametrization, obtained by 
SDUDPHWUL]LQJȜ1/p H[SĮ0ȕ;ZKHUH;LVDYHctor of predictor variables, and p is the 
shape parameter for the distribution (ibid.). Stata provides estimates of a parameter called 
‘gamma’, which is equal to 1/p. Thus, if gamma is more than or equal to 1, this means that 
the hazard decreases over time. If gamma is strictly less than 1, this indicates that hazard 
first increases and then decreases over time. We computed robust standard errors in all 
analyses, in order to adjust for clustering of observations at the level of individual rules (cf. 
Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Rao et al., 2001). The rules that did not experience a 
change over their lifespan were treated as censored. 
 
5.4.4 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the length of time between a rule’s birth or previous revision and 
its next revision or suspension. In line with previous studies (Beck & Kieser, 2003; March, 
Schulz, & Zhou, 2000; Zhou, 1993), we defined rule changes as either a revision or 
suspension of a rule. Rule revision involves the official replacement of an existing rule 
with another version of the same rule (March et al., 2000), while rule suspension occurs 
when a rule “is removed from the organization’s records and no successor version of the 
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rule is put in place” (March et al., 2000: 84). We measured such changes through a content 
analysis of the thirteen different editions of the Operational Guidelines. As emphasized by 
Zhou (1993), one of the challenges of research on rules is defining the boundaries of the 
key unit of analysis, viz. the individual rule. He points to the presence of a separate subtitle 
or a separate subsection as making such boundaries in a rulebook (Zhou, 1993: 1163). 
Accordingly, we used the numbered paragraphs in the Guidelines as the rule unit. 
Although these numbers change as new paragraphs are added to the Guidelines, the 
integrity of the paragraphs is preserved in the majority of revisions (i.e. paragraphs are 
seldom split or merged). 
Whenever the text of a paragraph changed in a new edition of the Guidelines 
compared to the previous one (including minor changes in language), this was coded as a 
revision of the paragraph. Changes in numbering of paragraphs or in the headings under 
which they appeared were not counted as revisions. Rule changes were recorded only 
when a new edition of the Guidelines was actually published, with the publication year 
used as the time measure. In a few cases, we found that a paragraph from a previous 
edition of the Guidelines would be split into two separate paragraphs (with or without 
revisions) in the new edition. In such cases, we coded one of the resulting paragraphs as a 
new rule, and coded the other paragraph as a revision of the old rule. When a paragraph 
was eliminated from the Guidelines and no successor paragraph could be identified, this 
was coded as a suspension. In a few cases, existing paragraphs were combined into a single 
paragraph (with or without revisions), in which case one of the paragraphs was coded as a 
rule revision, and the other as a rule suspension. 
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5.4.5 Technical and Political Factors 
To test the effects of growth and political factors, we included a number of time-varying 
covariates. These are discussed below. 
Technical variables. Three measures of organizational growth were included. To 
measure growth in staff, we computed the simple difference between the total number of 
full-time staff employed by UNESCO at the end of the current year and the corresponding 
number of the previous year. We used the number of sites inscribed on the WHL per year 
as a measure of output growth, since the processing of nominations of sites to the WHL is 
a central task for the organs of the WHP (i.e. the Secretariat, the Advisory Bodies and the 
Committee), and the inscription of a site on this List indicates the successful completion of 
this task (and a favorable outcome for the State Party concerned). Finally, we included 
annual change (i.e. difference from the previous year) in the number of States Parties to the 
WHC as an indicator of membership growth. The data on UNESCO staff were obtained 
from the UN yearbook, while the data on the number of States Parties to the WHC and the 
number of sites inscribed were obtained from the World Heritage website. As can be seen 
from the correlation matrix, all of the growth variables are only weakly correlated, in line 
with the assumption that they are capturing distinct aspects of growth (Kimberly, 1976). It 
is important to note that the absolute organizational size in terms of staff is decreasing over 
most of the observation period (i.e. growth is mostly negative). We shall return to this 
point in the discussion section of this chapter. 
In using yearly growth rather than an absolute measure of size, we are following 
research by March and colleagues, who similarly defined size in terms of yearly 
differences in order to avoid multicollinearity problems (March et al., 2000: 93). We 
encountered similar collinearity problems when we attempted to use absolute measures of 
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size in our models. Moreover, we follow these researchers in assuming that “the rule 
system responds to the magnitudes of changes in organizational size” (March et al., 2000: 
93). This is consistent with the arguments for our hypotheses, which emphasize the 
response of the rule system to slack and organizational problems, since the latter can be 
plausibly assumed to be more affected by short-term changes in size, then by the long-term 
trend in absolute size. Furthermore, short-term changes in size are presumably less related 
to structural inertia than size in absolute terms, since growth-induced inertial forces tend to 
develop in organizations gradually (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), rather than to fluctuate 
from year to year. 
Political variables. In order to test our four political hypotheses, we obtained data 
on States Parties that were listed as participants in the sessions of the Committee for a 
given year19
We used average cultural distance between States Members of the Committee as a 
measure of cultural heterogeneity. To measure cultural distance between a pair of States 
. We disregarded the States Parties that were present merely as observers, 
since observes do not have the formal right to participate in Committee decision making. 
Turnover in the Committee was measured by summing the number of States Parties 
leaving the Committee (i.e. those who were listed as members for the previous session, but 
not for the current session) and the number of States Parties entering the Committee as a 
percentage of the total number of States on the Committee during the previous session (cf. 
Cho and Shen, 2007: 750). Turnover fluctuated strongly over time, and in most cases 
alternated between high and low values on a yearly basis. 
                                                            
19 According to the WHC, the size of the Committee was meant to be equal to 15 States Parties until the Convention enters into force for a sufficient 
number of states, after which the size would increase to 21 States Parties. However, the official lists of participants in the Committee sessions show that 
there is some fluctuation size from year to year, since not all of the elected 15 or 21 States participate in these sessions. 
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Parties, we employed Kogut and Singh’s (1988) cultural distance index, which is based on 
Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
masculinity/femininity, and individualism. We then computed the average dyadic cultural 
distance between States Members of the Committee in a given year by taking the 
arithmetic mean. Measures of Hofstede’s dimensions were not available for 21 countries 
(30%) in the set of all countries that ever served on the Committee during the observation 
period. On average, we had 4.3 countries in a Committee session (23% of the average 
Committee size), for which the data were not available. When data was incomplete, we 
based our measure of cultural heterogeneity on all State Member pairs for which data was 
available.  
We relied on countries’ average GDP as a measure of their remunerative power in 
the Committee in a given year. The use of GDP as a measure of economic power is 
consistent with research on international relations (e.g., Dixon, 1983: 300). Moreover, it 
also captures power stemming from organizational resource dependence, since States’ 
contributions to the UNESCO budget and the World Heritage Fund are determined based 
on their GDP. Our data source for GDP was World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 
which allowed us to measure GDP for most countries on the Committee for each year of 
our observation period. We then computed the average level of GDP for the counties on 
the Committee in a given year, which we interpret as an indicator of overall Committee 
power. Unfortunately, for some countries GDP data were not available for certain years, 
and there was no data for Cuba for the whole observation period. This is much less of a 
problem for this variable than for cultural distance, however, since on average only 1.2 
countries (0.06%) of all countries were represented on the Committee in a given year  had 
missing values. We applied a natural log transformation to the GDP variable. 
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The fourth and final political factor in our model was States’ normative power or 
prestige, which we tried to capture by measuring countries’ representation on the World 
Heritage List. We reasoned that Within UNESCO’s World Heritage program, prestige was 
largely allocated to States Parties through the ‘tournament ritual’ (Anand & Watson, 2004) 
of inscription on the WHL. Countries such as Italy, with a substantial share of properties 
on WHL (5.2% in 1998), are thus assumed to acquire normative power in World Heritage 
Negotiations based on obtaining so many prestigious inscriptions. A country like Brazil 
had a share of only 1.5% of all properties on the WHL in the same year, which is still 
higher than many other countries. Inscriptions indicate success, which in turn “often 
signals cultural acceptance and an ability to deliver on commitments”, thus enabling 
successful players to acquire legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008: 63). For each year, 
we determined the total number of inscribed World Heritage sites located on the territories 
of the States Parties that were serving on the Committee in that year. We then divided this 
number by the total size of the WHL, thus obtaining a measure of Committee members 
representation (or share of sites) on the WHL up until that point in time. Of course, 
representation on the List is affected by the dates of accession of the relevant States 
Parties, since countries that joined earlier have had more time to get their sites inscribed on 
the WHL than countries that joined later. Thus, this variable is also capturing any prestige 
or legitimacy that might derive from counties’ longer ‘tenure’ within the WHP. 
 
5.4.6 Control Variables 
Rule-specific control variables. Previous research on rule change shows that the rate of 
change of organizational rules is affected not only by the characteristics of the relevant 
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organization, but also the individual histories of each rule. The fact that some rules may be 
more prone to change than others similarly needs to be controlled for in our models of rule 
change. To this end, we included two rule-specific controls. First, to control for one aspect 
of heterogeneity among rules, we included an indicator of rule type. We classified all rules 
as being either procedural or substantive. Substantive rules were defined as the rules 
concerned with decision outcomes and the conditions that have to be met for arriving at a 
given outcome (e.g., Heugens, 2005), while procedural rules were concerned with 
structuring bureaucratic processes and providing supplementary information about the 
organization. In operational terms, we classified all rules concerned with criteria for 
inscribing and deleting sites from the WHL and List of World Heritage in Danger as 
substantive (dummy variable=1), while all remaining rules (i.e. monitoring, reporting, 
procedures, schedule, financial assistance, etc.) as procedural (dummy variable=0). 
Second, following previous studies (e.g. Beck & Kieser, 2003; March et al., 
2000), we wanted to capture the effect of the age of the rule system. However, we found 
that including this variable as a simple clock led to collinearity problems. In response to 
these problems we constructed a rule-specific variable as a way of capturing the aging of 
the rule system, namely rule system age at the time of rule birth. Using this variable is also 
consistent with the idea that rules that were created together belong to the same ‘cohort’, 
and thus allows us to capture an important dimension of heterogeneity in our rule 
population. The variable simply measures the number of years elapsed between 1977 (the 
emergence of the rule system) and the birth-year of a given rule, and is constant over time. 
Other control variables. We controlled for growth in UNESCO total budget (in 
millions), a measure of the financial resources available to the organization, including any 
potential slack resources. Previous research found that financial resource scarcity (the 
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opposite of slack) was associated with higher rates of structural and process change in 
organizations (Koberg, 1987). The budget data was taken from the UN yearbook. 
UNESCO adopts its budget biannually for the coming two years.20
We also included two variables to control for the output of Advisory Bodies to the 
Committee, which may exert an institutional influence on World Heritage rule changes. 
Previous research has found support for institutional effects on rule change (Zhou, 1993). 
The Advisory Bodies to the Committee are explicitly recognized in the WHC enables them 
to exercise a normative institutional influence (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) on the 
Committee’s work. We used the output IUCN and ICOMOS, as manifested in key policy 
 The mandatory 
contributions of States Parties to the World Heritage Fund is always equal to one per cent 
of their contributions to the regular budget of UNESCO. Thus, this variable captures not 
only the funds available to UNESCO as a whole, but also the funds allocated to the World 
Heritage. As with the other growth variables, we used the simple difference between 
consecutive biannual budgets as a measure of budget growth for that biennium. To obtain 
an annual measure of growth, the difference between consecutive biannual budgets is 
divided by two, so that one half is recorded for the current year, and another half is 
recorded for following year. This interpolation is done for smoothing and captures the 
intuition that it takes some time before the full effect of any change in budget is felt, since 
the budget is set for the next two years. Unlike staff size, the biannual budget exhibits 
positive growth over the observation period, apart from a sharp fall in 1983, around the 
time when the United States stopped paying its contributions and withdrew from UNESCO 
(but not from the WHP). 
                                                            
20 With the exception of year 1981, when the budget was adopted for the coming three years. 
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documents of these organizations, as a proxy for this institutional influence. While these 
policy documents, such as resolutions and charters, do not have a legally binding status for 
the Committee, they may still serve as guidelines for its decisions, such as rule change. 
These documents represent consensus among experts from various countries on matters 
relating to cultural and natural heritage. Thus, we included the number of resolutions 
passed by the IUCN in a given year, which focus on natural heritage, as well as the number 
of charters adopted by ICOMOS in a given year, which relate to cultural heritage. The data 
were gathered by examining the documents published on these organizations’ websites. 
In order to eliminate causal concerns, all time-varying covariates were lagged by 
one year (t-1). This is in line with previous research on rule change (e.g. March et al., 
2000) and legal change (Van Witteloostuijn & De Jong, 2008). 
5.5 Results 
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics and correlations for variables used in models of time 
until rule change 
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Change in staff -35.39 
103.43
9 -231 168 1     
2. Sites inscribed 28.14 12.808 0 61 0.0826* 1    
3. Change in number of 
States Parties 5.43 2.367 1 9 0.0560* -0.3857* 1   
4. Committee turnover 0.4011 0.324 0 1 -0.2805* 0.0634* 0.1512* 1  
5. Mean cultural distance  1.916 0.242 1.42 2.74 0.1030* 0.4550* -0.2760* 0.0149* 1 
6. Mean GDP of 
Committee members (ln) 6.049 0.620 4.94 7.03 0.2587* 0.2615* -0.1843* 0.0249 0.6415* 
7. Sites of Committee 
members (%) 0.369 0.117 0 0.67 0.2344* 0.0870* 0.1072* 0.1324* 0.1682* 
8. Rule system age at rule 
birth 7.328 6.465 0 22 -0.0344 0.1763* -0.1597* -0.0543* 0.2908* 
9. Substantive rule 
(dummy) 0.217 0.412 0 1 -0.0321 0.0175 -0.0265 -0.0168 0.0329 
10. Change in budget 
(millions $) 14.72 52.258 -125.26 107.46 0.3134* -0.0565* 0.2097* -0.0722* -0.2426* 
11. IUCN resolutions and 
recommendations 24.18 38.562 0 118 0.4155* 0.2229* -0.4634* -0.4990* 0.1017* 
12. ICOMOS charters 0.32 0.710 0 3 0.1116* 0.1006* -0.2376* -0.028 0.1744* 
* p < 0.05 
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Table 5.1 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Variables Used in 
Models of Time until Rule Change 
 
 6 7 8 9 10 11 
6. Mean GDP of 
Committee members (ln) 1      
7. Sites of Committee 
members (%) 0.4066* 1     
8. Rule system age at rule 
birth 0.2189* -0.1032* 1    
9. Substantive rule 
(dummy) 0,0219 -0.0349 0.2005* 1   
10. Change in budget 
(millions $) 0.1515* 0.1644* -0.0312 -0.0182 1  
11. IUCN resolutions and 
recommendations 0.2142* 0.0333 0.0602* 0.0088 -0.0184 1 
12. ICOMOS charters -0.0069 -0.1469* 0.1092* 0.0118 -0.0047 0.0054 
* p < 0.05 
 
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for all variables are given in Table 5.1. As 
already mentioned, the total number rules created between 1977 and 2004 as part of the 
Operational Guidelines document was 180, of which 22% were substantive, and the 
remaining 78% procedural. Most of the rules (72%) experienced at least one change 
(revision or suspension) during the observation period, and the total number of changes 
that we observed was 186. The mean number of changes to a rule was 1.3, while the 
maximum number of changes was seven.21
                                                            
21 Compare, for example, with Beck and Kieser’s (2003: 802) study, where the mean number of changes was 2.4, while the maximum was 50. The 
difference in the maximum has to do with the fact that UNESCO’s WHP’s Operational Guidelines were revised much more rarely than the personnel 
rules of the Bank studied by these authors. 
 As in previous research (e.g., March et al., 
2000), the vast majority of rule changes were revisions (81%), while the proportion of 
suspensions was much smaller (19%). In total, only 21% of all rules were suspended 
before the end of the observation period. The mean rule version age, was 6.9 years 
(SD=5.7), while the maximum was 27 years (i.e. the whole observation period). 
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Table 5.2: Log-logistic AFT Models of Time until Rule Change, 1977-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Technical factors         
Change in staff  -0.005***  -0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Sites inscribed  -0.057***  -0.043*** 
  (0.007)  (0.004) 
Change in number of States Parties  -0.383***  -0.038 
  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Political factors         
Committee turnover   -0.082 0.130 
   (0.227) (0.217) 
Mean cultural distance   0.625 2.747*** 
   (0.735) (0.796) 
Mean GDP of Committee members (ln)   -0.400*** -0.213 
   (0.123) (0.136) 
Sites of Committee members (%)   -9.217*** -5.678** 
   (1.818) (2.454) 
Controls         
Rule System Age at Rule Birth 0.071** 0.023 -0.004 -0.011 
 (0.030) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) 
Substantive rule 0.033 0.066 0.068 0.062 
 (0.209) (0.170) (0.148) (0.142) 
Change in budget -0.006*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
IUCN resolutions and recommendations 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
ICOMOS charters 0.261*** 0.340*** 0.030 0.435*** 
 (0.053) (0.069) (0.074) (0.097) 
Constant 3.752*** 7.298*** 8.408*** 2.994 
 (0.152) (0.386) (2.543) (2.739) 
Gamma 0.839*** 0.690*** 0.621*** 0.587*** 
 (0.033) (0.042) (0.052) (0.050) 
Observations 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916 
Log-likelihood -763.93 -672.46 -666.76 -622.41 
Chi-square† 82.42*** 265.36*** 276.76*** 365.46*** 
Degrees of freedom 5 8 9 12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
† Likelihood ratio comparing the focal model to the model without any covariates 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
159 
 
Table 5.2 presents log-logistic accelerated failure-time models of rule change. 
Model 1 shows the effect of control variables only, while in Models 2 and 3 technical and 
political covariates are added, respectively. Finally, in Model 4 both sets of covariates, as 
well as controls, are entered simultaneously in a full model. Note that the fit of Model 4 is 
significantly better compared to when either set of covariates is included separately (see 
Models 2 and 3). The likelihood ratio that compares Models 2 and 4 is -2(-
672.46+622.41)=100.1, which is significant (p<0.01, 4 degrees of freedom). The 
likelihood ratio that compares Models 3 and 4 is -2(-582.58+565.28)=88.7, which is again 
significant (p<0.01, 3 degrees of freedom). 
The results broadly support a model of bureaucratic change in which both 
technical and political factors play a role. In Model 4, two of the three technical covariates 
and two of the four political covariates show significant effects (p<0.05), which suggests 
that neither set of effects is epiphenomenal relative to the other. Overall, Model 4 provides 
support for four out of seven hypotheses regarding the predicted direction of the effects of 
the various factors. Considering technical factors first, change in staff appears to reduce 
time until rule change (p<0.01), supporting hypothesis 1a. Similarly, the number of sites 
inscribed, has a significant (p<0.01) and negative effect on event-time, supporting 
hypothesis 2b. Inscribing more sites on the WHL appears to shorten the time until the next 
rule change. Hypothesis 1c, however, is not supported in this model; growth in the number 
of States Parties to the WHC appears to have no significant effect on time until rule change 
rather when controlling for political factors. Thus, for two out of three aspects of 
organizational growth, the results seem to suggest that organizational rule systems seem to 
become more unstable following periods of positive growth. 
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Turning now to political covariates in Model 4, the political perspective receives 
mixed support. Specifically, the coefficient of turnover of States represented on the 
Committee is positive and not statistically significant. Hypothesis 2a, which predicted a 
negative effect of turnover on time until rule change, must therefore be rejected. The effect 
of average cultural distance (a proxy for heterogeneity) on event-time is positive and 
significant (p<0.01), supporting hypothesis 2b. When the average cultural distance among 
the States represented on the Committee becomes higher, rule change is delayed. Contrary 
to hypothesis 2c, (natural log of) mean GDP of Committee members has no significant 
effect on event-time in this model, even though the negative sign of the coefficient is in 
line with our prediction (see also Model 3). On the other hand, the overall normative power 
or prestige of Committee Members, measured by the percentage of sites that they have 
been able to inscribe on the WHL since the WHC entered into force, seems to have a 
significant negative effect on event-time (p<0.05). Thus, rules appear to change in 
response to the interests of States with greater normative power, in line with hypothesis 2d. 
Overall, these findings provide support for the influence of both technical and political 
factors, notably rule-makers’ heterogeneity and normative power, with respect to the latter. 
Models 2 and 3 examine the influence of technical and political factors separately. 
Both models show a significant (p<0.01) improvement in fit compared to when only 
control variables are included. The respective likelihood ratios comparing these models to 
Model 1 are -2(-763.93+672.46)=182.94 and -2(-763.93+666.76)=194.34. Interestingly, 
the results for political factors differ between Models 3 and 4. Specifically, in Model 3, the 
coefficient of average cultural distance is no longer statistically significant. At the same 
time, the coefficient of the variable measuring mean GDP of the States members of the 
Committee is significant in this model (p<0.01). The coefficient is negative, suggesting 
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that participation of states with a higher level of remunerative power tends to accelerate 
rule change, as per hypothesis 2c. The other results for political covariates remain the 
same. The results for technical covariates do not change between Models 2 and 4, with the 
exception of the variable measuring change in the number of States Parties to the WHC, 
which is significant (p<0.01) in model 2. The coefficient is negative, in line with 
hypothesis 1c. 
The results for the control variables (Model 1) are also noteworthy. Positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.01) parameters of IUCN and ICOMOS outputs indicate that 
these institutional variables extend the time until a rule is changed. This is surprising, since 
we expected them to have the opposite effect. A possible explanation of this unexpected 
finding could be that the charters, resolutions and recommendation adopted by the advisory 
bodies act as a kind of substitute for changes to the Operational Guidelines (cf. March et 
al., 2000: 59). The slope parameter, gamma, is significant (p<0.01) and smaller than 1, 
which indicates that the hazard of rule change first increases with time (since rule birth or 
previous revision), and then falls. This is in line with a study by Schulz (1998b), who 
argued that the hazard of rule revision should increase with time (due to rule 
obsolescence), but at a decreasing rate, and found some empirical support for this based on 
the same dataset used by March and associates (2000). Beck and Kieser (2003) also found 
a similar effect using a different dataset. The models used by these authors differed from 
ours, however. They included natural log of version age directly as a covariate in an 
exponential model. 
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5.6 Discussion and conclusion 
The findings of this study suggest that both the technical and political perspectives are 
necessary in order to understand why bureaucratic organizations change their rules and 
when they will be more likely to do so. With regard to technical contingencies, we found 
that the formal rules of UNESCO’s World Heritage Program were more likely to change 
following larger increases (or smaller decreases) in organizational size, and specifically in 
the number of administrative staff and amount of service output. With regard to political 
factors, we found that rule makers’ cultural heterogeneity delayed rule changes, while rule 
makers’ normative power accelerated them. 
Our study makes three contributions to research on bureaucratic rule change and 
organizational change more broadly. First, we extend earlier models of rule change, which 
focused primarily on the effects of the characteristics of individual rules and the broader 
rule system, such as rule age and the number of rules (Beck & Kieser, 2003; March et al., 
2000), by incorporating the influence of the rulemaking body. We do so by drawing on the 
literature on organizational politics and upper echelons (e.g., Finkelstein, 1992; Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984; Ocasio, 1994). Although not all of our predictions regarding the effects of 
political factors were fully supported, our results do suggest that the incidence (or at least 
the finalization) of rule changes is dependent on the power and heterogeneity of actors 
participating in the rulemaking process. The fact that these political covariates continue to 
have a significant effect even when controlling for a number of technical, rule-specific and 
institutional forces calls into question the assumption that the behavior of actors 
responsible for adjusting organizational structure is limited to mere mediation of the effect 
of technical contingencies (Donaldson, 2001), institutional forces (DiMaggio & Powell, 
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1983) or processes associated with time-dependence of rule change, such as experiential 
learning or institutionalization (Beck & Kieser, 2003; March et al., 2000; Schulz, 2003). 
Second, and more broadly, the renewed emphasis on the political dimension of 
rulemaking has implications for bureaucracy theory (e.g. Heugens, 2005; Walton, 2005; 
Weiss, 1983). Our findings suggest that the influential Weberian image of bureaucracy as 
an ‘iron cage’ that constrains its officials, subjecting them to the disciplining logic of 
technical rationality (Weber, 1978), needs to be reconsidered. The very bars of the iron 
cage, which are formed by rational-legal rules, can be altered by bureaucratic officials with 
sufficient power to do so.. This revised image of bureaucracy sheds new light on some of 
this form’s well-known dysfunctions. Clearly, the operation of bureaucracies can be 
hampered by the failure to implement timely repairs to rules as they are becoming obsolete 
or inappropriate for the task at hand (Schulz, 2003), which is a form of bureaucratic inertia 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Merton, 1940). Such inertia might be linked to technical 
factors, such as organizational size and age (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Haveman, 1993), 
but also to political factors, such as administrators’ vested interests in existing rules (Walsh 
& Dewar, 1987). Our results provide partial support the idea that delays in rule change are 
sometimes caused by the political side of bureaucracy, and in particular, cultural 
heterogeneity among rule makers. Yet, they also challenge “the received understanding of 
power as a source of inertia” (Barnett & Carroll, 1995: 222) by showing how rule makers’ 
power in formal decision making meetings actually enables rule change. 
Third, and finally, our arguments and analyses contribute to technical and 
political approaches to organizational change (e.g. Haveman, 1993; Goodstein & Boeker, 
1991; Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007) by developing and testing the implications of these 
approaches for incremental organizational change. Incremental or piecemeal change in 
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organizations is largely neglected in this literature, perhaps because it is seen as rather 
mundane or trivial (but see March, 1981) or because normative theories of organizations 
have emphasized the virtues of radical change vis-à-vis incremental change (Miller & 
Friesen, 1982). Apart from research into rule change (e.g. March et al., 2000) and job 
change (Miner, 1991) in organizations, studies of incremental organizational change 
remain by and large confined to the qualitative research tradition in administrative science 
(e.g., Blau, 1955; Howard-Grenville, 2005). Our results indicate that some of the 
arguments in previous research concerning the effects of size (Haveman, 1993), decision 
maker heterogeneity (Goodstein et al., 1994) and power (Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007) that 
explicitly or implicitly focused on radical change, also generalize to incremental change. 
However, we did not find a significant effect of decision maker turnover, even though this 
factor is highlighted in the literature on organizational change during turnaround (Barker 
III, Patterson Jr, & Mueller, 2001). These results point to the need to further test the 
robustness of change theories across different types of change.  
 
5.6.1 Limitations and Future Research 
Naturally, our study has a number of limitations that are important to bear in mind when 
considering its results. First, the admittedly unconventional research setting of UNESCO’s 
World Heritage program can raise concerns about the generalizability of our findings to 
other kinds of bureaucratic organizations. While we cannot rule out the possibility that 
some of our findings may indeed be specific to our research setting, the fact that our most 
important findings regarding the effects of heterogeneity and power are in line with 
previous research (e.g., Goodstein et al., 1994; Van Witteloostuijn & De Jong, 2008) give 
us some confidence in their generalizability. Moreover, the factors that we examined in 
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this study, such as organizational growth and decision makers’ turnover, heterogeneity and 
power can expected to be relevant for rulemaking in any organization, and indeed for other 
forms of incremental formal change, such as changes in organizational jobs (Miner, 1991) 
and possibly even adoption of incremental workflow-process innovations (e.g., Adler & 
Borys, 1996). Future research can build on our study by exploring these possibilities. 
Second, while we would have welcomed the opportunity to replicate our results 
based on another body of rules from a different program of UNESCO in order to increase 
their credibility, we were unable to find a body of rules, the history of which was nearly as 
well-documented in the organization’s archive as that of the World Heritage Operational 
Guidelines. Thus, we were forced to rely on a single case, albeit with multiple observations 
over time and across sub-units (i.e. rules).  
Third, the data imposed some limitations on the analyses that we were able to 
perform. For example, we would have liked to include additional control variables, 
especially those capturing the heterogeneity among individual rules in terms of their 
content or subject matter (cf. Beck & Kieser, 2003), but the limited number of rules in the 
Guidelines meant that we could not include these variable. The limited length of the 
observation period and the fact that we were forced to use annual spells similarly meant 
that we could not include additional time-varying covariates. This may also explain why 
some of the variables are no longer significant in the full model. Moreover, we were forced 
to exclude measures of rule mass (Beck & Kieser, 2003) and absolute measures of 
organizational size due to collinearity problems. Future research may provide a more fine-
grained perspective on rule change by differentiating between revisions and suspensions 
(Schulz, 2003) or by considering different kinds of revisions, which we again were unable 
to do due to the limited number of observations. 
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Fourth, as is often the case with archival research on organizational rules (March 
et al., 2000), it is difficult to rule out alternative explanations for our findings, which may 
be at odds with those that we provided as part of the argumentation for our hypotheses. For 
example, more rule change may follow Committee sessions, in which participants have a 
higher representation on the WHL, not because such representation gives them normative 
power, but because the participants have a greater stake in the content of the Guidelines 
(e.g. the need for international assistance in maintaining and conserving the properties), 
which makes them more likely to push for rule changes. Similarly, the causal mechanism 
responsible for the effect of growth in service output on rule change may not involve 
generation of organizational problems, as we argued, but some other unobserved process. 
Many of the issues raised by our study can be addressed by future research. For 
instance, while we have shown that political factors matter for change, we did not 
differentiate between their effects on the content of change and the process of change 
(Barnett & Carroll, 1995: 219). Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that political 
factors mainly affect the timing of change, while the substantive nature of what is changed 
remains more or less determined by technical considerations (Donaldson, 1987: 20). 
Further research is therefore needed not only to test whether the influence of political 
factors can be sufficiently strong to push the organization away from the change path 
predicted by theories focusing on organizational adaptation to task-environmental 
contingencies (cf. Child, 1972b), but also to uncover the organizational and environmental 
conditions that are especially conducive to politically-driven organizational change. 
Despite the prominence it gained in the early 1980s (e.g. Pfeffer, 1981) and its 
incorporation into the more recent neo-institutional research program (e.g., Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996), the political perspective has still not achieved consistent recognition as an 
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independent framework for explaining organizational change (e.g., Barnett & Carroll, 
1995). At least one likely reason for this is the paucity of studies that explicitly test this 
perspective against competing theories (but see Hage & Dewar, 1973). We hope that our 
study would encourage future efforts in this direction. 
Future research could also explore potential interactions between technical and 
political factors, which we did not examine in this study. For example, it may be possible 
to develop proxies for the vesting of interests in certain rules, and then test whether rules 
with higher levels of vested interests are less likely to change in response to technical 
factors (Walsh & Dewar, 1987). A related question is whether the influence of political 
sources of inertia increases in the later stages of the rule system’s history, as argued by 
Walsh & Dewar (1987). It is also important to explore interactions between political and 
institutional factors affecting rule change as part of the broader research effort aimed at 
achieving closer integration between these two perspectives (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; 
Thornton, & Ocasio, 1999). Some progress in this direction has already been made in a 
recent study of rulemaking by Sullivan (2010), which combined factors related to 
organizational attention and institutional factors, like legislation, court cases and media 
exposure. And while allocation of attention by the upper echelon is certainly a key part of 
the political process in any organization (Ocasio, 1997), factors highlighted in this study, 
like actors’ power and heterogeneity, cannot be left out of the picture if we are to 
understand how political, technical and institutional factors combine or clash in generating 
organizational inertia or change. 
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Summary (Dutch) 
 
Theoriën in organisatiewetenschappen vormen een perspectief waarin formele of 
geschreven regels worden gezien als zijnde fundamenteel voor het inzicht in een 
organisatie. Betoogd wordt, bijvoorbeeld, dat formele regels organisatorische 
besluitvorming faciliteren, dat ze de basis voor coördinatie en controle vaststellen, en dat 
ze de geldigheid van een organisatie binnen de bredere institutionele omgeving helpen te 
vergroten. Zoals andere elementen van organisaties, veranderen ook de regels na verloop 
van tijd met mogelijke consequenties voor besluitvorming, coördinatie en geldigheid. Deze 
dissertatie neemt vragen op over de oorzaken van continuïteit en verandering van formele 
organisatorische regels, alsmede over bureaucratische organisatievormen in de bredere zin. 
Daarom is het bredere doel van deze dissertatie ons begrip van de dynamiek van 
bureaucratie, en van formele organisatorische regelsystemen in het bijzonder, te doen 
vooruitgaan. 
Het onderwerp over bureaucratische dynamiek blijft relevant, omdat 
organisatorische kenmerken die geassocieerd worden met bureaucratie, zoals specialisatie, 
hiërarchie, en vooral formalisering, overal in hedendaagse geïndustrialiseerde 
samenlevingen blijven. Elementen van bureaucratie kunnen gevonden worden in een 
deelverzameling van Silicon Valley high-tech bedrijven (Baron, Burton, and Hannan, 
1999), in een software-ontwikkeling bedrijf (Adler, 2005), en een groot consultatie bedrijf 
(Kärreman, Sveningsson, & Alvesson, 2002). In hun studie van een Duitse bank 
identificeerden Beck en Kieser (2003) 246 verschillende personeelsregels en vonden dat 
deze ongeveer 655 keer waren veranderd in een tijdspanne van slechts 18 jaar, wat 
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aangeeft dat aanpassing van bureaucratische structuur in geen geval een triviale taak is 
voor bedrijfsorganisaties. 
Zoals reeds vermeld, de reikwijdte van deze dissertatie zal voor het grootste deel 
beperkt zijn tot de antecedenten van de dynamiek van de bureaucratie/regels (in 
tegenstelling tot de resultaten ervan). Bij het onderzoeken van zulke antecedenten, zal 
speciale aandacht worden besteed aan de rol van actoren. Veel studies naar de dynamiek 
van formele organisatie presenteren nog steeds een ietwat passieve weergave van actoren, 
in de zin dat actoren impliciet worden verondersteld de formele structuur slechts aan te 
passen in reactie op diverse organisatorische en omgevings omstandigheden zoals 
verandering van omvang van de organisatie , onzekerheid in de omgeving, regel 
veroudering, vallende prestaties, institutionele eisen, enzovoorts (bijvoorbeeld March, 
Schulz, & Zhou, 2000), wat de indruk geeft van passiviteit aan de zijde van actoren in het 
bemiddelen van de effecten van deze beperkingen. Verschillende hoofdstukken in deze 
dissertatie zijn het niet eens met deze (impliciete) weergave van actoren.  
Onze geprefereerde theoretische strategie, welke is geïnspireerd door het structuur 
en agentschap debat in organisatorisch institutionalisme (bijvoorbeeld DiMaggio, 1988; 
Heugens & Lander, 2009), is het verleggen van de focus van de uitleg van de omgevings 
en organisatorische omstandigheden en beperkingen van welke worden aangenomen 
onomwonden bemiddeld te worden door reactie van actoren, naar het bemiddelings-proces 
zelf. We focussen op de meer "actieve" verklarende rol van actoren door het wijzen op de 
causale relevantie van hun belangen en strategische activiteiten (hoofdstuk 2), reflexiviteit 
(hoofdstuk 4) en het vermogen macht uit te oefenen bij het nastreven van conflicterende 
belangen (hoofdstuk 5).  
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Een andere bijdrage van deze dissertatie is het verder ontwikkelen van bepaalde 
bestaande concepten, alsmede het introduceren van een aantal nieuwe, en te pleiten voor 
het nut van deze concepten denkend aan bureaucratie en regels. Bijvoorbeeld, hoofdstuk 2 
ontwikkelt het concept van persistentie van organisatievormen (bureaucratische vormen in 
het bijzonder) door onderscheid te maken tussen drie paden van persistentie. Hoofdstuk 3 
ontwikkelt het concept van de geheugen functie van de formalisering, wat manieren 
voorstelt variatie in de sterkte van deze functie uit te leggen. Hoofdstuk 4 gaat over Schulz 
(1998a) zijn idee dat regels problemen kunnen absorberen en biedt een uitgebreide analyse 
van het 'probleem absorbtie' proces en de gevolgen hiervan. Door de gehele dissertatie, 
proberen wij te werken met een breed scala aan theoretische perspectieven en literatuur, in 
plaats van het beperken van het toepassingsgebied van de dissertatie tot een 
welomschreven onderzoeksprobleem, of theoretische traditie. 
De vier belangrijkste hoofdstukken die deze dissertatie omvatten nemen tamelijk 
verschillende benaderingen van het onderwerp van bureaucratische dynamiek aan en 
kunnen onafhankelijk van elkaar gelezen worden. De eerste drie grote hoofdstukken zijn 
conceptueel, terwijl hoofdstuk 5 een longitudinale empirische studie van de regel 
dynamiek bij een intergouvernmentele organisatie (UNESCO Werelderfgoed programma) 
is. 
Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt het lot van de bureaucratische organasatievorm, welke kan 
worden geïnstantieerd door meerdere organisaties, op het macro-maatschappelijke niveau. 
Naar aanleiding van de institutionele opvatting dat samenlevingen meerdere 
organisatorische velden omvatten (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), suggereert het dat het lot 
van de bureaucratie kan verschillen tussen deze velden. De centrale bewering van het 
hoofdstuk is echter dat bureaucratie blijft, of blijft heersen als een organisatievorm in veel 
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van deze velden, en dus in de samenleving in het groot. Echter, tegelijkertijd met 
volharding, kan een bureaucratievorm ook een bepaalde graad van trasformatie ondergaan, 
die aanleiding geeft tot verschillende 'persistentie paden'. Het falen van veel velden om te 
de-bureaucratiseren (dwz bureaucratische persistentie) samen met een aantal 
veranderingen aan de vorm zelf welke het mogelijk maken te volharden (dwz persistentie 
paden) zijn de twee dynamiek speerpunten die dit hoofdstuk behandelt. Het spoort de 
antecedenten van deze dynamiek aan de institutionele inbedding en politieke interacties 
van verschillende professionele / deskundige groepen in de laat-industriële samenlevingen, 
op. 
In de andere drie hoofdstukken is het niveau van de analyse een enkele 
organisatie. Deze hoofdstukken houden zicht bezig met wat er gebeurt binnen een 
organisatie dat een aantal kenmerken van bureaucratie laat zien, zoals formele regels en 
hiërarchie. Het dynamiek speerpunt in hoofdstuk 3 is het gehele proces van formalisering, 
welke zowel de vaststelling en wijziging van een organisatorisch regelsysteem via 
codificatie, als het handhavingsproces gericht op het verbinden van regels tot actie. Dit 
hoofdstuk richt zich op de consequenties van dit proces voor organisatorisch geheugen. In 
het specifiek, we identificeren een aantal factoren dat invloed heeft op de capaciteit van 
formele regels en regel-achtige documenten zoals procedures en handleidingen om 
gegevens uit het verleden te bewaren zodat het gebruikt kan worden in toekomstige 
belsuitvorming. Wij bieden een aantal onderzoeksvoorstellen aan om onze bredere 
bewering te illustreren dat het vermogen van formele systemen dienend als bewaarplaatsen 
van organisatorisch geheugen afhangt van de verschillende activiteiten van het 
fomaliserings proces. De ideeën die zijn ontwikkeld in dit hoofdstuk kunnen toekomstig 
onderzoek informeren over formele regels en organisatorisch geheugen.  
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Hoofdstuk 4 gaat verder met het thema van regel-gebruik waar al op wordt 
gewezen in hoofdstuk 3. Tsoukas en Chia (2002) nagaande, pleiten we in hoofdstuk 4 dat 
het gebruik van formele regels een belangrijke dynamiek genereert, namelijk wijzigingen 
van de categorieën van deze regels. We indentificeren probleem-absorptie (Schulz, 1998a) 
als de voornaamste bron van zulke wijzigingen. In tegenstelling tot eerdere literatuur, die 
stelt dat probleem absorptie bijdraagt aan de stabiliteit van formele regels, pleiten wij 
ervoor dat, vanwege het effect dat het heeft op de categoriën, het ook kan leiden tot 
veranderingen in de werkelijke tekst van formele regels onder bepaalde voorwaarden. Dus 
het hoofdstuk behandelt ook een andere dynamiek, namelijk formele regel-wijziging 
(herziening of schorsing). Verbindingen met het concept van organisatorisch leren zijn ook 
gemaakt in dit hoofdstuk.  
Hoofdstuk 5 tenslotte kijkt weer naar formele regel-wijziging als het dynamisch 
speerpunt, onderzoekend hoe het wordt beïnvloedt door verschillende antecedenten (vgl. 
Beck & Kieser, 2003). De antecedenten behandeld in dit hoofdstuk omvatten verschillende 
aspecten van organisatorische groei, evenals kenmerken van het orgaan dat de regels 
opstelt. De empirische context voor dit hoofdstuk is het UNESCO Werelderfgoed 
Programma. We verzamelden archief data over de evolutie van een specifiek regel-boek, te 
weten de Operationele Richtlijnen voor de implementatie van het Wereld Erfgoed Verdrag, 
tussen 1977 en 2004. We maken onderscheid tussen twee theoretische perspectieven op 
organisatorische verandering, namelijk het technische en het politieke perspectief, en 
ontlenen een aantal hypothesen over de antecedenten van regel verandering op de basis van 
deze perspectieven. Deze hypothesen zijn vervogens getest door het toepassen van de 
statistische technieken van de analyse van de geschiedenis van gebeurtenissen op de 
UNESCO data. 
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Kortom, deze dissertatie analyseert verschillende vormen van bureaucratische 
dynamiek en ontwikkelt een aantal verklaringen van deze dynamiek. Twee van deze 
verklaringen zijn empirisch getest. Deze dissertatie draagt bij tot het begrijpen van hoe en 
waarom bureaucratieën in de loop der tijd veranderen.  
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ESSAYS ON BUREAUCRACY AND FORMAL RULES
Theories of bureaucracy in organization studies constitute a perspective in which formal
or written rules are seen as fundamental to the understanding of organization. It is argued,
for example, that formal rules facilitate organizational decision-making, establish the basis
for coordination and control, and help to increase an organization’s legitimacy within the
broader institutional environment. Like other elements of organizations, rules also change
over time with potential consequences for decision-making, coordination, and legitimacy.
This dissertation takes up questions about the causes of continuity and change of formal
organizational rules, as well as of bureaucratic organizational forms more broadly. The
first conceptual essay (Chapter 2) starts with the observation that bureau cracy is a remark -
ably persistent organizational form and suggests that the reproduction or transformation
of this form and its prevalence in various organizational fields depends on the agency and
interaction of different expert groups. In Chapter 3, we present a conceptual account of
the dynamic process of codification and enforcement of formal rules and its influence on
the preservation and retrieval of organizational memory via these rules. In Chapter 4, we
offer a conceptual account of how the process of using existing formal rules to deal with
new organizational problems can ultimately lead to change in such rules. Finally, Chapter 5
reports the results of a longitudinal empirical study of rule changes in UNESCO’s World
Heritage Program. We find that that rule makers’ cultural heterogeneity tends to delay
rule changes, while rule makers’ normative power tends to accelerate them.
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